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ABSTRACT

Several extreme events are examined in this dissertation to better understand the
implications of such events for expanding the existing knowledge of crisis leadership.
Through interviews with leaders that had direct leadership roles in extreme events such as
the Fukushima nuclear reactor explosions, Deepwater Horizon oilrig explosion, and
Super Storm Sandy, in addition to national leadership, e.g. White House Situation Room,
an in-depth, cross-case analysis of leadership in extreme crises is presented. Previous
literature concludes that the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event
itself in determining the outcome of a disaster but due to the rarity of these events, there
has been limited scholarly consideration of the implications of these events for leadership
research and practice. Using an inductive, qualitative approach to analyze the interviews,
the results lead to several conclusions. First, there is a need for this and additional
research to clarify the meaning or unique challenges that define the characteristics of an
extreme event crisis especially in the most extreme cases. Second, the importance of the
effects of felt emotions including mortality salience on extreme leadership is profound on
the thinking and actions of leaders in these events. Third, classic crisis management and
leadership theories are insufficient for explaining the needed actions in responding to
extreme events.
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These conclusions were integrated with prior research to develop a model of crisis
leadership based on a continuum of crisis events from routine to extreme. This model is
developed around six leadership concepts either identified in prior research or developed
based on the findings of this study. The model also identifies threshold points where
routine crisis events become more extreme. At these threshold points the demands on all
actors in the event, especially the leaders, become more non-linear and can result in great
emotional influences on sensemaking and subsequent decision making. This dissertation
concludes that leadership in this context can almost exclusively be focused on life-saving,
and instinctual or emotional responses. Further the differences between leadership in
dangerous military and non-military domains are examined. The implication of these
findings for practitioners and future researchers is also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

A Qualitative Study of Extreme Event Leadership
As the world ―flattens‖ (Friedman, 2006) exposure of more populations to the
risks of extreme events expands. An extreme events is defined as ―a discrete episode or
occurrence that may result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical,
psychological, or material consequences to or in close physical or psycho-social
proximity to organization members‖ (Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio & Caverretta, 2009, p.
898). A hundred years ago, in a simpler world, people considered a dam failure resulting
in hundreds of deaths an extreme event. Today, we prevent dam failures and many other
events of that scale; however, with the global expansion of our world, we are vulnerable
to extreme events on a more massive scale. For example, with extensive worldwide
participation in air travel by different cultures, epidemics, e.g., SARS, are likely to spread
much faster today than just a few decades ago (Lagadec, 2009).
With significant advances in communications technologies over the past decades,
we now also have the ability to create massive worldwide fear as extreme events occur
(Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio & Caverretta, 2009).

A recent example of the global

―flatness‖ and global fear caused by an extreme event is the Great Japan earthquake,
tsunami and Fukushima nuclear event of 2011. As the first web-streamed nuclear event,
it raised fears of a harmful radioactive plume reaching globally. Conversely, during the
Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986) there were few pictures of the accident as the event
transpired. In fact, the world did not learn of the event until several days afterwards
when radiation appeared in milk in neighboring countries. During the Fukushima event,
cameras showed the world the explosion of nuclear reactors in real-time. Real-time
15

images of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear event exacerbated fear around the world
and thus added to the social disaster. This social disaster resulted in a major leadership
challenge for not only the Japanese but much of the international leadership community
as well. The international context altered the management of the crisis in Japan and the
manner in which their leaders resolved the event. That context raises questions regarding
how the existing crisis leadership theories address the new era of extreme events.
According to some researchers (Dynes, 1974; Dynes, Quarentelli & Kreps, 1981),
the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event itself in determining the
outcome of a disaster. A leader‘s ability to control fear and to mitigate the impact of a
crisis at the earliest point in the progression of the crisis to avoid turning a ―routine‖
crisis, e.g., a hurricane, into an extreme crisis, e.g., Hurricane Katrina, is critical.
Allowing a ―routine‖ crisis to cascade into an extreme event significantly increases the
leadership challenges. Additionally, in many ways the ―reach‖ of a crisis around the
globe, regardless of whether the crisis is man-made or natural, is increasing. Because of
the international political pressures brought to an event, the importance of understanding
extreme crisis leadership becomes even more important (Nafday, 2009).

Crisis

leadership in extreme events is a relatively underdeveloped domain of research (Boin,
2009). Through this research, a better understanding of crisis leadership in extreme
events emerged.
In sum, the world is shrinking; extreme events by nature and impact are growing;
modern communications systems are expanding fear; leadership of extreme events
increases in complexity; and the crisis management research is struggling to explain the
theories in these contexts (Mikusova, 2011).
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This research intends to expose the

theoretical elements of this new era of extreme events and gather up those elements to
understand better their theoretical linkages. My hope is to extend or discover leadership
theories or insights that explain those linkages. Then new theories allow leaders to
understand better the effective approaches to resolving the modern extreme event.
Finding these theories might help turn the modern dam failure, e.g., Fukushima, into a
manageable crisis.
Research Threads
Many different research threads exist in the extreme crisis literature. There are
few links among the theories or systematic approaches to crisis management theory
building (Mikusova, 2011). There are three important areas of research gaps or threads
identified in the existing crisis management literature (Mikusova, 2011): first, there is a
tendency for researchers to oversimplify insights from the more routine crisis; second is
the multiplicity of researchers who study in this domain; and finally, researchers tend to
miss the changing nature of crisis over time. The next few paragraphs will describe these
treads in detail.
One thread comes from the methodology used by a number of researchers.
Mikusova (2011) describes the existing body of crisis management literature as ―the
Tower of Babel1‖. Many researchers simplify the research by studying more routine
events such as first responders and then attempt to extrapolate their insights to extreme

1

“The Tower of Babel is a story told in the Book of Genesis of the Bible. According to the story, a united humanity of the
generations following the Great Flood, speaking a single language and migrating from the east, came to the land of Shinar, where they
resolved to build a city with a tower "whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon
the face of the whole earth‖. God came down to see what they did and said: "They are one people and have one language, and nothing
will be withheld from them which they purpose to do‖. "Come, let us go down and confound their speech‖. And so God scattered
them upon the face of the Earth, and confused their languages, so that they would not be able to return to each other, and they left off
building the city, which was called Babel "because God there confounded the language of all the Earth."‖ (In Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia. Retrieved 20:43, March 1, 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tower_of_Babel&oldid=540947902)
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events. This research fails to grasp all of the complications that come from extreme
events, and it limits the appropriate insights.
Further, the second research gap or thread discussed by Mikusova (2011)
concludes that scientists from many disciplines have added to the research of crisis
management, studying it from their perspective with their own context, language,
theories, and approaches. Consequently, as illustrated in the literature review in this
dissertation, this haphazard approach, while resulting in a broad scope of crisis leadership
insights, neglects to create an integrated theory of leadership in extreme events.
Finally, Boin (2009) describes a significant research thread in the crisis
management literature that has come with the changing nature of crisis over time. Boin
(2009) concludes that few researchers have delved into ―transboundary‖ effects of crisis.2
This insight relates to the ―flattening‖ of our cultures and thus the corresponding ―reach‖
of a crisis. The reach of a crisis may not only physically transcend national boundaries,
e.g., SARS, but certainly, with communications advances the reach has expanded the
potential for fear across national boundaries.

Further, his analysis of the crisis

management literature has highlighted a heavy concentration of articles focused on the
United States and Canada with a scarcity of research about transboundary effects in Asia.
Additionally, Lettieri, et al. (2009) discovered gaps in crisis management
literature including the lack of research on setback management, policy mapping,
capacity mapping, and incident command. Those research threads all involve routine
crisis preparation, not extreme crisis leadership. While these gaps identified by Lettieri,

2

The definition of the transboundary crisis considers the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems, functions, or infrastructures
that are threatened by the crisis and cause uncertainty of outcomes. Essentially, the transboundary effects are different from a routine
crisis in that the effects involve the coupling of systems within and among countries (Boin, 2009).
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et al. (2009) are important, because they do not directly apply to extreme events they are
not in the scope of this dissertation.
Research Directions
As illustrated in the current literature review, a new generation of crisis
management research has emerged in the last half-decade. Rather than focusing on the
basic elements of a crisis and its phases, the emerging research addresses strategic topics
such as sensemaking (Weick 1978), complexity (Mirvis, 1996), and failure theories
(Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Boin (2009) discusses three
current crisis management research directions. First, Boin (2009) highlights the need to
know and understand the political-leadership linkages involved in extreme events, that is,
how elected political leaders who are responsive to public outcry might influence the
decision-making of the leaders who are managing the crisis. The second direction is to
understand how resiliency of leaders and organizations influences how leaders respond to
events, that is, how firm or committed the leaders and the organization are to resolving
the crisis itself.

Might they lose their resolve under pressure from the public or

politicians? The last direction is to understand that these events necessitate the need for
deep thinking. Deep thinking is essentially sensemaking (Weick 1978). Extreme events
are very complicated and need a cognitive form of sensemaking well beyond that of a
routine crisis. Thus, given the intensity of these topics, I believe that a qualitative
methods approach would be useful in generating theory that links the research threads
together in a manner that explains the complicated leadership challenges during extreme
events.
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Consequently, my study conducted an in-depth investigation into these and other
directions by using a qualitative research methodology. Conger (1998) lays out a sound
case for the qualitative method. Driven mainly by the multi-dimensional aspects of
leadership, qualitative methods are best suited for understanding the ―whys‖ behind
research. This has led to heavy use of qualitative theory and case-study examination of
leadership in crisis contexts (House, 1977; Berlew, 1974; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Conger‘s
(1998) main caution in using qualitative methods is to ensure that researchers ―lead‖ by
not just cataloging leadership abilities but extensively investigating the unexpected and
unexplored aspects of leadership. An extensive review of Conger‘s (1998) insights
follows in the methods section of this dissertation. Several other serious methodological
issues exist when studying leadership using the qualitative approach. This dissertation
addresses those issues in the literature and methods sections.
Next, this dissertation reviews the extant literature around crisis management.
My qualitative research tends to follow the methodologies of contemporary researchers
such as Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) who offer a number of recommendations to
qualitative researchers, two of which address how researchers should approach the extant
literature. The authors recommend that researchers identify clear research threads, and
justify why theory building is better than theory testing in addressing those gaps. In
addition, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that qualitative research rests on broad
research threads involving interesting phenomena and lack of associated theory; this
gives the researcher the potential to develop new theories. Given that the domain of
crisis leadership is relatively broad, a literature review beforehand is not only helpful but

20

also necessary in determining the scope of the research and identifying clear research
threads.
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CHAPTER 2: EXTREME EVENT LITERATURE

This literature review provides an overview of the existing state of research in extreme
crisis management. It establishes a broad foundation for guiding my qualitative study of
leadership in extreme contexts. Normally, when using quantitative methods, researchers
hone their foundational hypotheses through deductive reviews of the literature. My study
uses an inductive approach; therefore, the overview of the existing literature allows for
post-hoc incorporation of the observations and results made in the research.
Incorporating my findings with the existing literature complements the commonalities,
differences, and extensions of the existing extreme crisis management theories.

In

addition, by providing a broad perspective of the literature, this review highlights specific
areas of focus for my qualitative analysis.

By providing a broad overview of the

literature first, I identify the concepts that led to specific questions that I developed for
interview subjects. Additionally, in this review, I summarize, where applicable, the focus
areas that inform the qualitative method used in my research.
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Figure 1 - Flowchart of Research

The literature review is necessarily dense.

The literature review intends to

capture a broad perspective of crisis leadership in extreme events to avoid biasing the
qualitative research. Nevertheless, because this literature review is dense, I provide a
general roadmap that depicts the fundamental process that is contained in this dissertation
(Figure 1, Flowchart of Research).

I discuss many theories, characteristics of both

extreme events and leadership, and methods in this section. Appendices A-D capture the
essential points made in throughout the literature review.

The summaries in the

Appendices allow for post-hoc simplicity. Figure 1 shows that after the interviews, the
data is screened to ensure that the event meets the definition of an extreme event. If the
data meets the extreme event definition, then I proceeded to conduct the qualitative
review. I compared the output of the qualitative review to the open research areas and
the characteristics of leadership. From that comparison, I built upon or generated new
theory.
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Characteristics of Extreme Events
In exploring the existing literature in detail, it is necessary to describe the
characteristics of extreme events. Outlining the characteristics of extreme events sets the
stage for an explanation of the subsequent theories and associated concepts explored by
researchers.

Appendix A provides a list of unified extreme event characteristics.

Characteristics of extreme events have implications on the concepts used to investigate
crisis leadership. For example, in some contexts, a ―crisis‖ might involve a threat to the
achievement of a corporate goal or layoff of workers. That threat is distinct from a threat
experienced under an extreme crisis condition, which might include life and death
situations; therefore, this implies that like concepts such as trust, or followership, among
others, can be non-linear (Thompson & Hunt 1997).

For example, in quantitative

leadership research, the construct of ―trust‖ is commonly included as a leadership
variable (Hannah, et al. 2009; Weick, 1978; Shrivastava, et al. 1988). In extreme events,
beyond the threshold of life and death, a survey or even an experiment struggle to
replicate the stress of a life and death situation, and therefore, those research methods are
slightly more limited than a deeper study based on the qualitative approach that actually
studies an extreme event. These non-linear effects are important as ―threshold‖ effects in
crisis events (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Concepts like trust may be linear up to the
point where life and death of the people involved become part of the decision-making.
Non-linearity suggests that beyond an undefined threshold, some concepts may take on
completely new meanings (Thompson & Hunt 1997; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
Threshold effects can influence the way researchers might measure concepts such
as trust (Thompson & Hunt 1997). Within the leadership literature, common leadership
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concepts take on an entirely new meaning in extreme crisis as compared to a routine
crisis, and the difference will affect the research methodology.

Thus, knowing the

specific characteristics of an extreme event becomes important not only in defining the
concepts but also in how one approaches the research methodology. This is one reason
that inductive research is appropriate in this domain. Inductive research through rich
discussions can explore and draw-out the issue of non-linear construct thresholds.
Section 2.12 covers extensively the science of inductive research on the non-linearity of
leadership.
My review of the literature did not yield a unified list of extreme event
characteristics. Some researchers have identified their own unique descriptions of the
characteristics of extreme events (Hannah, et al. 2009; Taleb, 2010).

Those

characteristics, as discussed in the following paragraphs, serve as part of a foundation for
the qualitative research.
The characteristics that differentiate a routine crisis from an extreme event are
important in defining an extreme event. I believe that those characteristics are also a
prime consideration for using the qualitative method in this research. Primarily there are
four differentiators of a routine crisis from an extreme event (Hannah, et al. 2009). First,
whereas crisis involves the threat to a high priority goal, e.g., a corporate or
organizational goal, the definition of an extreme event holds a tighter requirement. Such
threats must reach the threshold of ―intolerable magnitude‖ (Hannah, et al. 2009, p. 898)
where goals are imperative, such as life and death, and require a level of leadership much
beyond that of a routine crisis. I believe that the study of life and death situations, or
situations under which major damage to infrastructure, e.g., hurricanes, nuclear events,
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etc., requires a deep understanding of the parameters and decision-making involved in the
event as best investigated by qualitative methods.
Second, preparation time is a non-characteristic in describing the differences
between a routine crisis and an extreme crisis (Hannah, et al. 2009). One would think
that extreme events might come without warning and with little preparation time;
however, Hannah, et al. (2009) assert that organizations involved in extreme events may
have lengthy preparation time yet still be unprepared when the event occurs. Hannah, et
al. (2009) cite as an instance the U.S. military preparation for Operation Desert Storm.
For Operation Desert Storm, there was a lengthy force buildup prior to the event, yet
military planners did not comprehend all aspects of the ―crisis‖, for example, the
deliberate burning of oil wells. This characteristic implies that strategic considerations
are involved in the research of extreme events. Thus, through interviews of leaders
involved in the event, I discovered a deeper understanding of the leadership
considerations of readiness.
Third, ―probability‖ is an ingredient, but not necessarily a stand-alone
characteristic (Hannah, et al. 2009). Fire departments sometimes face severe fires that
might involve life and death, but that consideration alone is not enough to qualify as an
extreme event. Low probability must be accompanied with other characteristics, e.g., an
intolerable magnitude, to truly qualify as an extreme event; therefore, low probably is a
constituent characteristic of an extreme event but low probably alone is not enough. An
intense investigation of the probabilities and consequences is an essential element in
using the qualitative method in this research.
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Finally, the fourth characteristic separating a crisis from an extreme crisis is
―ambiguity of cause, effect, and means resolution‖ (Hannah, et al. 2009, p. 899).
Organizations may find themselves in an extreme crisis with the capacity to respond but
may not be able to execute the capacity adequately or may become hampered by
ineffective decision-making. This characteristic rests on the shoulders of leaders who
may be ineffectual in organizing the proper means of resolution. Through interviews I
delved deeply into the considerations and thought processes used by leaders in making
crucial decisions. Using open interview questioning I found that leaders ―opened-up‖
and were willing to explain how difficult the decision-making process is during extreme
events.
―Black Swan‖ events (Taleb, 2010) are events which come out of nowhere with
many unknown consequences. It seems that no one ever plans for Black Swan events, or
one does not recognize the possibility of an impossible catastrophe. Taleb (2010) focuses
on the human element that often ignores the possibility of Black Swan events. Taleb
(2010) provides five unique characteristics of human behavior that lead to blindness of
the possibility of Black Swan events. Those unique characteristics include confirmation
biases, narrative fallacy, lack of human imagination, signal theory (missing signals), and
ludic fallacy (tunnel vision).
In sum, while the characteristics of extreme events are not well defined in the
crisis literature, other theories, such as sensemaking, and transboundary theory offer more
insights into the characteristics involved in extreme events. Later in this dissertation is a
discussion of extreme event characteristics. Exploring the characteristics of an extreme
event is an important consideration in developing the concepts and is a foundation for the
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research. I use the extreme event characteristics to develop research areas and interview
questions.
Extreme Event Context
Defining extreme event context is the first step of the leadership concepts
discovery process. Hannah, et al. (2009) define extreme ―contexts‖ as:

Environments where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to
occur that may exceed the organization‘s capacity to prevent and result in an extensive
and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in
close physical or psycho-social proximity to—organization members (p. 898).

The difference between an extreme event and an extreme context is that extreme
contexts can involve multiple extreme events.

Some extreme events cascade into

extreme contexts. This is a very important concept that is essentially uncovered in the
research.

For instance, in Japan, the Great Eastern Earthquake (an extreme event)

cascaded into a tsunami (extreme event), which caused a nuclear meltdown (extreme
event), and resulted in a social disaster (extreme event); all four extreme events combined
to create an extreme context. This is likely to be one of the greatest extreme contexts
ever. Outside of war, humankind has rarely ever faced the forces of nature and the forces
of physics that the Japanese faced at that time. We remember that America bore the
brunt of several extreme contexts for example, the Great San Francisco earthquake,
Hurricane Katrina, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, to mention only three. In
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Fukushima, Japan, the extreme events leading to an extreme context all happened at one
time and in one place. The uniqueness of that context makes it rich in research potential.
Extreme contexts may be global in nature, likely unknown, and beyond the
control of the responsible organizations.

Lagadec (2009) terms the extreme event

context, as the ―Wilderness of the Unknown‖ (p. 478). Lagadec (2009) describes an
extreme event context as an unstable world with events that display a domino effect.
Theories Used in Extreme Event Research
Within this dissertation, I reviewed crisis theories, leadership theories and
decision-making theories, as those theories relate to extreme crisis management.
Extreme crisis leadership lies at the heart on a continuum of crises. Figure 2, Hierarchy
of Crisis Management Theories, depicts the relationships of major crisis leadership
theories to the continuum of crises. Crises range from the routine, to extreme, to Black
Swan and dangerous events. This dissertation focuses specifically on extreme crisis and
Black Swan and delves a little into the other ends of the crises leadership continuum
(routine and dangerous).
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Figure 2 - Hierarchy of Crisis Management Theories

Source: Casto 2014

As depicted in Figure 2, as the complexity of crisis increases, each of the crisis
management, leadership, and decision-making theories has special applicability. For
instance, readiness theory has special applicability to routine crises. Routine crisis are
frequent events, not complex and generally predictable.

Thus, for routine events,

readiness theory generally explains the type of crisis management needed for these
events, i.e., typically prevention and reaction. Crisis leaders do not need to possess
superior cognitive abilities to react to these types of events. Fire departments are a good
example of a ―readiness‖ organization that often faces routine crises. Readiness is less
effective and applicable for Black Swan events where by nature, events are rarely
predictable, thus unpreventable, and they are extremely complex requiring a superior
cognitive response by crisis leaders. As extreme events escalate into transboundary or
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international events, greater cognitive abilities are required of crisis leaders.
Understanding that demand for greater cognitive abilities for extreme events is an
essential point of this dissertation.
Next, this literature review catalogs the theories used in crisis management
literature (seen in Figure 2). My review finds that Sementelli‘s (2007) taxonomy of the
disaster and crisis theories is useful. Sementelli (2007) bundles a sampling of basic crisis
theories in an attempt to gain a broad perspective on the state of crisis literature and
theory. With regard to the applicability of leadership theories in crisis management,
Sementelli (2007) concludes that there is little in the way of leadership theory
development in the crisis literature.

Specifically, Sementelli (2007) concludes that

leadership theories remain ―heavily examined yet poorly understood‖ (p. 501) in the
crisis context. It appears that most researchers stay in their lane in that most researchers
do not compare and contrast theories. Apparently, most researchers approach the domain
strictly from their own perspectives and do not contrast their findings with extant
theories. I have integrated these theories with my research results. I develop a a theory
that integrates the existing literature as an expansion of the extreme crisis leadership
theories.
While Sementelli‘s (2007) taxonomy is thorough, because he focuses mainly on
the basic crisis research, it does omit several theories used in the crisis management
literature. Sementelli‘s (2007) focuses on decision, administrative readiness, economic,
and social theories, even though I found significant research in the more advanced
research areas of complexity, failure, sensemaking, and transboundary theories in the
literature. These areas will be reviewed later. Further, despite the research gaps or
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threads mentioned by Sementelli (2007) regarding cross-disciplinary research, there
appears to be some work not considered in his paper in the area of multi-team linkages
which is essentially cross-disciplinary research (e.g., DeChurch, et al. 2011; Gill, 2007).
Sementelli (2007) captures most of the theories used in the crisis management
literature. Nevertheless, my literature review consists of a brief summary of the insights
from the theories in Sementelli (2007) that I believe are most applicable to the extreme
context, including readiness, complexity, failure, sensemaking, transboundary, and
administrative (leadership and decision-making). These theories are necessary to provide
the overall landscape of the literature and serve as the foundation of my literature review.
The associated concepts were the starting point for my inductive approach to advance the
theories of extreme crisis management and crisis leadership. As stated earlier, there can
be many theoretical approaches to this topic. For completeness, I discuss a broad set of
theories; however, this dissertation ultimately focuses on administrative theories,
especially leadership theories. My goal with this literature review was to identify the
applicable concepts from the existent literature that enriched my qualitative study;
therefore, I review each theory for its specific application to extreme contexts.
Consolidation of Extreme Event Theoretical Concepts
Before I delve into each theory in detail, a brief overview of each theory and its
relationships is helpful. Table 1 - Matrix of Theoretical Relationships depicts how each
theory manages uncertainty, the related advantages and disadvantages of theory. The
goal of this research is to tie the research threads together in ways that explain leadership
in an extreme crisis. As shown in Table 1, each crisis theory has its own approach to
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dealing with a crisis (uncertainty), and some theories are better at explaining how leaders
should approach extreme events.

Table 1 – Matrix of Theoretical Relationships
Crisis Theories, Leadership &
Decision-making processes
Readiness

Uncertainty Management

Advantage(s)

Disadvantage(s)

Prevention

Based in educational theory Learning & preparation skills

Blind spots; Signal theory
flaws

Complexity

Absorbs

Somewhat antithetical to
organization theories

Failure

Acknowledges reality &
copes

Based in human behavior
theories - flexibility in
response
Recognizes latent
organizational errors &
human errors

Sensemaking

“Enacts” – frames

Shared understanding
Adaptation & innovation

Oversimplification; Optimism
bias; and pluralistic ignorance

Transboundary

Controls failure &
Mitigates impacts

Allows for “clumsy solutions”
& creative thinking

Highways for failure &
escalatory power

Surprise Management

Removes threats & Clears
obstacles
Embraces disorder &
disequilibrium

Read & react in an anticipated
fashion
Rooted in chaos theory –
creative breakdown

Extreme Event DecisionMaking

Optimizes

Based upon leader selfefficacy

Social Amplification

Manages risk perceptions

Use of technical justice

Extensive education &
training required
Leaders must reject stability
& equilibrium; live on verge of
chaos
Slow decisions and lack of
accuracy; fuzzy organizational
boundaries
Disproportionate public
response; secondary impacts

Non-linear Leadership

Theory not well developed;
conflict between High
Reliability (prevention) &
Normal Accidents (inevitable)

Source: Casto (2013)

Readiness Theory
The readiness theory derives from Smits and Ezzat-Ally‘s (2003) discussion on
the merger of the role theory and the learning theory. Fundamentally, this theory asserts
that organizations that are subject to crises or extreme events must establish a
preparedness to face their roles and organizational lessons.

That includes the

identification of emergency roles and responsibilities, role knowledge, training,
rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis.
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Other important concepts in the readiness theory are command, control, and
coordination. For instance, Voogd (2004) investigated the impact of command and
control on the readiness theory. Voogd (2004) concludes that the existing personnel,
structures, and emergency responders in a team context aid crisis preparation but have
their limits. Similarly, Smith (2004) investigates the role of disaster simulation, which is
an element of readiness. Through disaster simulation studies Smith (2004) finds that
organizational decentralization often used to respond to extreme events becomes
significant and complex thereby, challenging organizational success. Quarantelli (1988)
makes the strongest conclusion about prior planning. In considering the elements of prior
planning, e.g., identification of emergency roles and responsibilities, role knowledge,
training, rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis, Quarantelli (1988)
concludes that prior planning is helpful, but prior planning cannot eliminate complexity;
therefore, adaptations will be required under extreme conditions. Finally, Quarantelli
(1988) suggests that if the definition of extreme events is applied, organizations cannot
predict or prepare for the unknown-unknowns.
In another twist to the efficacy of readiness, Joffe (2003) suggests that optimistic
bias actually reduces preparation. Optimistic bias can falsely convince oneself that
uncertainty can be controlled. This means that as one trains and simulates, one is not
only preparing oneself for events but that organizations are driving out uncertainty,
thereby causing blind spots. Such optimism causes one to ignore the multiplicity of
factors that can come of extreme events.
It seems that Smits and Ezzat-Ally‘s (2003) readiness theory adds little theoretical
development to extreme crisis management for several reasons. For example, readiness
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concepts described as roles, responsibilities, command, control, simulation, and
optimism, while practical, offer little in the way of supporting or advancing a scholarly
theory of extreme event leadership. Because extreme events by definition exceed the
ability of the organization to cope, I believe the readiness theory is unlikely to provide
any substantial foundation for extreme event theory development; nevertheless, I explore
it for completeness. Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies command and control
limitations of the theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of decentralization and
Quarentelli (1988) concludes extreme events necessitate adaptations, my research could
potentially add value to readiness theory by addressing these limitations. Knowing the
important concepts associated with extreme event leadership could enable organizations
to better inoculate themselves against the uncertainty of extreme events through
improved readiness; however, as stated earlier, for extreme events, readiness might have
limited inoculation power.
Complexity Theory
Readiness theory asserts that organizations should focus on preparation, while
complexity theory asserts that organizations should develop an ability to embrace the
complexity of a crisis.

The complexity approach can lead to a reframing of crisis

management for organizations. By reframing crisis management from an avoidance
strategy to a strategy of absorption, organizations can better cope with the challenges of
an extreme event through changes in their behaviors (Ashmos, Duchon & McDaniel,
2000).

From the inception of the complexity theory, research (Mirvis, 1996)

acknowledges that the complexity theory is counter-intuitive for organizations.
Organizations seek to drive out uncertainty from their environments; however, the

35

complexity theory offers organizations a means to face a multiplicity of factors and make
sense of rapidly changing circumstances (Mirvis, 1996).
Fundamentally, Ashmos, et al. (2000) suggest that by using a behavioral
approach, organizations can reduce and absorb complexity to limit the edge of chaos.
Those behaviors include gathering information about threats, encouraging multiple and
conflicting organizational goals, using sensemaking to understanding coupling, and by
embracing complexity in their processes, that is, living with uncertainty, they become
familiar with the complex. Thus, when faced with a complex situation, the organization
will be better prepared to deal with chaos. This is the counterfactual thought to the
readiness theory‘s optimistic bias.
This multiplicity of factors involved in extreme events makes the complexity
theory more attractive as a research theory compared to the readiness theory. Because
the complexity theory tries to unearth the surprising patterns in a complex interaction, it
seems to be more enlightening in identifying leadership concepts for extreme events. The
complexity theory purports that when you step back from a set of complex interactions,
unforeseen connections begin to appear (Muffet-Willett & Kruse, 2009). Muffet-Willett
and Kruse (2009) describe complexity as a rubric of complex responsive processes. Abel
(2011) describes it as dissipative structure that moves into the edge of chaos. Abel
(2011) explains that this self-organization is not chaos; it is near chaos, because chaos
involves the study of simple patterns leading (linearly) into repeated patterns, while
complexity involves simple patterns leading to higher-level patterns, which are multiple
unique interactions, and usually non-linear.
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While to some degree, organizations may be able to adopt the complexity theory
approach; high-risk technological organizations3 are unlikely to do so. Researchers (Daft
& Weick, 2001, p. 255) recognize this tension and discuss what they call enacting
organizations. Enacting organizations recognize the indeterminate nature of life, but
actively engage with it rather than being reactive or passive. Organizations often test and
experiment with adaptive processes, models, and programs. Organizations typically learn
by doing and create a double-feedback loop to improve processes (Daft & Weick, 2001).
Mental models affect the way people work with the information and determine the final
decision (Argyris, 1977). The decision itself changes, but the mental models remain the
same. Once fixed, the established mental model allows for quicker decision-making. A
double-feedback loop (Daft & Weick, 2001) suggests that organizations develop
mechanisms to interpret ambiguous events and provide meaning and direction for
participants. Unlike single loops, this model includes a shift in understanding, from
simple and static, to broader and more dynamic, such as taking into account the changes
in the surroundings and the need for expression changes in mental models (Argyris,
1977).
I find the complexity theory model generally antithetical compared to other
rational behavioral theories of individual and organizational behaviors, e.g., rational
choice, theory of planned behavior, equity, and expectancy theories. Most organizations
want to limit uncertainty, and organizations do so by building procedures and processes
that constrains individuals to behave in predictable ways for predicable events. The
concern then becomes for individual and organizational behavior during unperceived
events. Typically, when people behave outside expected norms, the organization seeks to
3

High-risk technical organizations often include industries such as nuclear power, airlines, and NASA (Weick 1979).
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return the behavior to those within norms. Complexity theory tends to require that
people behave outside of norms in responding to a crisis. As Mirvis (1996) stated, this
requirement is counterintuitive.
Nevertheless, the concept of an enacting organization leads one to a discussion of
failure theories. It seems that the complexity theory, while useful, actually serves as the
foundation for failure theories (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).
Failure theory suggests that organizations structure themselves in uncertain frameworks,
i.e., into organizations that are prepared for complexities but organizations also retain
methods to avoid failure. Thus, the failure theory is a compromise between relying solely
on readiness, i.e., living with uncertainty, to organizations structuring organizations that
both prevent and cope with complex situations.
Failure Theory
Early in the understanding of organizational disasters and disaster management,
researchers blamed organizational failures simply on human error or errors that were
beyond human control (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001). These were simple explanations with single or few root causes. As
research progressed, these researchers began to see the multiplicity among high-risk
technology, human error, organization culture, and their context. Researchers discovered
other more complex explanations of organizational failure.
From this research emerged two main theories of failure. Those theories are the
normal accident theory and the high reliability theory. I explore these two theories
generally, and I explore them from the perspective of extreme events. The question is
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how these theories explain or provide insights into the potential for a new theory
generated by this research.
Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) are the fathers of the normal accident theory.
Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) began the discussion of organizational failure with an
assumption that accidents came from, ―just the right combination of circumstances to
produce a catastrophe‖ (Perrow, 1994, p. 217). Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) viewed
accidents as inevitable. The signals of extreme events bypassed organizational controls
and went unrecognized by the organization until the signals appeared and escalated into
full-fledged events. Miller (1988) suggests that it is not the ―sick‖ organization that
produces disasters, but it is likely the complex, modern, and efficient organization that
experiences major failure.
Modern organizations assume rationality in their contexts (Turner & Pidgeon,
1997). The assumption of rationality can actually magnify small errors turning them into
large-scale accidents. Should individuals miss the signals of error in their work, those
minor errors can stack-up and become errors that are bigger than the sum of their parts.
Perrow (1984, 2009) extends this argument through his research on complexity and
coupling.

Perrow (1984, 2009) asserts that the most knowledgeable people in the

organization will undervalue errors.

Operators will miss signals in tightly coupled

systems. Then, these errors will reappear as major accidents called ―normal accidents‖.
Others explain those missed signals as latent organizational issues (Aini & Fakhru‘l-Razi,
2013; Vaughan, 1997). These latent issues sit in the organization until the environmental
conditions change, and then latent issues reemerge as much bigger issues. Vaughan
(1997) in her assessment of the NASA space shuttle accidents refers to this scenario as

39

the ―normalization of deviance‖. Vaughan (1997) explains that organizations often miss
signals that are counterfactual to the established mental models.
Normal accident theory has yet to explain everything about the escalation of
accidents. If accidents are ―normal‖, then the question is why do most organizations
avoid them?

Not every organization experiences accidents; therefore, perhaps most

organizations have learned to become safer. It could be that organizations learn to decouple their processes, or it could be that organizations have just become more reliable.
Nutt (2004) suggests that these and other questions are questions that normal accident
theory researchers have yet to answer.
While Perrow (1984) does not subscribe to the theory that organizations can
prevent accidents, other researchers (La Porte, 2011; La Porte & Rochlin, 1994; Sagan
1994; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) argue that organizations can. High reliability theory
suggests that organizations could become reliable by using a dedicated safety culture
(Egan, 2011; La Porte, 2011). In fact, by using pervasive challenging and a questioning
attitude, organizations can become highly reliable. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) go even
further.

The authors insist that organizations can merge culture and organizational

structure into a Highly Reliable Organization. While La Porte (2011) and La Porte and
Rochlin (1994) agree with the basic high reliability theory, they somewhat disagree with
Weick and Sutcliffe (2011). La Porte (2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994) challenge
the ability of organizations to combine culture and structure to prevent events.
Certainly, Perrow (1994, p. 213) doubts the ability of organizations to become
―highly reliable‖. Perrow (1994) insists that, ―trying hard will not be enough‖ and
believes therefore that accidents are inevitable. This debate between normal accident
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theory and high reliability theory has reached a deadlock.

High reliability theory

researchers (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Sagan, 1994) believe that organizations do more
than ―try hard‖. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and Sagan (1993) claim organizations can
erect defenses that prevent accidents. LaPorte (2011) and La Porte & Rochlin (1994) are
somewhere in the middle of this argument. LaPorte (2011) and La Porte & Rochlin
(1994) believe that organizations should try hard by implementing procedures and
processes to minimize the possibility of failure (NASA), but LaPorte (2011) and La Porte
and Rochlin (1994) do not go as far to claim that organizational culture relates to disaster.
One aim of this research is to explore the disagreement between the theories that failures
can be prevented (high reliability theory) and that culture matters (normal accident
theory).

This disagreement is particularly relevant in the extreme event context.

Developing extreme event leadership theory that addresses the efficacy of readiness for
extreme events would help to advance the disagreement between the two theories and
may tip the scale towards one or another. Knowing more about how readiness would
mitigate extreme events would help to determine readiness countermeasures as suggested
by the two theories. Advancing theory as to this disagreement could demonstrate to
organizations whether readiness theory is more useful in the extreme context, that is, high
reliability theory would assert readiness theory concepts apply and organizations can
prepare adequately for extreme events.
Other researchers weighed into the debate between normal accident and high
reliability theories. Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) claim that the two theories
are not incompatible but that there is a temporal relationship that allows the two theories
to explain accidents at different times.

Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009)
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describe this as an open-systems argument that views organizations as energy
transformers. As organizations expand from their stable state, organizations go through
energy transformations and this open systems view accounts for both theoretical
perspectives.

Further, Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) acknowledge the

fallibilities of humans and the bounded rationality assumed by the theories.
Conversely, Perrow (2009) himself wrote a rejoinder to Shrivastava, et al. (2009).
Perrow (2009) dismissed the temporal and open systems arguments. Perrow (2009)
reminds us that normal accident theory acknowledges the role of humans and that time
was never a component of the theory. Perrow (2009) states that normal accident theory
rest beside the other failure theories.

Because normal accident theory explains the

coupling concepts involved in accidents, there is no need to reconcile the two theories.
There is only a need to find applications of normal accident theory. Turner and Gray
(2009) talked with Perrow (2009) about his comments. In that article Perrow (2009)
states that the temporal element is both immaterial and unnecessary because it is the
coupling that causes the rare event not the time component.
Shrivastava, et al. (2009) rebutted Perrow‘s (2009) comments. Shrivastava, et al.
(2009) reiterated that the normal accident theory applies only to a small set of accidents
and that the theory does not account enough for human failures. The debate continues
and a conclusion is elusive.
These arguments raise many important issues related to extreme events. For
instance, what is the role of norms on behaviors during an extreme event? Do norms
serve as constraints on humans and exacerbate the accident? As mentioned earlier, latent
organizational issues play a significant role in crises. Vaughan‘s (1997) normalization of
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deviance is but one example of how organizational errors lie dormant then split wide
open during a crisis. Organizational issues are an important factor in understanding a
crisis. Therefore, I gave particular attention to organizational matters as I formulated this
research.
To this point, research does not integrate high reliability and normal accident
theory with complexity theory.

Integrating these theories could enable high-risk

technological organizations with insight on the degree in which organizations should
prepare for extreme events. There is a balance between adding layers of prevention vice
the acceptance of normal accidents.

Companies must judge their investment in

prevention versus acknowledgement of the risks and establishing methods to cope with
accidents when accidents happen. Acceptance of the risks might imply that companies
would rely more on the leadership theories and invest in training their leaders on the
more complex leadership theories, e.g., sensemaking. My research sheds some light on
this integration. My integrated model of crisis leadership might be helpful in resolving
the deadlock to consider whether embracing complexity helps move the debate forward.
Through the investigation of extreme events, my research may shed light on the argument
and help to settle the deadlock.
Sensemaking Theory
The theories of readiness, complexity, and failure set the stage for more complex
theories and thus should be useful in explaining crisis management or extreme event
management. While those theories shed some light on the scope of concepts surrounding
complex events, other higher-level theories can more fully explain the concepts for
extreme events. The first of these high-level theories is sensemaking. Sensemaking is
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the process of social construction that occurs when discrepant cues interrupt individuals‘
ongoing activities, and involve the retrospective development of plausible meanings that
rationalize what people are doing (Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld & David, 2005, p. 409).
Again, the intent of this review is to focus on the insights from the theory that would help
give clarity and meaning to understanding extreme events by helping develop concepts
and theories.
Clearly, the seminal work in sensemaking is Karl Weick‘s (1988), ―Enacted
Sensemaking in Crisis Situations‖, that appeared as part of the JMS Special Issue on
Industrial Crisis Management: Learning from Organizational Failures. This work broke
new ground on the thought that technological failures had a strong construct of human
failure associated with them. Weick‘s conclusion that crises are not just the machines‘
fault but also the results of human-machine interactions sets the foundation for
sensemaking. It is a theory that tries to explain those interactions. Sensemaking is about
taking cues from the environment and framing those cues into a picture of what is
transpiring. This framing is where Weick suggests the enacting organization structure is
created, although one caution comes from Hernes, et al. (2008), who concluded that
sensemaking could lead to an oversimplification of an event because humans tended to
consider only a few factors during crisis. Humans have limitations on their cognitive
abilities, and therefore, seek to simplify problems. For example, bounded rationality
suggests that (Simon, 1972) chess players can only envision about one hundred moves
out of over 10120 possible moves. Therefore, as I proceeded with my research I was
conscious of information missed by leaders and thus the leaders never considered in their
sensemaking.
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In analyzing Weick‘s (1988) work regarding crisis management, there is a central
argument that when organizations (people) sort out a crisis, organizations generate both
the understanding used in sensemaking as it affects the crisis and the actions that changes
the progression of the event. Weick (1988) states, ―There is a delicate tradeoff between
dangerous action which produces understanding and safe inaction which produces
confusion‖ (p. 305).
For instance, in the Bhopal (Weick, 1988) case4, management‘s lack of
commitment to the facility resulted in weak procedures, training, emergency planning
and other latent organizational weaknesses. Therefore, as the operators tried to respond
to the event, i.e., they took actions to understand better the plant conditions, the latent
weaknesses combined with the human interaction resulted in exactly what the operators
were trying to prevent. Thus, their actions led to the enactment of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. In sorting out hundreds of control room alarms, operators complicated the
event through their actions of trying to mitigate the problem and understand it,
simultaneously. The operators themselves, while attempting to understand it, changed
the event scenario. This assessment is one of Weick‘s (2010) most powerful conclusions.
Weick (2010) offers that sensemaking can improve crisis prevention and management by
promoting shared beliefs about self-control and voluntary cooperation that will allow
people to understand that their own actions and decisions can be determinants of the
conditions that organizations try to prevent. A caution is that if the shared belief is based

4

The Bhopal disaster was a gas leak incident in India, considered the world‘s worst industrial disaster. It occurred on the night of
December 2-3, 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Over 500,000 people were
exposed to methyl isocyanine gas and other chemicals. The toxic substance made its way in and around the shantytowns located near
the plant. Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh
confirmed 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.
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upon flawed thinking or ―collective stupidity‖ that would have serious implications on
the outcome of the crisis.
Sensemaking Diverges
Research on sensemaking diverges into two paths from Weick‘s (1988) work.
The first path describes sensemaking as the events unfold. This path (Kayes, 2004;
Vendelo & Rerup, 2009; Wicks, 2002) unpacks a wide-ranging set of disasters as they
unfold. The second is a retrospective path that looks for sensemaking post-hoc (Brown &
Jones, 2000; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, Miglani & Anil, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon,
1997). The retrospective path primarily bases the research upon public inquiry reports
and others that describe the events post-hoc. The purpose of these studies was to present
institutional learning. These articles are very beneficial sources for my inductive study.
Using these retrospective path articles provided me with techniques to merge the
retrospective articles with the interview results to triangulate on the facts from the event.
Consequently, the interviews and retrospective views provided a clearer picture on the
leadership issues faced by the personnel involved in the event(s).
This divergent path of research, i.e., while events unfold or through retrospective
review, is an important consideration that might enable a better understanding of extreme
event responses. First, the initial response by people makes up the sensemaking during
crisis by blocking out contradictory cues until it is much too late causing an overly
positive view of the situation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik, 1977). Again, the
optimistic bias concept creeps into the research.

Second, research on collective

sensemaking in crisis demonstrates that there is a range of challenges facing groups and
teams (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). These challenges generate obstacles to shared
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understanding and coordination of action in conditions that are escalating and
unfathomable.

Third, the institutional contexts in which the organization and its

members are embedded influence sensemaking in crisis, and sensemaking often serves to
maintain these institutions (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).
Not explicitly discussed among the three themes is the role of ―felt‖ emotions in
sensemaking. Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) discuss the role of ―felt‖ emotions, such as
panic, on sensemaking. The next few sections discuss all of these themes in detail.
Fallacy of Optimism
An optimistic mindset that creates blind spots can be devastating for individuals.
In uncertainty, i.e., crisis, once individuals begin to express optimism openly, individuals
establish an unfounded commitment that begins a path to failure. Kayes‘ (2004, p. 1277)
study of eight climbing deaths on Mount Everest shows how pre-summit statements made
by climbers, like, ‗as long as the weather holds, we will have success‘ and ‗we‘ve got the
Big E [Everest] all figured out,‘ sounded overly positive and blocked out the
contradictory clues that would allow them to sense that they were facing an ill-defined
problem without clear goals, or solution paths.
Weick (1993) also highlights the effect of public statements by spotters on the
smokejumpers‘ aircraft during the Mann Gulch fire (1949) when 12 smoke jumpers who
parachuted into the area to fight a fire in the Helena National Forest, Montana, United
States, died. The spotters stated, ―The crew would have it under control by 10:00 the
next morning‖ (Maclean, 1992, p. 43). Those optimistic statements constructed a blind
spot that blocked out growing evidence to the contrary. When commitments are active,
voluntary, and public, those statements often create the biggest blind spots (Cialdini,
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Trost & Newsom, 1995; Salancik, 1977). Cialdini, Trost and Newsom (1995) find that
publicly assessing, explaining, and recommending actions in response to a crisis causes
people to feel much more bound to them than when people keep their commitments nonpublic. Over-commitment to a position along with the normalization of deviance creates
these blind spots (Nickerson, 1998; Vaughan 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These
public statements might increase accountability of the leader as the statements more
strongly connect the leader‘s image to the position. However, the accountability that
those statements generate for the leader may have a detrimental effect if the leader is
wrong.
On the contrary, Landau and Chisholm (1995) argue that pessimism, with the
failure-avoidance organizational perspective that it entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.
Landau and Chisholm (1995) suggest that organizations should ―institutionalize
disappointment‖ as a means to counteract self-deception. This conclusion is consistent
with the research articles on High Reliability Organizations.

High Reliability

Organizations instill in their members a sense of a ―preoccupation with failure‖. High
Reliability Organizations are encouraged to use ―vigilant wariness‖ at all times (Weick,
et al. 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Optimism has a place in crisis management as it
motivates individuals to take action; however, it can create blind spots and prevent
individuals from adapting to circumstances.
Establishing a Shared Understanding
The second challenge for responders during a crisis lies in establishing a shared
understanding of the environment, especially, in extreme events, when trying to
formulate shared understanding among responders is difficult. Weick (1995) discusses

48

three types of understandings: commitment, identity, and expectations. Commitment is a
foundation for sensemaking because responders often generate over-optimistic statements
or even generate explanations retrospectively to justify their actions (Weick, 1995).
While this has the potential to create helpful meanings in the wake of ambiguity, it can
also create dangerous blind spots (Weick, 1995).
Identity is another type of shared-understanding construct (Weick, 1995). The
importance of identity in such contexts becomes evident especially when it is threatened.
In crisis, responders can lose their own identity. Weick (1995) talks about this in the
Mann Gulch study when the smokejumpers dropped their tools and ran. The opposite
can happen as well. Wicks‘ (2002) study refers to the Westray mine disaster (1992) as an
example, where miners‘ identities as ―real men‖ and ―providers‖ blinded them from
seeing the dangers inherent in their work.
The other type of shared understanding is expectations (Weick, 1995). Weick
(1995) suggests that expectations connect with cues to create understandings. Individuals
then filter subsequent cues against this understanding and slowly build up their
confidence about a picture of the situation.
understandings, this can be good or bad.

Of course, as in the other types of

As in the Mount Everest case, an over-

optimistic picture can be very detrimental. The best strategy is for individuals to adjust
their expectations throughout the disaster.
In the end, shared understandings are difficult to gain, and create a positive or
negative outcome (Weick, 1995). Weick (1995, p. 148) suggests that, ―wisdom‖ can
overcome the contradictions in developing shared understandings. For Weick (1995) the
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elements of wisdom are ―updating and doubt‖, and importantly, updating and doubt
enable adaptation and innovation.
Institutional Effects
There is relatively little research on the institutional effects of sensemaking in
crisis (Jennings & Greenwood, 2003).

Obviously, this would be a fruitful area of

research. One of the most useful studies on the institutional effects is contained in
Wicks‘ (2002) study of the Westray mine disaster.

Wicks (2002) investigates the

institutional causes of blind spots. Wicks (2002) finds that the miners‘ daily practices led
to the creation of blind spots for them. There are a number of components leading to a
―mindset of invulnerability‖ created by work rules, non-work rules, and the culture of the
organization. Much like the normalization of deviance, these miners normalized risk.
The miners became overly comfortable with the risks that miners face every day in the
mines. Wicks (2002) echoes Weick‘s (1988) suggestions of enacted sensemaking. The
normalizing behavior of the miners became detrimental to safety.
Role of ―Felt‖ Emotions
Besides shared understandings, another area of sensemaking discussed earlier is
panic. Obviously, emotions play a role in crisis management. Some research discusses
how emotions, especially ―felt‖ emotions, can be detrimental to cognitive thought,
especially in sensemaking (Shrivastava, et al. 1988). Weick (1995) argues that felt
emotion, which comes from arousal, makes use of cognitive ability. It takes attention
away from the task. Conversely, as in much of sensemaking, felt emotions can also be
helpful.

Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) argue that emotions can actually facilitate

sensemaking. Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) add that other emotions such as shame,
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guilt, embarrassment, anxiety, and pride can play a role as well. These negative and selfconscious emotions can be the strongest of all emotions affecting sensemaking (Maitlis &
Sonenshein, 2010).
Retrospective Sensemaking Research
Regarding the post-hoc studies on sensemaking, some research (Brown & Jones,
2000) concludes that public inquiries constitute a valuable source of insights for
reviewing institutional sensemaking. Brown and Jones (2000) find that these studies
mostly focus on rebuilding trust and according legitimization to the organization.
Another insight from these studies is that the post-hoc enquiries tend to rebuild
authorities and leadership in the affected organization. This stream of literature informed
my research, in that my qualitative study used some inquiry reports. In cases where this
research could not find individuals directly associated with extreme events to interview, I
reviewed a secondary data source. For instance, an inquiry report from the Deepwater
Horizon was used to develop the sensemaking concepts used by the leaders who were
involved in the event.
In Search of Common Characteristics
In an attempt to identify operational characteristics of sensemaking, I conducted a
mini-longitudinal review of sensemaking articles seeking a common set of characteristics
that might be used to qualitatively review extreme events. I developed a review of
sensemaking characteristics for several significant disasters as summarized in Table 2,
Characteristics of Specific Disasters.

I intend this review to identify trends or

commonalities among sensemaking characteristics that might lead to the development of
concepts. The sources for the information are Weick‘s (1990) review of the Mann Gulch
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disaster, Vendelo and Rerup‘s (2009) review of the Roskilde Festival disaster, and
Dunbar and Garud‘s (2009) review of the Columbia shuttle disaster. I chose these
articles because they were case studies of single crisis (events), and each of the articles
focused on understanding the characteristics of sensemaking.

Definition of Terms:
Risk Context – Vendelo and Rerup (2009) situations where threats are low;
perceived low risk environments but risks can incubate.
Incubation period – Self-explanatory; period where latent weaknesses are present
but yet unobserved or active.
Pluralistic ignorance – Weick (1990, p. 588) describes pluralistic ignorance as a
view by crisis responders that they are, ―puzzled by what is going on, but I
assume that no one else is‖.
Collective sensemaking – Dunbar and Garud (2009) organizational members‘
struggle to make sense of the situation.
Team trust – Self-explanatory.
Panic – Self-explanatory.
Length of disaster – Self-explanatory; units provided.
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Table 2 - Characteristics of Specific Disasters5

A few examples of this author‘s judgment on the codings illustrate how
sensemaking characteristics reveal themselves through cross-case comparisons.

For

example, for the risk context, my judgment is that it is reasonable to view a forest fire and
a space shuttle launch as high-risk, while attending a rock concert is a low-risk
environment. People would not reasonably be worried about dying from attending a rock
concert. However, as the situation unfolds, I judge that panic grew in all three events as
the situation deteriorated. During the rock concert crush, people panicked. Further, for
the Columbia shuttle disaster there were over a hundred shuttle flights before the fateful
loss of the Columbia; therefore, the incubation period was extremely lengthy, while the
other two cases had short incubation periods. These are examples of my rationale for
determining the behaviors of the sensemaking characteristics.
5

Source: Casto (2014). The magnitudes are based upon my own personal judgment.
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The conclusions drawn from Table 2 are mixed. All three accidents resulted in
deaths. The risk context seems immaterial to the outcome. In the Roskilde festival case,
risk was low but deaths still occurred. Similarly, incubation period, pluralistic ignorance,
collective sensemaking, team trust and length of disaster seem immaterial as well. The
clearest conclusion from the three events is the growing state of panic during these life
and death situations. While it is obvious that panic exists among individuals when a
disaster unfolds, it would be interesting to find measures of organizational or leadership
panic.

Leadership panic is a characteristic not extensively covered by the crisis

leadership research. In my research, I was conscious of developing characteristics of
leadership panic where appropriate.
Later in this research review, I will discuss the characteristics of extreme
leadership. Some sensemaking characteristics are common among two of the disasters in
Table 2, but not all three; nevertheless, this collection of characteristics could serve as a
tool in quantifying sensemaking in this research study.
In sum, I believe that sensemaking is a highly complex theory that can shed light
on extreme event crisis management. There are many concepts to consider regarding
sensemaking when conducting a qualitative study. These begin with the determination of
whether the organization is ―enacted‖. The measure of an enacted organization is best
generated by reviewing a number of concepts to compare, contrast, and discover linkages
between those potential concepts (Weick, 1995). It starts by understanding the initial
response to the event by determining the degree of shared understanding that occurs.
Shared understanding is broken into three pieces: commitment, identity, and expectations
(Weick, 1995). As in the high reliability theory, a preoccupation with failure is an
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essential element of sensemaking. That preoccupation includes the normalization of
deviance, institutional disappointment, degree of optimistic statements, and wisdom
(doubt and updating). Finally, understanding the types of ―felt‖ emotions and cognitions
involved in the response could be one of the most powerful factors in sensemaking.
Transboundary Effects
Researchers have expanded the literature of crisis management through the review
of a relatively new theory called ―transboundary effects‖ (Boin, 2009). Transboundary
effects literature considers what Perrow (1994) would call the ―coupling‖ of modern
society. The definition of the transboundary crisis considers the functioning of multiple,
life-sustaining systems, functions, or infrastructures that are threatened by the crisis and
cause uncertainty of outcomes (Boin, 2009). Essentially, the transboundary effects are
different from a routine crisis in that the effects involve the coupling of systems within
and among countries. The recent 2009 financial crisis is an example of a transboundary
effect in that it affected not just the United States‘ economy, but the world‘s economy.
Few crisis management researchers have delved into studying transboundary
effects. Given that the number of articles associated with crisis management is on the
decline, many researchers believe that the crisis management domain is exhausted (Boin,
2009). Nevertheless, with the opening of the transboundary theory, there is a new
domain of interest for researchers of crisis management. A related stream of research lies
in the area of the ―Black Swan Events‖ (Taleb, 2010), which are unforeseen and
unanticipated events. Nafday (2009) claims that unforeseen and unanticipated events are
―unknown-unknowns‖, i.e., completely out of left field (p. 194). Often, these events are
non-linear and cascading in their seriousness (Nafday, 2009). For example, as in the
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Fukushima nuclear plant disaster (2011) a natural event cascades to an artificial (manmade) event and then to a global social event.
The characteristics of a transboundary crisis as documented by Boin (2009) are a
good fit even when describing the characteristics of an extreme event. These
characteristics include:
- Tightly coupled systems
- Extends cross-functionally and cross-nationally
- Transcends time boundaries
- No defined beginning, end, or ground zero
- Escalates quickly in unforeseen directions exploiting linkages
- Causes unfathomable damage
Boin (2009) describes the ―escalatory power‖ of a transboundary crisis. Boin
(2009) suggests that because globalization makes the world flatter (Friedman, 2006)
small perturbations may have drastic consequences. A coupling of systems (Perrow,
2009) extends this issue by creating what Boin (2009, p. 370) calls the ―highways for
failure‖.

Boin (2009) acknowledges that governments cannot keep pace with this

challenging and changing environment; therefore, governments have little capability to
deal with transboundary issues. The trends exposed deal with technological growth that
speed up transboundary effects. International terrorism is another trend that creates
opportunities to spread crises. Finally, escalation caused by demographic shifts and shifts
in global power arrangements introduces new dimensions that can contribute to an
escalation of the crises (Boin, 2009).
For the present research, I note the importance of Boin‘s (2009) study in the light
of his list of executive tasks in managing a crisis. The following five tasks are difficult
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and fraught with complications: 1. preparing in the face of indifference; 2. making sense
of an emerging and evolving crisis; 3. managing large response networks; 4. offering
credible answers; and 5. learning under pressure.

These five tasks were useful in

informing the qualitative concepts in my research by providing a categorization of tasks
and allowed me to separate tasks from cognitive reasoning skills.
Other authors explore further transboundary effects. For instance, Wachtendorf
(2009) describes an effect she refers to as ―trans-boundary social ruptures‖. Wachtendorf
(2009) refers to transboundary social ruptures defined by Quarentelli (1988), Lagadec
(2009) and Boin (2009) as events that reach beyond social boundaries and disrupt
multiple social systems. Social ruptures could become transnational as well (especially
in the cases of the United States, Canada and Mexico). Transboundary effects bring
entirely new problems to the leaders of extreme events. With the rapidly connected
world come new challenges for event leaders. The challenge of a tightly connected world
requires new readiness, mitigation, and response strategies.

I explored these new

dimensions in my interviews.
There are other transboundary effects, specifically the relationship between risk,
crises, and public management (Lodge, 2009). Public managers often seek clarity of
response to extreme events. Public managers seek to purify readiness and response
thereby desire to limit uncertainty and that public crisis management employs one-way of
responding to a crisis. However, crises are often ―clumsy‖ and might require ―clumsy‖
solutions (Lodge, 2009, p. 406). In my research, clumsy solutions were juxtapositioned
against sensemaking to find new links of interconnectivity between transboundary effects
and sensemaking.
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Some authors (Santella, Steinberg, & Parks, 2009; Parks, 1971) bridge research
and practice by creating software tools to model the crisis for policy-makers. These tools
often model routine crises. Software tools provide a roadmap for leaders in approaching
their response to a crisis.
Another applicable article for this research is Lagadec (2009) whose focus is on
innovative thinking in the context of transboundary crises. Lagadec (2009) concludes
that, ―in our cultures and in our selection (of leaders) creative thinking is punishing and
punished‖ (p. 483).

The argument is that nonconventional thinking is needed in

nonconventional crisis.

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, creativity in crisis

response is antithetical to the norm of organizations that often drive for certainty through
procedures and processes. Nevertheless, in my research this concept of driving out
creative thinking can be interesting. That is, if a leader concludes that he/she was
unprepared for an extreme event because crisis drills leave him/her unprepared for
creative thinking, that insight itself would be interesting.
Extreme Event Context as Related to Transboundary Crisis
There is a similarity between a transboundary crisis and an extreme event or an
extreme event context. While there appears to be little, or no, literature in this area, these
crises, events, and contexts appear to have similar characteristics. Among the similarities
are the international implications of an extreme context. Farazmand (2009) discusses a
perspective that all ―grand failures‖ by governments have global implications.
Farazmand (2009) believes that a grand failure by a global government, e.g., the United
States, implies that lesser governments would have little chance of success in a similar
situation is a gap in the literature. This is true especially for the United States in its
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position as a global leader. Failure to respond to a large event shakes the confidence of
other nations regarding the United States as a global leader. Certainly, in the Chernobyl
case, the failure of the Soviet Union fostered a lack of confidence by Soviet citizens and
the world. Farazmand (2009) also suggests that smaller nations lose hope that a smaller
nation could cope with an extreme event given that a country as developed and powerful
as the United States failed to address Hurricane Katrina in an appropriate and timely
fashion.
The ability of leaders to manage crisis response is essential to leadership success.
This is the second step in the leadership construct discovery process.

Finding the

necessary leadership concepts needed in an extreme event is a goal of my research. Can
great leadership minimize the impact of extreme event? Is it a goal of leadership can be
to arrest the cascade from a routine crisis becoming an extreme crisis? For instance, do
leaders control panic and mitigate the impact of a crisis at the earliest point in the
progression of the crisis to avoid turning a routine crisis, perhaps a hurricane, into an
extreme crisis, for example, Katrina or moreover turning an extreme event into an
extreme context? The answers to these questions, among others, were essential for my
research.
In sum, transboundary effects are highly important considerations for this
research. As the world flattens, extreme events multiply, and our ability to create fear
around the world expands, most extreme events will take on the characteristics of a
transboundary event. As the qualitative study progressed, I attempted to reflect upon the
data to determine how transboundary issues comport with extreme crisis. The applicable
concepts for my research gleaned from transboundary effects included the six
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characteristics of transboundary effects and the five executive tasks identified by Boin
(2009).

Other notable effects of interest were Wachtendorf‘s (2009) transboundary

social-ruptures and Lagadec‘s (2009) innovative thinking.
Considering the complications entailed in a combination of the extreme crisis,
extreme context, transboundary, and Black Swan aspects, integrating the associated
concepts could provide fertile ground for crisis management theory research.
combination can provide researchers with a significant new domain.

This

Few, if any,

researchers are publishing articles in the domain of integrating these theories, but it I
believe that these domains bring with them new leadership challenges that might call for
new research concepts and associated leadership competencies. As stated earlier, most
crisis research uses routine crises as a foundation and then extrapolates the findings to
extreme events. Through studying extreme events explicitly in this research, there were
interesting and valuable findings while walking through the specifics of the extreme
events.
Next, this review moves into the final area of theory, in fact, two administrative
theories. First, I cover leadership theory as it applies to routine events and discuss the
limitations of existing theory to explain extreme event leadership. Understanding the
concepts behind leadership is especially crucial in extreme crisis management. I discuss
the decision-making theory last. Decision theory moves leadership from the strategic
thinking cognitive levels to the action levels.
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Administrative Theories
Leadership
Understanding leadership theory in extreme events is a daunting challenge. Given
that the dimensions of an extreme event are continually changing as humankind
advances, keeping pace with the demands of leadership under these conditions is nearly
impossible. A significant challenge for this part of the literature review is the lack of
articles exploring extreme event leadership.

However, the lack of extreme event

literature is both a challenge and an opportunity.
Because extreme events are rare, past research on extreme event leadership comes
mainly from two domains: most researchers study routine crisis events, for example,
hurricanes, and then extrapolate their conclusions to extreme events (Mikusaova, 2011;
Kayes 2004; Maclean 1992). Another line of scholarly inquiry studies military battles
and then applies the conclusions to non-military extreme events (Baron & Scott, 2010;
Campbell, Hannah & Matthews, 2010; Fisher, Hutchings & Sarros, 2010; Weeks 2007).
Studying these domains has methodological limitations. Due to the threshold effect
described earlier in this literature review, routine crisis events are not likely to produce
conditions that leaders face during extreme events; therefore, the usefulness of
extrapolation is questionable (Yammarino, et al. 2010). In the research on military
applications, there seem to be even more problems. When fighting wars, military training
permits troops and leaders to sacrifice themselves, and troops often train for and
experience extreme events (Weeks, 2007). Unlike in extreme events, in these classic and
military research domains, command structures usually remain in place. Additionally, in
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the military structure, people follow the established rules without question, e.g.,
displaying a respect for rank (Weeks, 2007).
In non-military extreme events, organizations usually do not train for
unfathomable conditions (Yammarnio, et al. 2010). Additionally, by definition, extreme
events usually involve the loss of governance, particularly the loss of corporate control
and government control (Comfort, 2002). By nature, extreme events can exceed the
capacity of both military and non-military. Similarly, many of the government agencies,
unlike the military agencies, do not have directive leadership and are unfamiliar with
failure of business continuity (Yammarnio, et al. 2010). There are broad organizational,
leadership, and readiness differences between the military and non-military organizations
(Yammarnio, et al. 2010).
Hannah, et al. (2009) discusses the tensions between leaders who are adaptive
versus those who are ―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis. By ―administrative‖, the
authors mean classic authoritative or directive leadership. There exists a general tension
between using adaptation during an event versus following the administrative, i.e., classic
leadership route. Thus, using the military model for extreme leadership research is
challenging. I believe that this is an important consideration when conducting extreme
event research. Researchers usually do not control for military organizational structure
considerations, such as self-sacrifice, training and adherence to rank, when examining
non-military-based extreme events (Hannah, et al. 2009; Useem, et al. 2005); thus, using
articles that use military contexts in the present research controls for administrative
differences.
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An insight from a seminal article (Hannah, et al. 2009) that provides a broad
perspective of extreme leadership and addresses not only the leadership concepts but
importantly, the methodological issues as well, frames the direction of my research.
Hannah, et al. (2009) focuses on developing a framework of study using a typology that
defines and distinguishes extreme context from crises and other contexts. The Hannah, et
al. (2009) article strongly endorses the qualitative approach to research of extreme event
leadership.

Hannah, et al. (2009) frames the direction of continued research on

leadership in extreme events. One important direction that is applicable to this research
is their recognition that extreme leadership research may not change the essence of
leadership, or make existing leadership concepts invalid; however, the Hannah, et al.
(2010) suggest that research could discover new relationships between concepts and
necessitate advanced methodologies. That discovery is one potential contribution of this
research.

Perhaps I can make discoveries of the unique interrelationships among

leadership concepts, and discoveries of the most important leadership concepts within the
extreme event context.
Sensemaking, Surprise Management and Non-linear Leadership
Developing insights on leadership strategies used in addressing extreme events is
an important element of this study. A key to the necessary leadership insights comes
from the work of Mumford (2005). Mumford (2005) finds that underlying a leader‘s
sensemaking activities is the formation of a prescriptive model.

Mumford (2005)

suggests that finding a ―prescriptive model often provides the ―solution‖ to the problems
broached by the crisis‖ (p. 522). Weick (1988) suggests this as well in his study on
sensemaking. Weick (1988) and other scholars ('t Hart, 1990; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978)
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identified ―making sense‖ as a crucial element that dictates leaders‘ success. Mumford
(2005) concludes that, ―the bewildering pace, ambiguity, and complexity of a crisis tends
to overwhelm the normal modes of situation assessment‖ (p. 372). For these reasons, my
research included the elements of the complexity and the sensemaking theory to derive
the sensemaking and making sense insights of extreme events and developing an
integrated model.
Farazmand (2009) introduces the strategic theory of ―surprise management‖.
Surprise management, Farazmand (2009) suggests, ―Aims to read and act in an
anticipated fashion, remove or minimize potential threats and clear obstacles to achieving
goals and missions‖ (p. 407). According to Farazmand (2009), surprise management has
roots in chaos, complexity, and dynamic systems‘ theories. For me, surprise management
clearly has roots in Weick‘s (2001) ―management of the unexpected‖ as well because the
dynamic elements of surprise management, e.g., understanding, framing and enacting, are
essential in surprise management and management of the unexpected.

Finding the

linkages or intersections among these theories may result in new and powerful leadership
strategies. Farazmand (2009) finds some of the linkages between chaos, complexity, and
dynamic systems theories; in my research I discovered linkages among other crisis
theories.
The bottom line is that managing non-linear events (extreme events are nonlinear) successfully necessitates non-linear leadership techniques like surprise
management (Comfort, 2002). The key is that extraordinary and emergency situations
require leaders to reject stability and equilibrium. Leaders must use non-linear-dynamic
thinking, which often calls for embracing disorder and disequilibrium. This means living
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on the edge, at the threshold, where the situation appears stable but is on the verge of
chaos (Farazmand, 2009). Farazmand (2009) calls this situation ―creative breakdown‖.
Farazmand (2009) references Schumpeter‘s (1942) quote that ―Breakdowns may be the
―birth pangs‖ of a better future‖ (p. 405).
Weick (1995) cautions that most managers often make a big mistake of thinking
linearly; managers try to solve non-linear organizational problems in a linear fashion.
Instead, mangers should get out of the causality box that has frozen their mindsets.
Managers must think strategically and non-linearly to anticipate and manage the
―unexpected‖ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Educational and training programs, formal and
informal, periodic and continuous, can help to train and develop surprise management
teams, leaders, and managers for crisis management in the age of rapid and non-linear
changes that constantly produce complexities (Farazmand, 2009). Hospitals are a good
example of organizations that train and develop surprise management that face non-linear
challenges from simple gunshot wounds to mass casualty events.
Managing complexity on the ―edge of chaos‖ (Pascale, 1990), too, requires a
different set of organizational learning, a learning to learn surprise management capacity
(Waldrop, 1992). Farazmand (2009) asserts that developed or advanced nations fail to
take surprise management seriously. Farazmand (2009) finds that the combination of
complicity, ignorance, arrogance, leisurely habit, and dismissive attitudes results in a
frozen mind-set of government leaders during catastrophes. Farazmand (2009) suggest
that when developed or advanced nations learn to address surprise management besides
helping them respond to catastrophes, it will help the less developed nations address
catastrophes by learning from the developed world.
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Some authors (Farazmand, 2009; Waldrop, 1992; Weick, 1995; Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2007) remind us of the importance of non-linear thinking. Leaders must release
their rigid mindsets in order to manage surprise or unexpected events. These authors
generally agree that it takes education and training that is continuous and periodic, formal
and informal, and that stresses adaptive management to help cope with crises and
disasters. Accordingly, Farazmand (2009) asserts that developing such a capacity of
adaptive management requires the integration of capacity building to support surprise
management from youth to adulthood. Farazmand (2009) gives the examples of children
in countries that are taught at an early age to prepare for natural disasters, e.g., floods,
earthquakes, and droughts, as an example of capacity building.
For me, I believe that the meta-thinking work of Crittenden and Woodside (2007)
with regard to thinking-about-thinking could play a role in the education of crisis-leaders.
Their thought that leaders need more than intuitive thinking seems appropriate, in that the
classic linear crisis management tools do not work in the non-linear environment. Metathinking seems to address many of the limitations identified in linear decision-making,
such as ignoring non-conforming information, implementing decisions based on little
knowledge, and being over-confident in the leaders‘ initial impressions of the event. I
believe that challenging leaders to think about thinking as leaders respond to a crisis will
cause the leaders to consider gaps in their knowledge and discover flaws in their
decision-making processes.

Meta-thinking is not mentioned in the extreme event

literature, and I believe that including meta-thinking in this research would be useful.
Using the techniques of meta-thinking could provide crisis leaders with a new cognitive
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tool heretofore underdeveloped by the literature.

I believe that meta-thinking in

leadership is a relatively undeveloped concept.
Leadership Lessons from Hurricane Katrina
From a strategic perspective, Farazmand (2009) provides a comprehensive list of
strategic lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Farazmand (2009) advises leaders
never to compromise the long-term strategic goals of a nation, system, or organization for
political or economic benefits.

Farazmand‘s (2009) other advice includes building

capacity in preparation; leadership and central command are the most important elements
of crises management. Farazmand (2009) suggests that traditional crisis management is
useless in the extreme event that these events test a government‘s competency, and that
governments avoid surprises by preparing for simultaneous and multiple crises. My
research considered these elements of leadership strategy, i.e., maintaining national
strategic goals, building response capacity, competent leadership, and preparation for
extreme events.
A problem with Farazmand‘s (2009) thesis is that he sees the government as the
savior that steps in to arrest chaos; however, I believe differently. In the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill (2010) the government did play a role, especially in requiring
compensation of victims; however, British Petroleum (BP) managed the resolution of the
technical aspects of the event. Similarly, with the new private spacecraft companies, the
government expects them to plan, control, respond, and recover from the events that
those private entities cause. It would be helpful to identify new leadership strategies so
that private companies can control more of these events. The world is flattening more,
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and more naïve companies are facing extreme events and often without advanced
governments to support them during an extreme event.
Others who have researched lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina have other
thoughts about leadership in an extreme event (DeChurch, et al. 2011). While DeChurch,
et al. (2011) agree that a leader‘s first role in the crisis is to develop a strategy;
DeChurch, et al. (2011) believe that the largest benefit of the strategy is when it serves as
an accurate picture and response framework for the entire response team. These thoughts
are consistent with Weick‘s (1978) ideas on sensemaking because Weick (1978) suggests
that developing a strategy framework is crucial to enactment.
The Role of Trust in Leadership
Hannah, et al. (2009) capture the essence of the trust in leadership literature by
building a framework for examining extreme event leadership. Hannah, et al. (2009)
believes that an extreme event stretches organizations to or beyond their limits. It is then
that trust in the leader becomes a crucial element. Although as discussed earlier, this is a
different kind of trust, it is trust above the threshold, or life-or-death trust. Some of that
trust is idiosyncratic in that it is built-up beforehand, but in extreme events, it may break
down on reaching the life-or-death threshold.
Further, Hannah, et al. (2009) describes other important characteristics mentioned
in the literature. Hannah, et al. (2009) stresses cohesion of the followers as a crucial
factor of trust. According to their work, leaders achieve cohesion by using Weick‘s
(1996; 1998) sensemaking or even ―sense-giving‖ techniques.

The authors refer to

Weick‘s (1998) caution that leaders can be overconfident in their ability to understand a
situation, or at least believe as leaders they understand the situation. Therefore, by
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having too much confidence the leader over-acts and thereby makes errors and loses
cohesion of the group. Hannah, et al. (2009) discuss the work of Weick (1988) and
Shrivastava, et al. (1988) who developed the concept of triggering points, which are
disenabling events linking back to human judgment; judgment that deteriorates under
pressure. I discovered triggering points in my data collection, and those triggering points
are discussed in the Results.
Tension of Adaptive and Administrative Leadership Styles
When analyzing the literature on leadership in extreme events, one sees a
fundamental tension between adaptive leadership and administrative leadership styles
(Yukl, 2006). Adaptive leadership consists of ―improvisational‖ and ―ambidextrous‖
leadership styles (Yukl, 2006), which are styles that flex between exploitation and
exploration (exploration refers to pursuit and acquisition of new knowledge, whereas
exploitation indicates the use of knowledge for efficiency).

While administrative

leadership styles are those of classic leadership, for example, autocratic or directive, one
of the keys to the success of the present research is to uncover the relationships between
leadership styles in extreme events. This tension is an important insight for this research.
Understanding whether organizations need to be more improvisational or whether
organizations need to be more ambidextrous could provide valuable insights for
leadership.

Further examination of this tension was necessary as this research

progressed.
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Decision-Making
Extreme Event Decision-making
It is important for this research to identify the major concepts involved in making
decisions during moments of extreme crisis. Ultimately, these concepts should guide the
research but not direct it. Within the crisis management literature, there exist classic
decision-making articles along with articles on decision-making during crisis (Hannah,
Campbell, & Matthews, 2010; Sweeney, 2010). The goal for this research is to explore
the conclusions of the literature regarding extreme event decision-making. I focus herein
on what the literature asserts with regard to the important potential differences between
crisis decision-making and extreme event decision-making.
Decision-making Accuracy
Hadley, Pittinsky, Sommer, and Zhu (2011) study many of the complex factors
that might predict the decision-makers‘ accuracy in cases of the extreme events. Hadley,
Pittinsky, Sommer, and Zhu (2011) observe that the optimal solutions that are available
to the decision-makers under normal circumstances are usually absent during a crisis.
The lack of time and information render decision-making based upon optimal solutions
unlikely. Therefore, Hadley, et al. (2011) suggests that there is a need for greater
precision in the measures of decision-making.

Those measures should focus on

―difficulty‖ and ―confidence‖. Difficulty of the decision and the confidence of the leader
influence decision-making precision.

Obviously, the strain of the situation affects

decision-making difficulty. For that matter, the strain of the situation affects confidence
regarding the decision as well. This is because the quality of the decision-making
process affects the decision-makers‘ confidence as Hadley, et al. (2011) state. Thus, the
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authors suggest that a single measure that might capture all of these considerations is
―self-efficacy‖. Bandura (1986) defined self-efficacy as:

People‘s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action
required to attain designated types of performances. It is concerned not with the
skills one

has but with judgments of what one can do with whatever skills one

possesses (p. 391).

Hadley, et al. (2011) suggest that decision-makers‘ confidence is conditioned by
their prior success and perhaps even vicarious experiences, which contribute to their
belief in success. Hadley, et al. (2011) call for ability measures, which might be valid
predictors of decision-makers‘ accuracy; therefore, for this research, understanding a
leader‘s self-efficacy could be an important consideration leading to a theory of extreme
event decision-making.
Tools for Decision-making
Some authors (Santella, et al. 2009; von Lubitz, Beakley & Patricelli, 2008)
devise specific tools or models used for decision-making in extreme crises.

These

authors attempt to structure crisis management decisions by the use of decision tools.
This process seeks to achieve decisions that are more accurate by simplifying crisis
information. For example, von Lubitz, et al. (2008) devised the OODA loop (Observe,
Orient, Decide, and Act), and Santella (2009) proposed the CIPDSS (Critical
Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System) model, while Hadley, et al. (2011)
designed the C-Lead scale (Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing and Deciding scale) to
model or guide decision-making under extreme conditions.
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Research that develops

decision-making tools is interested in modeling whether these sophisticated models or
tools can provide insights on the decision-makers‘ competencies, cognition, or accuracy
under extreme conditions.
Use of Expertise in Decision-making
More importantly, it is critical to consider what the decision-makers should not do
when facing a crisis. James and Wooten (2005) discuss a phenomenon, which can occur
during a crisis, whereby as the complexity increases, the ability to make wise and rapid
decisions decreases. This comes as the highest echelon of decision-makers seeks advice
from technical experts. Sometimes, the power of the expert slows the speed and accuracy
of decision-making processes. James and Wooten (2005) assert that the experts, with
their narrow knowledge, are not in the best position to make decisions. They question
whether experts hold the proper perspective to give advice on how best to position the
organization.
Escalation of Commitment
Sometimes, a routine crisis escalates into an extreme event, and this escalation
could bring with it new considerations for decision-making.

Parashevas (2006)

highlights this escalation as an acute stage in the crisis where the organization reaches a
―critical instability‖ point that might involve a ―bifurcation point‖ or ―phase transition‖.
This transition may become important because it often decentralizes decision-making.
Complex events change organizational boundaries (Parashevas, 2006). As the event
becomes complicated, more leaders of the organization become involved in the decisionmaking process. This transition may result in ―fuzzy‖ boundaries and diverse leaders,
who might see the crisis from different perspectives. The fuzziness might affect the
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accuracy of decision-making.

In the end, either the organization fails, survives, or

evolves into another dimension. That new dimension may consist of various agents of
the old organization. It is likely that the new leaders will lose their connection with the
old central authority (Kauffman, 1993). The direction an organization takes is somewhat
dependent upon the readiness of the organization to face the complex event (Waldrop,
1992).
Parashevas (2006) suggests that complexity science could provide insights to the
agents.

Parashevas (2006) asserts that there should be early warning systems and

feedback mechanisms to detect and monitor event escalation. Agents should not script
decision-making, but agents should define the interaction between them beforehand.
Parashevas (2006) believes that decision-making should be a living and evolving system,
where leaders, followers or others involved in the crisis must understand their roles in
this system. Finally, Parashevas (2006) suggests that researchers should use complexity
science in researching the kind of leadership necessary to generate these realizations and
behaviors.
In the end, decision-making is a complex science (Parashevas, 2006).

The

difference between crisis decision-making and extreme event decision-making is most
significant when the unfathomable conditions change the parameters of the decision point
(Parashevas, 2006). During this research, I maintained awareness of occasions when the
extreme event conditions change, particularly those ―game changing‖ events. At game
changing points, complexity is likely to increase causing new and significant leadership
challenges.
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Social Amplification and Its Impact on Crisis Leadership Decision-making
Social amplification of risk framework (SARF) research is a concept that explains
the effects of public involvement in helping to frame a risk significant event (Renn, 1992,
1998; Kasperson, et al. 1987). Crisis leaders often attempt to frame adverse events for
public understanding. Typically, crisis leaders frame the discussion in their own terms.
Once the public better understands or is indirectly or directly affected by the adverse
event, the public begins to frame the issue in their (social) terms.

The public‘s

perspective might be manifested through mass media, social media, lawsuits, government
intervention, or other social mechanisms that bring pressure on the company. Social
amplification causes ripple effects that may affect the company, its industry, or others
involved both directly and indirectly. The public itself becomes a transmitter either
moderating or amplifying the consequences of adverse events.
After decades of research on the public experience of risk, no comprehensive
theory exists to explain why an apparently minor risk or risk event, as assessed by
technical experts, sometimes produce massive public reactions, accompanied perceptions
of risk and risk related behaviors (Renn, 1998). Often the reactions are a disproportionate
response to the risk. Renn (1992) refers to the work of Kasperson, et al. (1987) who
approached the study of social perceptions of risk. The concept became known as the
social amplification of risk framework (SARF). SARF is a conceptual perspective and
with further research could develop into a full-fledged theory. According to Kasperson,
et al. (1987), ―the concept of SARF is based upon the perspective that events related to
hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways
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that can raise or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and shape risk
behaviors‖ (p. 139).
The social amplification phenomenon consists of two parts. Information flow
from the event feeds the amplification channels, and then the reaction to the information
flow either attenuates or amplifies the risk perception. This begins the ripple effect
(Renn, et al. 1992). I see as an example of ripple effects in the nuclear accident at Three
Mile Island. While there were no deaths or serious health effects because of the accident,
there was extreme public interest in the accident. Fear was rampant throughout the
country, and the President appointed an emergency manager and visited the site himself.
Further, the accident caused repercussions in other industries. This ripple effect is in part
because of the social amplification of the nuclear accident.

In this sense, social

amplification provides a corrective mechanism by which society acts to bring the
technical assessment of risk more in line with a fuller determination of risk (Kasperson &
Kasperson, 2005). According to Renn (1998), crisis managers usually focus on the
technological justice of these events and not on social justice aspects. Renn (1998)
suggests that crisis managers tend to evaluate the event in their context of science, and
crisis managers underappreciate the social justice impacts such as fear, worry, and the
sense held by the public that adverse events are not under control.
Why Crisis Leaders Should Consider Social Justice
Crisis leaders often discount the public‘s view during their response to an extreme
event (Slovic, 1991). Nevertheless, the public reaction to actual or perceived risk should
be a significant input into the considerations of crisis leaders. Slovic (1991) addresses
the issue of the calculation of actual risk and perceived risk. Slovic (1991) concludes that
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public perceptions are the product of intuitive biases and economic interests and reflect
cultural values more generally. Thus, if crisis leaders ignore the public‘s input, the public
will voice their perceptions at the highest levels of government.

Then political

involvement becomes a major consideration for the crisis leader.
The Risk-Perception Link
From a risk-perception perspective, Kasperson, et al. (1987) define social
amplification as the mechanism by which information processes, institutional structures,
social-group behavior, and individual responses determine the social perception of risk.
Risk perception becomes a factor that companies must consider when an event occurs.
This concept illustrates the issue of social justice in that risk events and their social
impacts are a framework that the public considers in their assessments. Risk perception
gives meaning to how people think about risks and their relationship to the risk. Slovic
(1991) asserts that there is no such thing as ―true‖ (absolute) and ―distorted‖ (socially
determined) risk. Rather, the information system and characteristics of public response
that compose social amplification are essential elements in determining the nature and
magnitude of risk. The bottom line is that from the public‘s perspective a given event is a
risk if the public thinks that it is. This public perspective is a key in determining the
appropriate response to an event. Public opinion conditions the technological response.
Amplification
So how does risk perception become amplified? Cantrell (2011) claims that the
public information system is like a stereo receiver and it may amplify risk events in two
ways. Cantrell (2011) suggests that stereo receivers can intensify or weaken signals that
are part of the information that individuals and social groups receive about the risk.
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Further, stereo receivers could filter the multitude of signals with respect to the attributes
of the risk and their importance. Conversely, there may be the opposite communications
mechanism than a stereo receiver. Some mechanisms, e.g., the affected organization
itself, may act as a transmitter. Public information systems may transmit intent through
press releases, government filings, lawsuits, and other public mechanisms. Conversely,
other organizations act as a stereo receiver. Those include the news media, activists and
social organizations, fanatics, governments, social media and other reference groups
(Cantrell, 2011). There are many communications channels these groups can use to
either expand or weaken the conversation. In the technological environment of today
these signals are amplified greater and faster than at any time in the history of humanity.
Those stereo receivers can become social amplification stations generating and
transmitting information via communications channels. Beyond that, the receivers of the
information themselves become additional transmitters that provide information to their
communications channels, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.
Consequences of Amplification
These receivers and their echoes are multiplications of the original risk signal. As
such, at each level of transmission, risk signals cause resultant behaviors.
secondary transmissions result in associated secondary impacts.

These

Secondary impacts

include such effects as the following (Yannopaoulo, 2011):

– Enduring mental perceptions, images, and attitudes (e.g., anti-technological attitudes);
– Alienation from the physical environment;
– Social apathy;
– Stigmatization of the environment or risk manager;
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– Local impacts on business sales, residential property values, and economic activity;
– Political and social pressure (e.g., political demands, changes in political climate and
culture);
– Changes in the physical nature of the risk (e.g., feedback mechanisms that enlarge or
lower the risk);
– Changes in training, education, or required qualifications of operating and emergency
response personnel;
– Social disorder (e.g., protesting, rioting, sabotage, terrorism);
– Changes in risk monitoring and regulation;
– Increased liability and insurance costs; and
– Repercussions on other technologies (e.g., lower levels of public acceptance) and on
social institutions (e.g., erosion of public trust).
These secondary impacts can repeat themselves many times over and can cause
the company to change the means by which the company responds to a crisis, and thus
begins the ripple effect. Clearly, in the current age of technology, social amplification is
evermore present. I see several examples of this in the present world culture. For
instance, the Arab Spring of 2011 escalated through virtual petitions and slogans. Global
political protest, Occupy Wall Street, Greenpeace, and others use social media to
facilitate communications. Societal discussion often facilitates participative decisionmaking.
Ripples
The ripple effect essentially moderates the signals created by an event that can
raise or lower the social significance of an event. Usually the immediate victims of an
event are the first to be notified of the situation. The victims then raise or lower the
amplification. This amplification results in the secondary impacts particularly associated
with the specific company involved. As in the Three Mile Island case, indirect effects are
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caused by secondary impacts.

This sometimes results in industry-wide effects.

Therefore, not only are there secondary signals, but there also are resultant secondary
impacts.

Yannopaoulo (2011) suggests that amplification can introduce substantial

temporal and geographical extension of impacts. The representation demonstrates the
possibility that social amplification may increase the direct impacts quantitatively and
qualitatively. In this case, the inner circle changes its shape with each new round of
ripples and can influence the actions of politicians who then can affect the decisionmaking of crisis managers. If some cases, the political impact can be counter to the
technological need to resolve the event.
In sum, the social amplification of risk is a framework that recognizes the role of
the public in crisis leadership. Crisis leaders often only consider the technological justice
involved in ―solving‖ an event.

Crisis managers then manage the consequences.

Meanwhile, social media transmits a signal that conditions the technological justice
through a social justice prism. As the amplification increases, there is more sociological
pressure on the event leaders. Sometimes these social pressures are counterproductive to
the technological solution to the crisis. For instance, in the Fukushima nuclear disaster,
the social concern of highly radioactive water reaching the ocean led the Japanese Prime
Minister to decree that the crisis leaders prevent, at all cost, highly radioactive water from
reaching the ocean. As a result, the crisis leaders had to minimize the flow of water into
the reactors thus delaying the safe shutdown of the reactors. Social justice sometimes
―corrects‖ for technological justice. As stated earlier, when crisis leaders make public
statements predicting a successful crisis outcome prematurely, accountability theory can
cause crisis leaders to hold unnecessarily to those public pronouncements. Politicians
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might succumb to social pressures and impose constraints or politicians may make public
statements that commit them to a course of action.
Leadership in Dangerous Contexts
Next is a brief summary of the literature on leadership in a dangerous context
(Campbell, et al. 2010). This context is beyond the extreme event context on the crisis
management continuum. Usually a dangerous context involves the life and death of the
people involved. As stated earlier, the concepts contained within this literature may shed
light on the leadership concepts for extreme events. Extreme event leadership does not
consider all the characteristics of dangerous contexts, e.g., life and death of the leader or
followers; however, considering the characteristics of dangerous contexts might be the
natural progression of extreme event leadership research. Thus, considering leadership
beyond extreme events is analogous to considering ―routine‖ leadership concepts on the
other end of the continuum to dangerous contexts.
This summary begins with Yammarino, et al. (2010), Campbell, et al. (2010), and
Hannah, et al. (2010), who conceptualize dangerous contexts leadership separately from
other crisis leadership research. Similarly, as my dissertation suggests that extreme event
leadership differs from routine leadership, Yammarino, et al. (2010) asserts that there is a
special model of dangerous context leadership. This dangerous context leadership model
rests on the proposition that leadership in dangerous context is best assessed on a
multilevel basis (individual, dyadic and group), and further that the dangerous context
leadership model is multiplexed (pragmatic, individualized, and shared leadership) rather
than contingent. The Yammarino, et al. (2010) dangerous context leadership model
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allows for the consideration that leadership may be unnecessary in normal conditions if
the group dynamic is competent and skilled.
Baran and Scott (2010) develop leadership concepts based primarily on
sensemaking and complexity theories. Baran and Scott (2010) argue that leadership in
these contexts is a collective sensemaking activity that reduces ambiguity while
improving resilience. Essentially, Baran and Scott (2010) are suggesting that group
members are the choreographers of leadership; that the job of the group involves framing,
heedful interrelating, and adjusting.

It is almost as if Baran and Scott (2010) are

concluding that the group members will resolve the issue themselves and that the leader
serves to guide them along, rather than the leader organizing the ambiguity through
framing, heedful interrelating, and adjusting.
I discuss the construct of ―trust‖ within my dissertation. There is an interesting
article by Sweeney (2010) that investigates whether or not followers reassess their trust in
the leader throughout the event. Sweeney (2010) finds that followers are constantly
reassessing their leader‘s abilities and that trust in leadership is of paramount importance.
Fisher, et al. (2010) reaches a similar conclusion in arguing that leader competence
develops trust by followers. Fisher, et al. (2010) discusses the influence that leader
competence has on engendering trust by the followers. In dangerous contexts, Fisher, et
al. (2010) concludes that trust is a function of how well a leader performs in the
dangerous contexts.

Further, both studies highlight the importance of supportive

relationships (loyalty) between the leader and the group. The concepts of trust and
loyalty are interconnected and cannot exist alone.
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Samuels, et al. (2010) and Hannah, et al. (2008) write about leaders‘ ―selfefficacy‖. Fundamentally, Samuels, et al. (2010) find that past success portends future
success, i.e., experience in dangerous contexts prepares leaders for future events. Also,
experience builds confidence in leaders by building the leader‘s self-efficacy, selfcontrol, and assertiveness.

Most importantly, their research supports the idea that

personal mastery is a key to developing self-efficacy along with loyalty. The more
dangerous the context, the more followers reassess their trust in the leader and the more
the followers expect personal mastery of the leader.

This is a crucial dynamic in

Samuels, et al.‘s work.
Hannah and Avolio (2011), Quick and Wright (2011), and Hannah, et al. (2010)
discuss character-based leadership in dangerous contexts. These authors suggest that the
character of a leader may be the most important element to the construct. Character does
not mean personality or even the values of the leader. Instead, character consists of a
leader‘s mastery and hands-on experience, and it is contextualized across multiple levels
of the group with each level having its own concepts.
I considered all of character-based leadership concepts in the methods section of
the dissertation, and I used the character-based leadership concepts to develop interview
questions. Appendix B provides a summary of the leadership concepts for both extreme
events and dangerous contexts.

I used character-based leadership concepts in the

methods design to draft interview questions and formulate codes for data analysis. Very
interesting insights were revealed from the interrelationship between extreme events and
dangerous contexts.
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Areas for Research
Before delving into specifics of my research methodology, I address a
fundamental question regarding how inductive research addresses existing areas of
research.

The fundamental point is how an inductive research paper addresses the

existing research, particularly the open research threads identified in the literature. There
must be a clear understanding of how the existing research threads contribute to the
methodology.
Principally, case study inductive research can build upon theory or extend existing
theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) state, ―sound
empirical research begins with strong grounding in related literature, identifies a research
gap, and proposes research questions that address the gap‖ (p. 26). For theory driven
research, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that the research has to frame the
research within the context and then explain why inductive research is beneficial. On the
other hand, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that for phenomenon-driven
research, the researcher has to justify the importance of the phenomena and justify why
the inductive approach is necessary for theory building.
Another interesting perspective on the use of existing literature and open research
threads in inductive research comes from the work of Bryman (2004). One important
concept raised by (Bryman, 2004) is the concept of cumulativeness of the inductive
research. Because qualitative researchers tend to build theory rather than extend theory,
there becomes a lack of cumulative research. Cumulating theory is a major benefit of
quantitative research methods. Thus, Bryman (2004) concludes that without building on
existing theory qualitative research may be idiosyncratic, duplicative, incoherent (with
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existing literature), and lack common terminology, among other flaws. I believe that this
lack of cumulative research could be the basis for the earlier criticism discussed in this
paper about the crisis leadership research resembling the Tower of Babel (Bryman,
2004). By strictly adhering to what the interview subjects share with researchers, those
researchers sometimes fail to engage in theoretical reflection (Kaghan, Strauss, Barley,
Brannen, & Thomas, 1999; Lofland, 1971). Bryman (2004) describes three approaches
to the use of existing literature. First, researchers can use the existing literature as a
―springboard‖ for their work; second, qualitative researchers can use the existing
literature as a counterpoint to their own work; and finally, qualitative researchers can use
the existing literature post-hoc to compare their findings with the existing literature.
Bryman (2004) confides that the journal Leadership Quarterly expects authors to
describe how the underlying logic of their argument applies to existing research and how
the author‘s research will contribute to expanding the knowledge of the subject. Bryman
(2004) admits that qualitative researcher must ―straddle‖ the issues related to the use of
existing research.
In Section 2 of this dissertation, I have outlined the existing crisis leadership
literature including the open research threads identified by each author and some open
research threads I have identified myself. In summary, the review of extant literature on
extreme crisis leadership indicates several research threads in addition to those previously
identified by other scholars (Mikusova, 2011; Lettieri, 2007). Appendix C provides a
compiled a list of the 27 research threads that emerged from the literature review. I used
these research threads to identify some general research areas; however, this dissertation
only addresses research threads that are applicable to extreme events. I do not consider in
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this research threads that are applicable to other types of crises or are not concerned with
crisis leadership.
Appendix D identifies the disposition of each research thread. I examined each of
the 27 identified research thread to determine specific research areas of interest to my
dissertation that might extend the existing literature. Many of the identified research
threads are duplicative or may be addressed post-hoc or the threads are addressed in the
methods section of this research. In Appendix D, I list all 27 research threads and
disposition those research threads in the last column of the Table. I evaluated the first
three research threads in the methods section of this dissertation. I considered a few of
the research threads post-hoc after discovery of my results. After evaluating all 27 of the
research threads, I identified nine primary research areas that I considered in developing
the interview questions and the coding methodology.
It is important to note that while I identify these research areas in my literature
review, the essence of inductive research as conducted in this study is to focus on issues
that develop from the qualitative data. I allowed for both theory development and theory
extension in my research. While my intent was to explore the issues as the issues
develop from the interviews without pre-supposing those issues based on existing
research, I used predetermined research areas as linkage to the past research to enable
theory building. The nine areas are merely research threads that I discovered in the
literature review and that my research potentially would extend. The research areas do
not represent all of the actual research topics, nor was my study constrained by them.
Those nine research areas were:

85

Area 1 – Is there a conflict between behavioral theory, e.g., rationality, and
organization theory during an extreme crisis?
Area 2 – Which theories are the best fit for leadership during a Black Swan
event?
Area 3 – What is the impact of ―felt‖ emotions in extreme event leadership?
Area 4 – Is sensemaking a crucial component of extreme crisis leadership
decision-making?
Area 5 - What impact, if any, does leadership panic play in extreme crisis
management?
Area 6 – As the transboundary effects of an extreme crisis accelerate, how do the
executive tasks of the crisis leader change?
Area 7 – Are there measures of decision-making precision during the event?
Area 8 – Is there a relationship between social justice and technical justice that
influences political accountability and influences leader decision-making in
significantly negative ways?
Area 9 – What are the overlaps between extreme and dangerous event leadership?

In the next section of this dissertation, I describe the methodology used in this research.
I followed the guidelines for inductive research. Ultimately, by using an inductive
research, i.e., grounded theory, approach, this research developed an integrated theory of
extreme crisis leadership.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS - QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

Inspired by the methods for developing theory created over 40 years ago by
Glaser and Strauss (1967), this dissertation was influenced by those methods to
investigate several cases of leadership during extreme events using qualitative methods
and to discover new crisis leadership theory. Conger (1998) and Bryman (2004) endorse
qualitative methods as a valuable technique to investigate leadership. Conger (1998)
suggests that qualitative researchers are more sensitive to the implications of a specific
circumstance. Qualitative researchers are often the best to assess the style of a leader
including during a crisis (Conger, 1998). Conger (1998) adds that it is remarkable how a
few qualitative studies have added so much value to the research of leadership.
Specifically, Conger (1998) discusses the benefits of applying the qualitative approach to
the social process of leadership. Those benefits include: qualitative methods can help to
reconcile differences between quantitative and qualitative results; qualitative theorists are
quick to explore new forms of leadership, e.g., e-leadership, environmental leadership;
qualitative researchers have questioned the status quo of leadership research; and
qualitative researchers have brought forth new data analysis methods (Conger, 1998).
My sampling approach acknowledged challenges described in the literature
review.

For instance, I used theoretical sampling6 as a technique to guard against

researcher bias. With regard to the rarity of extreme events, my use of natural, artificial,
i.e., man-made, and extreme events broadens the sampling domain to capture as much
data as possible. Finally, where needed, I used other triangulation methods7, e.g., review

6

In theoretical sampling, the researcher choses samples based upon their contribution to theory development and less on the case
uniqueness (Yin, 1994 as discussed in Eisenhardt, et al. 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
7
Refer to the Roshomon Effect, Roth, et al. (2002).

87

of post-hoc event reports, to guard against retrospective bias, forgetfulness and other
interviewee biases.

Section 3.1 ―The Qualitative Debate‖ (below) provides more

examples of the challenges with qualitative technique along with the strategies I used to
avoid these challenges.
I conducted a number of semi-structured interviews of key players in these
extreme cases. Each of these interviews generated rich data that was used to develop
leadership concepts. Then, I analyzed that data to reveal potential theories. I used the
appropriate controls, checks and balances to assure the academic rigor essential for
ensuring the validity of this research including the use of theoretical sampling.
Theoretical sampling allowed me to proceed in a methodical approach to collect data,
then analyze and develop theoretical statements to guide the next data collection and
further theoretical sampling.
My methodology used the literature review to inform the methodology.

I

acknowledge, however, that conventional grounded theory research relies relatively little
(or even not at all) on a literature review to start the research process (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). In fact, purists in this technique would reject any method beyond pure inductive
research that relies on interviews and other methods, as these might bias the researcher‘s
understanding of the existing research and prevent the emergence of theoretical insights
from the data (Thomas & James, 2005). To a purist, prior knowledge of the literature
undermines the method (Thomas & James, 2005).

Nevertheless, since Glaser and

Strauss‘ (1967) seminal work, much of grounded theory research has varied in its
approach to both literature reviews and technical grounded theory methods (Thomas &
James, 2005).
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Grounded theory is not without its legion of critics.

Dey (1999) gives a

comprehensive list of claims against the method. Fish (1989) asserts that grounded
theory is not theory at all, but it is mere ―theory talk‖ (p. 14). Most of these criticisms
attack the validity of the inductive approach itself as ―interpretation before
understanding‖. Next, I discuss these challenges as they apply specifically to the use of
grounded theory as a method to research the leadership domain.
The Qualitative Debate
This section of this dissertation reviews the general debate surrounding the
methodological issues in using the qualitative research method. I intend to cover some of
the more pertinent critiques along with counterpoints that I used in my research to
increase the viability of my results. Considering the issues involved in this debate was
helpful in avoiding known pitfalls of qualitative methods.
In a unique ―From the Editors‖ column, Gephart (2004) raises a number of issues
related to the efficacy of qualitative research as noted by the Editors of the Academy of
Management Journal (AMJ). Gephart (2004) raises six problems noted in qualitative
article submissions to AMJ. Further, Gephart (2004) offers avoidance strategies for
qualitative researchers. I address these avoidance strategies in the Limitations section.
First, Gephart (2004) suggests that there are too many ―one off‖ papers submitted.
Many authors are not involved in ongoing research programs and therefore have little
ability to go back out into the field when AMJ reviewers ask for more data. Suggesting
that researchers be a part of an ongoing research program, Gephart (2004) believes that
researchers can avoid this problem. While my research is not part of an ongoing research
program, I avoided this problem by ensuring that my research is well constructed, using
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my dissertation committee for advice, obtaining thorough reviews of this research, and
maintaining awareness of recent qualitative leadership literature as I progressed through
the process.
Second, Gephart (2004) concludes that researchers fail to conduct a thorough
literature review at the beginning of their work, conducting the literature review only
after knowing the results of the researchers‘ study. This seems somewhat counter to the
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) method; however, Gephart (2004) is
addressing all methods of qualitative research.
A third and related problem noted by Gephart (2004) is that qualitative
researchers need goals, objectives, or research questions to guide their work.

By

identifying the research gaps, Gephart (2004) suggests that qualitative researchers can
state the fundamental contribution made by their paper.
Fourth, Gephart (2004) advises that research papers provide the theoretical
background related to the concepts covered by the researchers‘ paper including
explaining key concepts among the theories, research questions, and methodologies of
the domain. Gephart (2004) expects that the reader of the research can anticipate how the
researcher reflects the theories and concepts of the domain in the data or observations.
Fifth, Gephart (2004) concludes that many qualitative researchers fail to describe
thoroughly the methodology, especially in capturing meaning of data, thoroughly
interpreting results, drawing linkages across data, and explaining the origins of
conclusions. Gephart (2004) advises that, where possible, qualitative researchers should
include raw data as much as possible in the researcher‘s submission.
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Finally, Gephart (2004) notes a problem in that qualitative researchers fail to
revisit research questions or goals in the results section of the researcher‘s submittal. In
addition, qualitative researchers fail to offer the broader implications and contributions
that the researcher is making with the submittal.
Because grounded theory heavily influences my dissertation, I should discuss the
challenges with using grounded theory as an influence. Glaser and Strauss (1967) in their
book entitled, ―The Discovery of Grounded Theory‖, discovered a method a qualitative
research known as ―Grounded Theory‖. Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined procedures to
generate theory from empirical data. Their procedures remain highly respected as a
method to analyze sociology (Thomas & James, 2005). Glaser and Strauss (1967) solved
the data problem that many social researchers faced at that time. Researchers had data
from interviews, observations, and other methods; however, researchers lacked consistent
procedures to mold raw data into theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) found the answer.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed procedures and a means to generate theory. Their
solution enabled a generation of qualitative researchers to discover new theories.
Motivated by their frustration with the obsessive use of hypothetic-deductive research at
that time, Glaser and Strauss (1967) wanted to counter it and developed grounded theory
as an alternative. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, over the past few decades
qualitative research has grown considerably in popularity (Thomas & James, 2005). In
this dissertation the methods identified by Glaser and Strauss (1967) influenced my work.
Despite existing for over four decades, qualitative research still has its detractors.
The many challenges of the grounded theory approach are beyond the scope of this
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dissertation. For the sake of parsimony, I focused on fundamental questions about the
method by highlighting some of the most pertinent challenges.
Thomas and James (2005) offer a critique of grounded theory by challenging
three fundamental precepts of grounded theory, i.e., ground, theory, and discovery.
Thomas and James (2005) claim first, that,

Grounded theory oversimplifies complex meanings and interrelationships in data;
second, that it constrains analysis, putting the cart (procedure) before the horse
(interpretation); and third that it depends upon inappropriate models of induction
and

asserts from them equally inappropriate claims to explanation and

prediction (p. 768).

Ironically, Thomas and James (2005) seem to claim that grounded theory research
suffers from its own self-identity. Thomas and James (2005) assert that holding to the
terms ground, theory and discovery, limits the appreciative inquiry of researchers. By
over proceduralizing grounded theory research with ―epistemological and theoretical
precepts embodied in its name‖, (p. 787) researchers confine themselves. With the
academic demand to develop a ground, and theory, along with all the coding and
synthesis, researchers walk past the most important benefit of appreciative inquiry, i.e.,
understanding what is missed or dismissed through rigorous processing of information.
Thomas and James (2005) challenge the benefit of ―interpreting interpretations‖ (p. 789)
as taking the process a step too far.
Thomas and James (2005) also offer some cautions that seem worthy of
consideration when using grounded theory. Those cautions involve the significance of
interpretation, narrative and reflection techniques used in the process of grounding
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theory. Thomas and James (2005) argue that many ground theory researchers conduct
simple interpretation, give basic narrative and use superficial reflection techniques. In
my analysis of the results in this dissertation, I considered these cautions when
performing the data analysis. I sought to find the correct balance between adequate
interpretation and over-interpretation.
Conversely, Suddaby (2006) answered Gephart‘s (2004) ―From the Editors‖
column in the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) on the problems identified by
AMJ Editors with qualitative research, specifically grounded theory research. Suddaby
(2006) gives six misconceptions regarding ―what grounded theory is not‖, and the
overuse of the term ―grounded theory‖. Those six misconceptions are described in the
following paragraphs.
First, in his ―Letter from the Editors‖ Suddaby (2006) offers that Grounded
Theory is not an excuse to ignore the extant theory and literature in qualitative research.
Suddaby (2006) debunks much of the advice given to grounded theorists that suggests
grounded theorists ignore the literature by starting a proceeding with a blank slate.
Suddaby (2006) suggests that grounded theorists should link to past literature and
constantly remind themselves that they are human. Suddaby (2006) encourages the
grounded theorist to stay in the middle ground between being biased by the extant
literature and totally ignoring the literature. I followed that advice as I proceeded through
the collection and analysis of my data.
Second, grounded theory is not theory texting, content analysis or word counts
(Suddaby, 2006). Suddaby (2006) refers to grounded theorists‘ tendency to slur the
methods in that grounded theorists test what they expect to unearth. The caution offered
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in this regard is to avoid ―forced categories‖ in the coding process (Suddaby, 2006, p.
637). In my dissertation I provided examples of codings, and I did not claim those are
the exact codings driving my data collection.
Third, grounded theory is not a formulaic approach (Suddaby, 2006). Grounded
theorists must continue the interaction between the data and the researcher. This is a
reason that recursive cycling and saturation were important to my research.
Fourth, and fifth, Suddaby (2006) reminds us that the grounded theory method is
not perfect, nor is it easy. These misconceptions are self-explanatory. I acknowledge
that the method and the resultant data in this dissertation was not ―clean‖.
Finally, the use of grounded theory is not an excuse for the lack of a methodology
(Suddaby, 2006).

As developed in my dissertation, the proposed methodology is

rigorous, and thorough. By clearly defining the methodology I followed, the results
should reveal themselves clearly in the data.
Other techniques, e.g., qualitative data analysis8 (QDA), and methods, e.g.,
naturalistic inquiry9 have invaded the grounded theory approach (Glaser, 2007).
Naturalistic inquiry divides into two research camps of positivists and constructivists
(Cupchick, 2001). Positivist researchers assert that truth is native in that it is real and
comprehendible while constructivist researchers believe that truth is created by
individuals and groups (Cupchick, 2001). Regardless of the positivist or constructivist
question, Glaser with Holton (2007) takes issue with the use of these naturalistic
questions and QDA as these concepts apply to grounded theory. Glaser with Holton

8

Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) is the range of processes and procedures whereby researchers move from the qualitative data that
have been collected into some form of explanation, understanding or interpretation of the people and situations we are investigating
(Coffee, 1996).
9
"Naturalist Inquiry" deals with a fundamental problem: "the concept of truth" (Guba, et al. 1985). Guba and Lincoln (1985)
formulate truth as a systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods, and paradigm.
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(2007) takes strong exception to these ideals invading grounded theory. Furthermore,
Glaser with Holton (2007) believes the flaws of QDA are many, including:

A short list of these would include accuracy, interpretation, construction,
meaning,

positivistic canons and naturalistic canons of data collection and

analysis of unit samples, starting with preconceived structured interviews right
off, sequencing frameworks, preconceived professional problems, pet theoretical
codes, etc, and etc. The list is long, the idea is clear (pp. 66, 67).

On the other hand, Glaser (2009) talks about the benefits of retaining grounded
theory in the hands of the novice. Glaser (2009) believes that the future of grounded
theory rests in the hands of the novice. Glaser (2009) summarizes his believe in stating,

My general point or message in this chapter is read the novice‘s situation,
problems and actions correctly. Do not rescue the initial confusions and data
overwhelm with preconceived frameworks and outs. They block GT. Trust to
emergence and skill development using GT methodology. Trust to delimiting
procedures of GT.

Encourage the novice‘s openness to emergence by

encouraging him/her to stick to the tedium of conceptualizing constant
comparisons and allowing GT skill development, and letting categories of latent
patterns make sense of the confusion (p. 19).

Glaser (2009) strongly encourages the novice to use his/her enthusiasm to guide
their research.

Finally, Glaser (2011) addresses many of the recent challenges to

conceptualization in grounded theory. Glaser‘s book, ―Getting out of the Data: Grounded
Theory Conceptualization‖, identifies many blocks to the researcher‘s conceptualization
of the information gained in the research. Those blocks include:
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Authoritative blocks, preconceptions, inability to adequately conceptualize, the
initial confusion and regression, multiversion view of GT, QDA requirement
blocks, data collection overload, data coding overload, peer reviews, dealing with
jargonizing GT, and being a novice both in experience and in scholarship with GT
(Chapter 10, p. 1). NOTE: This list is plentiful with challenges that must be
considered in proceeding with this dissertation.

Qualitative Research on Leadership
Early in the study of leadership, many researchers (House, 1977; Berlew, 1974;
Katz & Kahn, 1978) wrote theory articles on the study of leadership. At that time,
quantitative research on leadership was limited. Little was known about the subject of
qualitative methods, so developing models and questionnaires without a fundamental
knowledge of leadership concepts would have yielded relatively few meaningful results.
Thus, early research in an emerging field often starts with theoretical pieces and
qualitative study to develop fundamental insights (Parry, 1998).

Ultimately, after

identifying general theories, yielding initial ideas, quantitative research may develop the
literature further through empirical testing (Parry, 1998).
If this research progression is applicable and we know more about leadership
today than in the 1970‘s and before, why then is qualitative leadership research still
worthwhile today? Conger (1998) offers an explanation that leadership theory remains
complex, and the enduring nature of the topic necessitates continued deep pursuit of the
phenomenon. Despite hundreds and maybe thousands of qualitative and quantitative
research articles on leadership, we continue to identify new concepts and fail to identify a
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general theory of leadership (Yukl, 1994). Qualitative research can help with deep
pursuit of theory (Yukl, 1994).
Given that researchers also continually identify multilevel aspects of leadership,
those dimensions need further exploration. We remain in the infancy of multilevel
leadership theory (Hannah, et al. 2008; Yammarino, et al. 2010). As discussed earlier,
whenever research is in its infancy, one method is to start with qualitative methods to
begin identifying the interactions and interrelationships among concepts (Parry 1998). In
this case, the multilevel leadership concepts (Hannah, et al. 2008; Yammarino, et al.
2010) are still in relatively early phases of understanding.

For instance, a caution

regarding the limits of quantitative research comes from Avolio and Bass (1995), who
caution that quantitative research can be limited in drawing conclusions across levels of
leadership. Avolio and Bass (1995) suggest that surveys are usually mono-dimensional
and therefore may miss the interactions among multiple levels of leadership. Philips
(1973) argues that quantitative leadership research focuses mainly on attitudes about
leadership rather than actual observed leadership behavior. Finally, quantitative research
fails to develop the ―how‖ and ―why‖ of leadership behavior (Pettigrew, 1990).
Nevertheless, many authors (Hiller, DeChurch, Murase, & Doty, 2011) hail the value of
quantitative research in leadership, with over 95% of leadership research in academic
journals from 1985 to 2009 conducted with quantitative methods.
Using a quantitative methods approach to extreme event leadership is particularly
difficult given the dynamic nature of the situation. In those dynamic situations, not only
is leadership working at multiple levels, but the relationship between leader and follower
is changing throughout the event response (Sweeney, 2010). Sweeney (2010) finds that in
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dangerous contexts followers undergo constant reevaluation of their leaders. In addition,
the threshold effect discussed by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) would be difficult to
measure quantitatively.

Usually measuring shifts in attitudes through surveys is

problematic given surveys are usually based on a snapshot in time (Conger, 1998;
Bryman, 2004). Surveys are usually not rich enough in explaining why attitudes change
to be valid over time, especially if there are intervening variables.

Nevertheless,

Sweeney, Thompson and Blanton (2009) did conduct a quantitative study of the nonlinearity of trust. Sweeney, et al. (2009) developed a trust and interdependence model for
combat situations.
Given the social nature of relationships between leaders and followers, qualitative
research often allows the researcher to identify previously unrecognized or emerging
factors or concepts (Conger, 1998). While quantitative methods allow for researcher
detachment from the observed phenomenon, which might improve validity, this very
detachment prevents the researcher from contextualizing the findings in a particular
setting. Qualitative approaches allow for contextualizing more easily (Conger, 1998). In
fact, Conger (1998) cautions that qualitative researchers are relying too much on solely
using interviews in their research. Conger (1998) asserts that a mixed method allows for
a more balanced approach and removes the biases that a knowledgeable researcher might
bring to a familiar topic.
Since the conclusions of Conger (1998) that leadership research remains in its
infancy, the amount of qualitative research on leadership increased significantly. Bryman
(2004) finds that there were only 10 qualitative articles on leadership prior to 1991, and
since then each year there has been at least one substantial qualitative piece published.
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Qualitative leadership research was slow to take hold (Bryman, 2004). Research designs
were mostly case studies and now have evolved to cross-sectional studies with the
interviewing technique as the dominant research method (Bryman, 2004).

Further,

Bryman (2004) concludes that most qualitative leadership research focuses on an ―inputoutput‖ model that explores the questions of the leadership impacts, factors that influence
how leaders behave, or the type of people who become leaders. Finally, Bryman (2004)
stresses that most qualitative leadership research works to investigate both the context
surrounding the leader and the style of leadership used in that context (often researchers
focus on the senior leader in a given context). Bryman‘s (2004) challenge to researchers
is not to focus on the context itself, but to find the generic insights surrounding the degree
of task structure, leader–member relations and the leader‘s position power that are of
interest, not the situational factors.
Bryman (2004) offers many conclusions regarding the benefits of qualitative
research and the insights it might generate. Bryman (2004) calls for the qualitative
research of leadership studies to be both contextualized and generative; while the
situation is important, understanding the generic insights leads to grounding new theory.
Kempster and Parry (2011) responded to Byrman‘s (2004) call for qualitative research
with a critical realist perspective for grounded theory research. Kempster and Parry
(2011) see a critical realist approach to grounded leadership theory through two lenses.
First, Kempster and Parry (2011) believe that by placing an emphasis on the lens of
contextual understanding and explanations for the social processes of leadership and
leadership development, rather than the identification of universal truths about leadership,
Kempster and Parry (2011) can meet Bryman‘s (2004) challenge. That is, the task is not

99

to focus on the context itself, but to find the generic insights surrounding the degree of
task structure, leader–member relations and the leader‘s position power that are of
interest, not the situational factors. Second, Kempster and Parry (2011) believe that the
using a lens of contextual variation across outcomes variations will allow researchers to
amass a body of knowledge on the social processes of leadership. This too would address
Bryman‘s (2004) challenge not to focus on the context alone. Kempster and Parry (2011)
suggest that researchers should think out of the box and not worry so much about classic
research rigor; that researchers should embrace their own experience and be creative in
their research. Kempster and Parry (2011) offer a number of characteristics that make up
the critical realist approach.
Grounded Theory and the Social Process of Leadership
Leadership is a process of social influence (Conger, 1989; Bryman, et al. 1988;
Yukl, 1994). Thus, researchers may consider the applicability of using the grounded
theory approach to study a social process.

Many researchers have addressed the

applicability of using grounded theory in detail (Conger, 1989; Alvesson, 1996; Bryman,
et al. 1988).

Those researchers borrow from the disciplines of sociology and

anthropology to complete their research, and using qualitative research methods
identified many social influence processes.
Grounded theory was used by Hunt (1991), Martin and Turner (1986), and others
to theorize about the leadership process. The descriptive nature of the grounded approach
is useful in describing social processes. In addition, Pettigrew (1990) suggests that the
importance in the grounded approach comes from theory generation of secondary data,
and interviewing, as an inductive method to integrate and explain the leadership process.
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Bryman, et al. (1988) suggests that the qualitative and quantitative approaches are not
competitors, but are complementary partners, and using them in combination could
actually allow for the triangulation of leadership theories.
There is a continued call for using the grounded theory method for leadership
research (Avolio, 1995; Bass & Avolio, 1990; Bryman, 1992). Grounded theory as a
research method comes from, and is grounded in, the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). A
key to the grounded process is finding the basic social processes in a given situation, and
then deriving a theory about those processes based on data. With data collection and
analysis around a situation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) grounded theory is discovered,
developed, and verified. In order to ―ground‖ the theory there must be a continuous
process of gathering more data, performing additional analyses, frequently draw
comparisons to past analyses, and repeating the process until no new insights emerge.
This inductive approach is a source of validity in the grounded method (Silverman,
2001).
Glaser and Strauss (1967) discuss two approaches to the grounded theory method:
the full and the partial grounded theory method. In the full-grounded theory method, the
researcher follows the entire process of ―rinsing and repeating‖ the data and analysis
steps, whereas in the partial method the researcher stops at the data collection stage and
begins the process of theorizing about the data. Obviously, there are benefits and pitfalls
to both approaches.
Other concerns about using the grounded theory approach to investigating a social
process include: the researcher‘s intellectual ability to understand sociology; the
researcher‘s personal biases; validity of the researcher‘s analysis; the sources of data; and
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the lack of replicability of the method (Parry, 1998). Parry (1998) makes a number of
suggestions regarding improving the validity of grounded theory research to investigate a
social process. Among his suggestions is to continue using the entire method submitted
by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in grounded theory research and to validate the emergent
grounded theory with the extant leadership literature. Parry (1998) argues that these
suggestions might improve the replication of the methods and result in a more formal
theory of leadership. I acknowledge the point made by Parry (1998) to continue using the
Glaser and Strauss (1967) methodology, but as discussed throughout this Section, there
are valid alternative approaches.
Qualitative Research in Extreme Contexts
Extreme contexts bring especially difficult challenges for the qualitative
researcher (Bass & Bass, 2009). Different extreme contexts usually require different
leadership styles, and, as discussed earlier, different leadership styles may be required
before, during and after the events. The need to contextualize these phenomena would
help to contextualize the research. Bass and Bass (2009) suggest that this may result in
conflicting findings because a taxonomy of extreme contexts has not yet been developed.
Thus, Bass and Bass (2009) suggest that without a taxonomy, comparisons across cases
are very difficult.

Hannah, et al. (2009) suggests that to resolve this difficulty,

researchers should disentangle the relative effectiveness or proper mix of effectiveness by
focusing on the agentic behaviors of adaptive and administrative leadership styles.
Hannah, et al. (2009) admit that there is not a clear answer to this issue other than
focusing on the agentic behaviors more than the event context; however, few events lend
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themselves to that level of disaggregation particularly because extreme events usually
require centralization of authority (refer to the discussion of readiness theory, p. 17).
As discussed throughout this dissertation, many of the leadership concepts have
non-linear effects, with a wide range of variance and volatility depending upon the
context (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Pursuing research on leadership in extreme
contexts requires concomitant thinking about required methods to study these contexts.
This limits the generalizability of qualitative research, particularly when attempting to
define specific methodological criteria. Because of the opportunity to hold a dialogue
with interviewees, digging deeper into the thought processes of leaders is another reason
that an inductive approach is useful in the research of leadership in extreme contexts.
Qualitative researchers must also allow for the possibility that new concepts
might appear during the study of extreme events. Given that extreme events exceed the
normality of leadership, unfamiliar and unknown situations may arise. In the Fukushima
reactor case, for instance, leaders never fathomed that the reactors would explode
(Yomiuri Shimbun, August 16, 2012). This unique situation may result in new or unique
leadership concepts.

Those situations could also bring high variation in expected

outcomes. Several researchers (Mohr, 1982; Cabral & Cunha, 2003; Denrell, 2003)
discuss special modeling considerations when studying non-linear concepts, unique
concepts or variable outcomes in research. Mohr (1982), Cabral and Cunha (2003), and
Denrell (2003) suggest concentrating on special situations that might occur during
extreme events that could expose these concepts. Special situations might be situations
of hyper-turbulence, oscillations, divergence in strategies, or chaotic conditions.
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Researchers should concentrate on special situation situations, for special situations
might expose non-linear concepts, unique concepts or variable outcomes.
In sum, using the grounded theory concepts to conduct research on leadership
during extreme events should provide a deeper understanding of the ontology involved in
this special case of leadership. By pursuing the uniqueness of extreme event leadership,
this dissertation may discover unique concepts that could serve as a foundation to a
theory of extreme event leadership. Once such understanding is developed, then the
linkages to other forms of leadership can be investigated and contribute to a general
theory of leadership.
Building Theory from Cases – Suggestions for Good Qualitative Research
Qualitative researchers seek to build theory from their work (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 1977). This is not an easy task. In their seminal article on building theory
from case studies, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) give some useful advice to qualitative
methods researchers.

Although the article focuses on the case-study approach, the

authors provide useful suggestions for qualitative research, including the use of
interviews. Some major points include:
- Concentrate on the recursive cycling10; this keeps researchers ―honest.‖
- Identify clear research gaps; justify why theory-building is better than theory
testing in addressing those gaps.
- Qualitative research rests on broad research gaps with interesting phenomena
and lack of associated theory; this gives the researcher flexibility.
- Random or stratified sampling is unnecessary; cases are selected on their
suitability for illuminating the concepts.

10

Recursive cycling is a theory-building process occurring via cycling among the case data, emerging theory, and later, extant
literature (Eisenshardt & Graebner, 2007).

104

- Multiple case studies provide a stronger base for theory building (Yin, 1994);
they also result in more deeply grounded empirical evidence with more precise
concepts.
- Use of ―extreme‖ cases that are polar opposites is beneficial.
- Interviewer bias is controlled for by diverse perspectives of interviewees and
using retrospective and real-time cases.
- Stronger theory comes from ―pooling‖ the case data rather than isolating each
case;

the challenge becomes that you lose the ―interesting‖ story, but gain

strength in

theory. Write a good theory, not necessarily a good story.

- Tell the theory story in many different means; use narrative, graphic models and
tables.

Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 30) challenge the qualitative researcher to find
fresh theory bridging well from rich qualitative data into mainstream deductive research.
Through the strategies mentioned within this Chapter, I concentrated on ensuring that this
research sought to comply with these major points. Specifically, this research relied upon
recursive cycling, the identification of research gaps, smart sampling of cases to
illuminate interesting concepts, controlling interviewer bias, and pooling the data to
develop a ―good‖ theory. One area where this research has limits is in sampling routine
crisis cases. As discussed earlier, I studied extreme event cases.
Data Collection - Doing the Dirty Work – Organizing Chaos
Conger (1998) calls it the dirty work of research, organizing the data. After
collecting hundreds of pages interview transcripts, observation notes, company records
and other information, it all must be organized into something useable. Conger (1998)
strives to follow the guidance of Glaser and Strauss (1967) in developing a continual
integrating process of data review, analysis, comparison and result finding to synthesize
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the information. Even with an efficient coding process and continual streamlining of the
data, the work is laborsome. Since the work of Conger (1998) computer software has
improved the efficiency of the data (Lewins & Silver, 2007; Friese, 2012). Yet it remains
a strenuous process. Conger (1998) concludes that even with the intensity of qualitative
methods, the richness the method brings to the development of theory is worth doing the
dirty work needed to expose new ideas and interrelationships of leadership.
Of course, there are benefits and challenges (Glaser, 2007, 2011; Wolfe, et al.
1993; Kelle, 1995; Gephart & Wolfe, 1989) with the use of software to conduct
qualitative data analysis (QDA). In his work, Glaser (2007, 2011) strenuously opposes
the use of software for the grounded theory method; Glaser (2007, 2011) is not opposed
to its use in the QDA method. Glaser (2007, 2011) opposes the mixing of QDA and
grounded theory methods. Glaser‘s (2007, 2011) reluctance to use software comes from
the concern that the richness of data will be lost and that the mechanical nature of
software coding dilutes the influence of the researcher‘s memoing.
Others (Wolfe, et al. 1993; Kelle, 1995) support using software for coding while
acknowledging the challenges. Wolfe, et al. (1993) and Kelle (1995) recognize that
software cannot use intuition and reasoning. Wolfe, et al. (1992) and Kelle (1995) do
however believe that software can facilitate intuition, reasoning by offering a systematic,
timely, and exhaustive analysis of data. Wolfe, et al. (1993) and Kelle (1995) also see the
benefits of presentation, manipulation and analysis offered by software including the
potential to identify linkages not envisioned by the researcher.
Using microcomputer storage methods has distinct advantages. As an advantage,
Gephart and Wolfe (1989) offer that data storage systems allow for the collection of large
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amounts of data without losing the natural occurring meanings. Data storage allows for
concepts and meanings to emerge from the data and allows for managerial management
of the data. In effect, Gephart & Wolfe (1989) see software as a merger between
qualitative and quantitative research. In addition, Gephart (1997) acknowledges that
software allows the research to ―pool‖ the data from the context and then recombine the
subsequent analysis back with the context to provide descriptions or examples of the
analysis.

Figure 3 - Data Gathering Flowpath

Source: Casto (2013)

For this dissertation, I followed the systematic data collection techniques of
coding and memoing. Given that the semi-structured interviews generated significant
data, I coded the data with the support of computer software (Atlas.ti). Next, I classified
the data into categories and themes (I mention some practices throughout this
dissertation). I continued to collect data to ―ground‖ my observations and substantiate
the emergent themes.

This iterative process will sustain the inductive approach to
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generating theory from data. Figure 3 depicts the overall data gathering flowpath for this
research.

Table 3 - Key Data Collection Process Terms

Source: Glaser and Holton (2007)

As a reference, definition of key process terms is appropriate. Borrowing from
Glaser with Holton (2007), Table 3 reflects some key process terms from the grounded
theory approach. These key process terms are useful to organize the process as this
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dissertation proceeds through data collection. I will review to these terms as appropriate
in the next subsection of this dissertation.
Coding and Memoing
The goal of coding is to disaggregate the interview data then build it back in a
different form (Glaser & Holton, 2004). By breaking them down, the data become
independent of the case and take on a neutral form (Glaser & Holton, 2004). Coding
allows the data to be put back together in a form that might allow new theories to emerge
(Glaser & Holton, 2004). The codes can be generated either top-down, i.e., from the
literature to the data, or bottom-up, i.e., from the data to the literature (Edwards, 1993).
In this research, I used both top-down and bottom-up coding as depicted in Figures 1 & 3
(refer to Figures 1 & 3 for the comparative flowpath process used in this research). Key
to the grounded approach is the comparative analysis process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
The comparative process consists of three stages. First, I compared the data from each
event (across events) as code-to-code. One goal was to gather as much data as possible,
through multiple interviews.

Of course, the more interviews there are, the more

variability will likely occur and the more time consuming and difficult the research
becomes. Obviously, many codes emerged from these three events. As those codes
emerged, I sought to find relational groupings to minimize the data scatter. As groupings
appear, the second step is to add in the data from the next event to validate the group. A
final step is to compare groups to groups to seek new insights from the data and to reduce
duplication among the groups (Glaser & Holton, 2004).
This constant comparative method is fundamental to grounding the research. It
brings out the richness of the data and allows the researcher to discover insights that
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ground the potential theory. In this case, I used the comparative method to validate
existing theories, as described in the literature review, and to identify new theories.
Throughout the process, it was useful to keep research notes regarding the
rationale behind the groupings (coding).

This documentation process is almost as

essential as the data themselves. NOTE: There is a difference between memoing and
defining codes.

Typically, the researcher records the definition of the codes in a

codebook. However, typically the research uses memoing to describe ideas or insights
discovered while looking at relationships among codes or categories. The identification
of the relationships between groupings is where new theory might emerge. Locke (2001)
calls this the ―memoing‖ process. Researchers keep memos about the relationships or
linkages between groups and ultimately these relationships or links become the
foundation for the new theory. The general areas of research are generated from the
research gaps or threads and leadership concepts identified in the literature review. These
research areas serve two primary purposes. First, research areas guide the development
of basic/ preliminary interview questions that allow for interview flexibility. Second, I
used the research areas to facilitate the development of some codes based on extant
literature that is used to analyze the data.

Essentially, the literature-based coding

provided me with the ―book answer‖ to crisis leadership in an extreme event. In addition,
I generated codes from the data pool resulting from the actual interviews and other
sources of information. In the end, I compared the two codings, i.e., the literature-based
coding and evidence-based coding, by using the recursive cycling technique. From this
comparison, conclusions were extracted that provided general insights towards an
integrated theory of extreme crisis leadership.
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This dissertation involved both a top-down and bottom-up approach to data
analysis. Appendix E identifies the leadership concepts associated with the nine research
areas. Each of the research areas has associated leadership concepts. These concepts
helped explore the interview questions. You can view these Research Areas as the
opening conversation. Research areas are the areas of interest exposed by the literature.
The interview itself then takes a direction either consistent with these concepts or it will
begin a dialogue in different concepts. That is the purpose of the qualitative approach.

Table 4 – Codings

Source: Casto (2013)

Table 4 is an example of the coding process. Table 4 provides examples of the
codings concepts associated with the nine research areas. As I identified new concepts
during the interviews, I generated new codings. Those would were listed in the Column
―Codings from Data‖. Ultimately, differences and similarities were explored in the last
column, also remembering that a key to the success for the grounded approach is
―memoing‖ by the researcher. Describing the thought process behind both the coding
and the analysis is crucial in the discovery of new theory.
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Sample
As discussed in the literature review, because of the nature of extreme events, past
research has primarily focused on routine crises as samples in qualitative work. This
includes samples in case study research as well. Because of the rarity of extreme events,
and the work involved in studying those events, relatively little research exists in this
area. This dissertation tried to expand extreme event research by exploring multiple
extreme events. The sample used was rich and purposeful. As discussed by Guest,
Bunce and Johnson (2006) a purposeful sample is a deliberately selected sample where
the researcher believes it is representative. In order to better assure representation, my
research consisted of three extreme event types. Those events were chosen based upon
the applicability to the extreme event characteristics, the access to information, and the
variety of events. There are a number of extreme events that I used in this study
including: a natural event (e.g., Hurricane Katrina in 2005), an artificial or man-made
event (the Three Mile Island nuclear event in 1979, or the Deepwater Horizon oil rig
explosion in 2010), or a natural event that leads to an artificial event (the Great Japanese
Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011). These three types of events give
the most purposeful sample that I could postulate given the resources at my disposal.
Before selecting the specific events, I continued to generate my theoretical sampling
process because ex-ante I was not certain of the access that I had for specific interviews,
e.g., the Three Mile Island accident, for memories have likely faded.
My personal experience includes over 30 years in the nuclear power business.
More importantly I was the lead US federal executive in Japan for the Fukushima nuclear
event. Therefore the potential for researcher bias does exist for the Fukushima event.
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Thus, I included multiple cases in my sample selection and select interview targets that
provided the best theoretical sampling for the dissertation thereby controlling for
researcher bias.
In qualitative work, sample size is less a matter of quantity and more a matter of
quality of information gained from the sample (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006; Morse,
2000). In addition, Morse (1995) suggests that there are not exact guidelines for reaching
the saturation point11 (refer to Section 3.2.4 for further discussion on saturation). One
study (Guest, et al. 2006) finds that twelve interviews are likely to produce a purposeful
and homogeneous sample. For this research, I targeted nine specific interviews and
expected that at least three additional interviews would be developed from the initial set
of planned interviews. I will allowed for a potential of many more interviews to emerge
during the research. In the allowing for recursive cycling and saturation techniques the
resultant number of interviews was 19, in addition, there were secondary sources.
My criteria for sample determination were both the breath of applicable theories
and the variance for the interviews.

Table 5 – Applicability of Extreme Event

Characteristics, lists the major characteristics associated with the three major extreme
event types (natural, artificial and natural leading to artificial).

11

Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing
phenomena seen before (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
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Table 5 - Applicability of Extreme Event Characteristics

Source: Casto (2013)

Table 5 lists each characteristic as it applies to the event (i.e., has no applicability,
limited applicability, potential applicability or has high applicability). This overview
facilitates the determination of required interviews (sample size). Generally, I initially
propose interviews for those situations where the characteristics either have: limited,
potential, or high applicability to the extreme event or a combination of those situations.
In cases where the characteristics have no applicability to the extreme event there is little
of interest; therefore, I eliminate these situations. After consolidating the characteristics
into four major areas of interest, i.e., Transboundary, failure theories, ground-zero events
and cross-cases (including counterpoints of each case), Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted
Interviews – gives the most suitable representative sample of the extreme event theories.
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Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews

Source: Casto (2014)

Further, Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews and Table 7 – Interview Sample
Matrix provide the specific level of leader targeted for the nine interviews. I chose the
specific leadership levels on the bases of their closeness to the event. In addition, I chose
them to provide the variance among the leadership levels.

Additionally, to aid in

triangulation, cross-case interviews are helpful for theoretical sampling12, and I depict
those at the bottom of Table 7.

12

In theoretical sampling, the sample choices are chosen by their contribution to theory development and less on the case uniqueness
(Yin, 1994 as discussed in Eisenhardt, et al. 2007).
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Table 7 - Interview Sample Matrix – Variance

Source: Casto (2014)

Table 7, Interview Sample Matrix, specifies the level (type) of leader who should
be interviewed in each case.

I chose these levels to provide a wide variance of

perspectives on extreme events. For instance, because transboundary events may cross
national boundaries, I targeted a national or senior government leader for an interview.
Exactly which national leader depended on the access available, fortunately I was able to
obtain the highest level of national response, e.g., The White House Office of Resilience.
Similarly, on the cross-cases interviews, I sought the highest-level official available and
first-responder e.g., state police leader. In addition, Table 7 sought for variance in
government, private sector, social organizations, e.g., Red Cross, and military leaders, all
of whom offer a unique perspective on extreme events. Access to these individuals was
facilitated by my experience in the area of emergency management. In addition, I have
unique access to White House Officials, military and electric power utility executives.
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Interviews
I approached the interviews in a step-wise fashion, meaning that in theoretical
sampling, the researcher collects, codes, and analyzes the data, but he/she has to decide
what data to collect next and where to find that data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45).
Thus, the theory emerges as the research proceeds through the process. A key to success
in the interview process is to be flexible so that different insights might emerge.
Theoretical sampling allowed me to follow the interviewers‘ suggestions for other
interviewees and became new ground for future interviews. Thus, as the interviews
progress, new places, individuals or situations are exposed, and I incorporated those
changes into the process (Goulding, 2001).
I conducted at least the nine interviews as shown in Table 7. In the end, I
conducted 19 interviews and used secondary data. I generated the preliminary/basic
interview questions from the nine research areas. I used the same questions for the
leaders associated with leading the extreme event and a different set of questions for the
social organization leaders. I focused the questions for the social organizations in two
areas because the social organizations do not actually lead the event. I designed those
areas to illuminate the impact of the extreme event on the public and reflective questions
that assess the acumen of the leaders who were leading the extreme event.
Use of interview transcripts and coding exposed emergent themes from the actual
events, which were then compared to the themes derived from the literature review. I
correlated the research areas to specific leadership concepts.

I developed interview

questions that would best allow me to investigate each of the nine research areas
(Appendix E). The goal was to ask interview questions that would unearth insights
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around those areas. My procedure, Figure 3, Data Gathering Flowchart, called for a
comparison of the codings from the literature with the codings from the data. This
allowed me to both address the research threads and discover new areas of theory. From
those insights, an integrated general theory and specific insights about extreme crisis
leadership was revealed.
Each interview was recorded (with permission) via personal interview, Skype, or
telephone. I transcribed and entered each interview into Atlas.ti for coding.

As a

validation sample, I provided the transcripts to one interviewee. I coded the interview
responses to compare them with the leadership concepts. Those correlations served as
the analysis phase of my research. My analysis, subsequent conclusions, and memoing
all served to form the foundation of my integrated model of crisis leadership.
Theoretical Saturation
When is enough, enough? Understanding when the research has reached its
―saturation point‖ or ―data adequacy‖ is essential to the reliability of the research (Morse,
1995). Two considerations aid in finding the saturation point. First, ―the tighter and
more restrictive the sample and the narrower and more clearly delineated the domain, the
faster saturation will be achieved‖ (Morse, 1995, p.148).

Second, Morse (1995)

highlights the importance of the richness of the data. My thinking is that richness comes
from quality interview questions and by allowing the data to take you where it takes you
that is as a researcher, i.e., being flexible in following the data.
Analysis
Gioia, et al. (2012) offers a method for improving the rigor of grounded research.
Gioia, et al. (2012) submits that there is a need for further rigor in conducting grounded

118

theory work. Gioia, et al. (2012) offers a model that seeks to move the method beyond
merely identifying the applicable concepts. Gioia, et al. (2012) encourage researchers to
move into improving the means by which research conceptualizes 1st order themes, i.e.,
an analysis using informant-centric terms and codes, and 2nd order themes, i.e., one using
researcher-centric concepts, themes, and dimensions; thus, inspire the1st- and 2nd-order
labeling. Gioia, et al. (2012) believes that depicting the resultant relationships into
graphic models improves the understanding of the reader. Further, Gioia, et al. (2012)
ask qualitative researchers to write better stories that create excitement in the minds of
the reader, and Gioia, et al. (2012) challenge grounded theorists to improve the writing in
both the methods and results sections.
In an article on dangerous contexts, Baran and Scott (2010) address the issues of
analyzing higher-order leadership thinking through qualitative methods. Previously, I
discussed their call for further study in the areas of sensemaking, particularly in
organizing ambiguity through framing, heedful thinking, and adjusting. Their research
on near-miss reports from firefighters exposed the sensemaking used by firefighters to
lead their crews. Their technique of summarizing the classification of typical leadership
concepts (as discussed in the literature review) to the categories of framing, heedful
thinking, and adjusting has appeal as a technique to reflect how leaders use sensemaking
in complex situations. Baran and Scott‘s (2010) article is an example of a method to
collect and categorize the data in a parallel framework of sensemaking. It was a useful
reference in using the grounded theory approach for the purpose of this dissertation.
In a highly relevant stream of research, Gephart (1997) uses the interpretive
textual analysis of sensemaking using a computer-supported approach.
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Interpretive

textual analysis (ITA) ―seeks to represent and understand members‘ meanings and
discourse, two objectives which are increasingly important in organizational inquiry‖,
(Gephart, 1997, p. 584). Kelle (1995) describes interpretive textual analysis as applying
QDA to understand the meaning of data and text. This is a significant twist in QDA and
grounded theory in that Gephart (1997) and Kelle (1995) offer that ITA differs from
QDA by establishing the understanding and meaning of the text for social actors and then
developing and elaborating theory.
According to Gephart (1997), QDA can become mathematical, while in the
research of sensemaking in particular, the meanings behind the social actions are most
significant. QDA can establish the facts; however, to derive a richer meaning from social
behavior, interpretation of those facts is needed (Gephart, 1997). This is especially true
in technical situations where numbers and technical jargon can get in the way of analysis
(Gephart, 1997). Interpretative analysis as founded by Shutlz (1973) is a methodological
strategy for identifying valid and scientific constructs by identifying constructs of the
social actors involved in the event which express the actors‘ actual meanings to their
statements.
Specifically regarding meaning in the use of sensemaking, Weick (1995)
discusses sensemaking as more of a plausibility process rather than an accuracy process.
Sensemaking is about the reasonableness of the plausibility of the facts (Weick, 1995).
Weick (1995) concludes that the plausibility, whether or not it perfectly meets the facts,
is a key consideration for sensemaking. A story may have factual errors, but the story is
plausible and makes sense (Weick, 1995). Plausible sensemaking is thus the provision of
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acceptable and credible accounts which explain phenomena and energize action (Weick,
1995, p. 61). Finding these plausible accounts is the work of ITA.
ITA uses many of the same structure as QDA and actually expands QDA
(Gephart, 1997).

The primary structure of ITA is analysis, theoretical sampling,

computer software-supported textual analysis, expansion analysis, and producing textual
statistics and meaningful linkages (Gephart, 1997, p. 587). I discussed earlier in this
Section, theoretical sampling and computer software. The areas where ITA and QDA
depart are in the textual analysis and expansion analysis. I explain those processes
herein.
Data expansion analysis is an hermeneutic approach that involves writing an
interpretation (line-by-line) that show a contextual analysis to theoretical concepts
operate together in a data display or representation (graphic) (Gephart, 1997). Many of
the software programs, e.g., Atlas.ti, perform this task easily by delinking the statements
from the context and then allow for recontextualizing the statements. An important
feature of ITA is collocation statistics (Gephart, 1997) which provide a quantitative
measure of the likelihood that the co-occurrence of selected key words in a text segment
differs from (is more likely than) the likelihood of the words co-occurring in the overall
text (p. 587).

I use collocation statistics to discover meaningful linkages between

keywords, discourse and behaviors. Thus, by using textual statistics and meaningful
linkages the analysis (through interpretation) finds meanings behind the behavior then
linking these meanings provides the basis for a theory. For this dissertation, especially
with its focus on sensemaking and other cognitive theories, ITA provided a powerful
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process for theory expansion and creation. As I proceeded through data collection, I
sought to use of ITA.
The next section will present the data collection, coding, analysis and results.
Another important activity for the researcher is to validate the process. That validation
criteria and process is also included in the following subsection.
Data Collection – Results
Data collected for this study were primarily from personal interviews. Interviews
were then transcribed and entered into an ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Unit13 for coding,
memoing, and analysis. Because it was difficult to obtain interviews for one of the cases
(Deepwater Horizon), secondary data including one book, an interview of a
knowledgeable oilrig Captain (and coauthor of a book on Deepwater Horizon), and
transcription of legal testimony were included in the dataset and used for triangulation
purposes. Chapter 3.3.3 describes the interview sampling in detail.
For this dissertation, one case-specific Hermeneutic Unit was created for each
case. Having one Hermeneutic Unit for each case allowed for case-specific coding and
analysis; however, as each case was built, existing codes were carried forward from each
case (Hermeneutic Unit) to prevent duplication of codes and facilitate the development of
an emergent coding structure. Further, using separate Hermeneutic Units aided in the
measurement of theoretical saturation, i.e., as cases built the number of new codes
decreased indicating a decrease in new learning.

Ultimately, all of the case-based

Hermeneutic Units were merged into one integrated Hermeneutic Unit that covered all of

13

Friese (2012) explains that a Hermeneutic Unit provides the data structure for each project in ATLAS.ti. The name was chosen to
reflect the initial approach taken when building a support tool for data interpretation. The most basic level of a Hermeneutic Unit
consists of the Primary Documents, followed closely by the ―quotations‖ (selections from the Primary Documents). On the next level,
codes refer to quotations. A Hermeneutic Unit can become a highly connected entity, a dense web of primary data, associated memos
and codes, and interrelations between the codes and the data.
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the case samples. For the integrated Hermeneutic Unit, there were 165 codes established
to capture the essence of 1187 quotes. Every code contained a comment either regarding
the context of the code or the definition of the code. A code-book was established in
ATLAS.ti capturing all 165 codes with their respective comments and definitions. There
are 17 memos in the Hermeneutic Units that capture insights on the research questions
and other theoretical issues.
Management of Coding14
Management of coding and memoing in this dissertation was conducted using the
insights from several references. These included Analyzing Qualitative Data (Bernard &
Ryan, 2010), Qualitative Data Analysis with ATLAS.ti (Friese, 2012) and Qualitative
Research in the Study of Leadership (Klenke, 2008). These references were used as the
primary guidance for the establishment of codes and memos (Note: The actual coding
comes from the data, i.e., bottom-up. These references served to help establish a coding
infrastructure/framework). Content analysis was aided greatly by the Bernard & Ryan
(2010) book which focuses on the proper methods of analyzing qualitative data to
provide meaning. The Friese (2012) book served as guidance on structuring codes and
memos, providing extensive and valuable suggestions on building the ATLAS.ti
infrastructure. The Klenke (2008) book served as a valuable guide in content coding for
leadership. Its focus on narrative analysis and content analysis gave leadership meanings
to the infrastructure created by the Friese (2012) book. These three resources were
instrumental in establishing meaningful codes, memos and the proper infrastructure for
the ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Units.

14

Refer to Chapter 3.2.1 for coding definitions and processes.
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Also, the structure outlined in Chapter 3.2.1, Coding and Memoing, was used as a
guide throughout the process of data collection. As discussed, that guidance includes
top-down and bottom-up analyses, use of the constant comparative method to bring out
the richness of the data, and memoing. As stated in Chapter 3.2.1, these techniques are
crucial in the discovery of new theory.
Before codes and memos were established, the data was read to identify
meaningful quotations (Friese, 2012). Each transcript was read line-by-line to identify
sentences or phrases that gave meaning to leadership in extreme events.

For this

dissertation, there were 1187 quotations identified which provided some insight into the
interviewees‘ thoughts on extreme crisis leadership. As suggested by Friese (2012),
every sentence that an interviewee stated, even introductions and salutations, are
considered as potential quotations. In some cases those opening and closing sentences
did provide insights into the interviewee‘s demeanor or experiences associated with the
event under discussion. Those quotations were coded as well. No statement by the
interviewee was ―left off the table‖. Furthermore, each quotation was ―renamed‖ in
ATLAS.ti in a short title format that allowed for easy reference to the quotation. Those
titles became useful in the analysis phase as a bridge between the coding and the
quotation.
Establishing specific codes and memos came after reading the quotation. The
researcher established either one or more codes that capture the essence of the quotation.
Prior experience can help a researcher define specific codes while considering the
interviewee‘s perspective; refer to discussion in Chapter 3.2.2 regarding my personal
experiences (Friese, 2012). Also, knowing individual constructs in the literature helps
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the researcher to establish and define codes (Friese, 2012). It is important, however, to
keep eventual biases in check and ―let the data speak‖ instead of imposing preconceived
notions on the emergent insights (Gioia, et al. 2012). In the end, there is a blending of
experience and literature that aids the definition of codes.
Sampling
As described in Chapter 3.2.2 Sampling, multiple data sources were included in
the dataset to ensure rich and purposeful data (Guest et al., 2006). As discussed in
Chapter 3.2.2, this dissertation included three sample event categories; i.e., natural
events, artificial, i.e., manmade events, and a natural event that leads to an artificial i.e.,
manmade event. Those sample event categories were based upon the criteria set out in
Chapter 3.2.2, which provided for an appropriate amount of variance. In accordance with
Chapter 3, Table 5 – Applicability of Extreme Event Characteristics, each sample was
screened for applicability as an extreme event. From the identified samples, specific
interview subjects were chosen. Chapter 3, Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews and
Table 7 – Interview Sample Matrix provide the foundation for both theoretical sampling
and the variance in the sample data.
As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, Table 6 – (replicated below) a specific set of
interview targets was identified to provide data on specific extreme event theories. After
consolidating the characteristics into four major areas of interest, i.e., Transboundary,
Failure theories, ground-zero events and cross-cases (including counterpoints of each
case), Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews – gives a suitable representative sample of
the extreme event theories.
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Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews

Furthermore, to ensure adequate variance in perspectives and experience, a
specific hierarchy of interviewees was envisioned as discussed in Chapter 3, subchapter
3.2.2. See Table 7 – Interview Sample Matrix – Variance, from Chapter 3, replicated
below, for the specific hierarchy. The actual dataset used adhered to this proposed
hierarchy (refer to description below). For the Natural Events (e.g., Hurricanes) and the
cross-case events, i.e., non-case specific, the interviewee sample included a first
responder at the State level (State Police Colonel for Super Storm Sandy); and several
White House Situation Room Directors, along with an Electric Utility operator. With
regard to the artificial, i.e., manmade, events, Three Mile Island and Deepwater Horizon,
the interviewees included first responders, the Governor, and White House Situation
Room Leaders; however, as stated earlier, for triangulation purposes some secondary data
was used for Deepwater Horizon. This approach for the Deepwater Horizon event was
necessary because of the lack of access to rig personnel due to ongoing Grand Jury
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proceedings. Regarding the natural and artificial, i.e., manmade, event, interviews in the
dataset included first responders, military leaders, politicians, and a respected journalist.
Additionally, for cross-case analysis, i.e., not a specific event, instead individuals with
experience with many events, the interviewees include one senior U.S. military leader
(Admiral) and an Executive Vice President of the Red Cross.

Table 7 - Interview Sample Matrix – Variance

In the data collection process, this dissertation exceeded the number of interviews
in most categories. For natural event, there are six interviewees; for artificial event, i.e.,
manmade, there are seven interviewees; and for natural event leading to artificial, i.e.,
manmade event there are five interviewees. In summary, the actual interviews conducted
(Table 8) include the following individuals.
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Table 8 – Matrix of Actual Interview Subjects
Event Name

Natural Event

Artificial Event

Super Storm

Commander New Jersey State

Sandy

Police (Ref. JH) and White

Natural + Artificial Event

House Situation Room staff and
electric utility executive (see
cross-case list below)
Three Mile Island

Lead Presidential Responder
(Ref. HD)
Governor of Pennsylvania
(Ref. DT)

Deepwater

Fleet Captain

Horizon

Secondary data – 4
transcripts (including
Captain, Oilman in charge,
and two key staff members)
and one book (Fire on the
Horizon, Shroder, et al.
2011) (Leaders: Ref. CK, JH
Crew Ref. CP, AM
Ref. Fire on Horizon JK)

Fukushima

On-scene commanders (3)
(Ref. IN, IZ, MA)
Prime Minister’s
representative (Ref. GH)
Journalist (Ref. YF)

Cross-Case

White House Situation Room leadership (2) (Ref. OD, JB)
Executive Vice President of Red Cross (Ref. RR)
Admiral – (Ref. RW)
President of a Large Coastal Utility (Ref. SS)

Consistent with the proposal in Chapter 3.2.2, the interview samples are provided
in Table 8. For each case there is at least one first responder interview and at least one
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senior level official interview.

This approach helps with providing variance in the

dataset. Furthermore, the cross-case interviews, in addition to providing many leadership
insights, provide insights into the transboundary issues associated with extreme events.
Further, with regard to sample structure, throughout Chapters 4 and 5, this
dissertation provides references for each quotation.

Those references are from the

individual interview transcripts. The reference, cited as ―Ref‖ refers to an individual
interview. In Table 8 there is a reference initial for each interview, e.g., RW. Thus, in
the narratives a citation of ―Ref. RW‖ refers to the interviewee RW as marked in Table
815.
Interview Process
In the dataset, there are 19 interviews along with the secondary data. Interviews
lasted from one hour to two hours. All interviews were transcribed and entered as
Primary Documents into ATLAS.ti through a Hermeneutic Unit for each case. Interview
questions were primarily open-ended and were included in the transcripts. All but three
interviews (including all of the Japanese interviews) were conducted face-to-face in a
conference room or office setting. There were three telephone interviews. The telephone
interviews were: interview OD for the cross-case sample, JH for Super Storm Sandy, and
DT for the Three Mile Island event. For the interviews in Japan, even though there was
an interpreter present, all interviews were transcribed from the Japanese speaker to
English. The interpreter‘s words were not included in the data.

15

For purpose of autonomy, consistent with the interview agreement, actual names are not used in this dissertation. This coding is
used to autotomize the individuals.
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Theoretical Saturation
As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, Sample, theoretical saturation16 is about quality –
not quantity – in qualitative research. Guest et al. (2006) find that twelve interviews are
likely to produce a sufficient sample for qualitative research. As discussed in Chapter
3.2.2, the original goal for this dissertation was nine interviews; however, allowing for
recursive cycling and reaching the saturation point, the final sample is 19 with additional
secondary data of four courtroom transcripts, a book (Shroder, et al. 2011), and
interviews with an independent, knowledgeable oilrig Captain (and co-author of the book
on Deepwater Horizon).
For this dissertation, the ATLAS.ti structure used separate Hermeneutic Units for
each case, which aided in the determination of theoretical saturation. As each case is
built, the codes are collected and advanced to the next case; therefore, the researcher can
assess exactly the number of codes added by successive cases. As the interviews built,
and the Hermeneutic Units were created, fewer and fewer new codes were created. Other
methods for determining the theoretical saturation point include assessing the crossloading of codes, use of the co-occurrence analysis tool in ATLAS.ti which depicts the
embedded nature of similar codes and potentially through the use of the ―word cloud‖
feature in ATLAS.ti which shows the frequency of each word in the transcripts (Friese,
2012). The word cloud gives a researcher the ability to assess the most frequently
mentioned operative words.

If certain words dominate, there is little benefit in

continuing with more interviews (Guest et al. 2006). Theoretical saturation is simply the

16

Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing
phenomena seen before (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
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point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing
phenomena seen before (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
Interviewer Bias
Researcher bias is discussed in Chapters 3.1.1 and 3.1.4. In Chapter 3.1.1 many
authors (Perry, 1998; Conger, 1998; Bryman, 2004) discuss the challenges with
researcher bias for those researchers using the qualitative approach.

Those

methodological issues were addressed in Chapter 3.1.1. In Chapter 3.1.4, the challenge
of controlling researcher bias in the interview process was discussed.

As listed in

Chapter 3.1.4, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest controls for researcher bias from
interview data. Major points that Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest with regard to
researcher bias in the data collection and analysis process include:



Use of diverse perspectives of interviewees and using retrospective and real-time
cases



Stronger theory comes from ―pooling‖ the case data rather than isolating each
case; the challenge becomes that you lose the ―interesting‖ story, but gain strength
in theory. Write a good theory, not necessarily a good story



Tell the theory story in many different means; use narrative, graphic models and
tables

Further, Eisenhardt (2007) suggests that a technique used to control for researcher bias is
through the use of ―highly knowledgeable informants‖ and maintaining extensive ties to
the appropriate literature also helps control for bias as well. These suggestions were
considered throughout the data collection process. For each of the extreme event cases,
except for the Three Mile Island case, data was collected from at least three interviewees.
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All of the extreme event cases were ―pooled‖ into one data-set. The data itself was
analyzed using multiple analytical methods, Chapter 4.

132

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT

This chapter presents the data analyses and results of the interviews conducted as
described in Chapter 3: ―Methods and Qualitative Design‖. The approach used in this
dissertation as detailed in Chapter 3 was both, a ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ process
whereby a theoretical model and the associated insights derive from the data and were
compared to existent, relevant literature. This Chapter presents the results of the data
analysis. The discussion in Chapter 5 is intended to examine existing and associated
theoretical models to identify the similarities, weaknesses, imperfections, and new
territories.
Preview of Results
As a preview, Chapter 4 will reveal six important crisis concepts of extreme event
leadership that emerged from the data. Those six crisis concepts were (1) Situational
Context, i.e., the fathomable and unfathomable impacts associated with the event and the
organization‘s ability to respond to those impacts; (2) Felt Emotions17, i.e., the effectual
influence of traumatic or unfathomable events on leaders/leadership; (3) Crisis Response,
i.e., the management of response; (4) Sense-making implications; (5) Decision-making;
and (6) Leadership. The data suggested that felt emotions cause significant alterations in
normal leadership responses during an extreme event including instances of inducing
emotions of strong defiance among leaders and followers. Also, the data suggested:
17

The role of felt emotion in extreme event leadership is discussed in Chapter 2.8.1.4.
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That the situational context is unique for each extreme event.



That the concept of ―crisis response‖ has a significant influence on successful
outcomes of an extreme event.



That the actual event cases evoke more emotion in the first responders than in the
senior level officials.

With regard to decision-making, this research revealed a number of insights in
terms of the efficacy and efficiency of the decision-making process in extreme events.
Finally, for leadership in extreme events, a number of crisis concepts were reviewed
related to the extreme event leadership.
Approaches to Qualitative Analysis
In qualitative literature, there are many potential approaches to generate theory
from data. While approaches to the analysis phase can vary, the literature provides a
general process for grounding the theory in the data. Primarily, this dissertation followed
the approach outlined by Gioia et al. (2012). Gioia et al. (2012) offer clear guidance on
the approach to be adopted through a three-order analysis. Some of the key approaches
discussed by Gioia et al. (2012) include using an iterative approach to interviewing and
analysis, i.e., interviews inform the coding and the coding informs the subsequent
interviews in a recursive process. Gioia et al. (2012) suggest that 10 interviews can
generate as many as 50 to 100 so-called ―first-order‖ concepts. The first-order analysis
suggests that the researcher should adhere faithfully to the interviewee‘s phrases and
terms; therefore, using a liberal number of first-order concepts. In this dissertation, the
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research proposal targeted nine interviews.

With recursive cycling and theoretical

saturation there were 19 interviews, which generated a total of 165 first-order codes. As
the research progressed, the number of codes increased significantly, implying that the
researcher kept faithful adherence to the interviewee‘s phrases and terms giving them
unique codes.
Once the researcher embarks on successive interviews, Gioia et al. (2012) suggest
that there arises the need to see the common themes and crisis concepts that emerge from
the collated data. Thus, the researcher can initiate the ―theoretical sampling process‖
(refer to Chapter 3). In theoretical sampling, there is an overlap between the different
orders of analysis, especially the second and third-order analyses. As each order of
analysis progresses, the researcher begins to recognize the start of the next order of
analysis, i.e., theoretical sampling occurs as the interview progresses and the researcher
asks the question, ―What‘s going on here?‖ (Gioia, 2012, p. 20). This commences the
―second-order‖ analysis as suggested by Gioia et al. (2012). In the second-order analysis,
the number of codes narrows down significantly to usually around 25 to 30. Gioia et al.
(2012) suggest that this narrowing is the theoretical sampling piece that leads to the thirdorder analysis of ―aggregate dimensions‖.
Finally, in the third-order analysis, the researcher introduces the relevant literature
and starts recursive cycling (Chapter 3, Section 1.4) between the data, themes, concepts,
dimensions, and the relevant literature. This cycling also serves a purpose in identifying
the past precedents in the literature through the top-down process while the gaps in the
literature begin to reveal new concepts. Ultimately, the researcher hones in on the new
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concepts in the ―findings‖ chapter to enable examination by other researchers and create
a point from where further research can take off.
This dissertation followed Gioia et al.‘s (2012) approach of incorporating the
three-orders of analyses. In identifying those 165 first-order codes, I tried to comply with
Gioia et al.‘s (2012) admonition to maintain close fidelity with the interviewees‘
comments. Each interview identified and captured the germane concept mentioned by
the interviewee as a code (refer to the detailed description of coding and memoing in
Chapter 3 section 3.1). After a peak in the number of codes, and after a reasonable
number of interviews, the researcher found himself between the first- and second-order
coding with each successive interview generating fewer codes. This has been termed the
saturation process (refer to Chapter 3, subchapter 2.2). The challenge for the researcher
is to remain open to new codes and refrain from immediately limiting the number of
codes. On the other hand, the second-order analysis starts during the course of the firstorder analysis. If the researcher waits until all the interviews are completed to begin the
second-order analysis, the number of interviews could be infinite much before any
conclusion has been reached while the extra interviews would not add value to the data.
For this dissertation, the first attempt at a second-order analysis resulted in 23
major second-order themes (refer to Chapter 3 subsection 3.3). This is less than Gioia et
al.‘s (2012) suggestion that the number of second-order codes should be between 25 and
30. While that deviation was true for my early attempts at second-order themes, the
categorizations changed with continued analysis. Specifically, Chapter 4, subsection 2.4
details the means in which 23 second-order themes produced eight third-order concepts.
The difference between the original number of second-order themes in this dissertation
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and Gioia et al.‘s (2012) guideline is driven by several factors.

Those factors are

primarily related to the continued recursive cycling with the literature and through the use
of the ATLAS.ti co-occurrence process which was not used by Gioia et al. (2012).
Chapter 4 subsection 4.2 (Approaches to Qualitative Analysis) elaborates this cycling
process.
The subsequent subchapters discuss the validity of the coding and the correlations
between them. Significant results emerge when using the bottom-up methodology for
data collection and the third-order analysis process.

These results have also been

discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.1.
Code Linking
ATLAS.ti is a powerful software tool that allows the researcher to establish codes,
memos, comments, code networks, and use many other features to organize data.
However, the cautions mentioned by Friese (2012) are important to ensure a clean and
organized system to prevent what she calls the ―code swamp‖. The researcher initially
establishes a code in ATLAS.ti. This code is subsequently linked to a second-order and
perhaps, a third-order code. Further, the researcher might add comments or memos to the
code. Establishing an organized Hermeneutic Unit is essential for maintaining data
fidelity and enabling second- and third-order analyses. An example of code linking for
this dissertation18 is presented below:

Code: Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness {76-5}~
Comment: Calmness of the leader. Opposite of panic.
<is part of> crisis_response_(in)ffectiveness
<is associated with> Felt Emotions
18

See Chapter 3.3.1 for specific examples of how quotations are coded.
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The code is ―Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness‖ and has been established
by the researcher. First, the code refers to a category of ―felt emotions‖ and is also
associated with the crisis response. The felt emotion is ―calmness‖. Thus, the code string
is created as ―Felt_Emotions_Crisis_response_Calmness‖.

Further, there was a

―comment‖ field in this code written by the researcher as a reminder or for adding
clarifications or comments. Links are established to other codes and perhaps, secondand third-order codes. In this case, the ―Felt_Emotions_crisis response_calmness‖ code
was linked to five other concepts, four of which were first-order concepts and one is ―Felt
emotions‖ which is a second-order theme. Also, listed after the code, in parentheses, are
the measures for code groundedness and density (76-5) where 76 indicates the number of
quotes associated with groundedness, i. e. the number of quotations to which the code is
applied, while 5 refers to the number of second-order codes linked to density, i.e., the
number of links to other codes. Also, each link has a ―relationship‖, e.g., <contradicts>,
as defined by the researcher. This relationship is used in the network view (see Section
4.2.2 for a description of code networks) to describe the relationship between the codes.
It is most useful in establishing the links between the first- and second-order codes. Note
that the tilde after the ―(76-5) ~‖ above, indicates that there is a comment for this code.
This coding process is duplicated for all 1187 quotes, 165 codes and the first- to thirdorder codes. The analysis/results for the Hermeneutic Unit were derived from these
relationships.
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Code Network
In this dissertation, initially the 165 codes were organized into eight second-order
themes (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3). All of the second-order themes are linked
through a relationship editor that enables the researcher to describe the relationship
between

the

code

and

a

coded

network.

The

code

example

above:

―Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness‖ looks like this in ATLAS.ti network view:

Figure 4 – Example Code Network

Note that the code ―Felt Emotions‖ in Figure 4 is the highest order code (which is
why it is highlighted in red) and its groundedness and density are (0-23). This means that
―Felt Emotions‖ is a second-order code; hence, the first number is zero and it subsumes
23 first-order codes. The symbol inside the rectangle means that there is a memo
associated with this code that describes its theoretical linkages with the literature, e.g., a
research question discussed in Chapter 2. Ultimately, second-order codes are analyzed
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using the analysis tools in ATLAS.ti to produce third-order codes and relationships that
build the results.
Code Co-occurrence19
The use of co-occurrence is critical to code integration because it enables the
discovery of meaningful relationships and themes among the codes in that the software
seeks instances where the codes intersect or have similar meanings. As a starting point
for the second-order analysis of the data, a global co-occurrence matrix was generated in
ATLAS.ti. As a means to understand the overall perspective of the codes, the cooccurrence query in this first analysis included all 165 codes that were queried against all
other codes. Essentially, this query finds cases where codes intersect or have common
codes. The specific query involves 165x165 codes and seeks to combine concepts.
ATLAS.ti generates a matrix of the results which provides the common codes, the
associated number, and links to the quotations. The ATLAS.ti matrix is too large to
replicate in this dissertation; however, I generated two charts that depicted the
information from two different perspectives.

The purpose of this analysis was to

determine significant themes, as discussed in Chapter 4.2. Further, according to Gioia et
al.‘s (2012) suggestion that the first-cut at the second-order analysis should result in 2530 codes, this particular query resulted in 23 codes20.
Figures 5 and 6 below depict the results of the second-order analysis. Figure 5 is
a complex line graph. The vertical axis shows the number of quotations; the horizontal
19

ATLAS.ti has many analytical tools to aid the researcher in discovering concepts, constructs, themes or dimensions of importance
in the data. The Co-occurrence Explorer allows the researcher to ask different types of questions (refer to Chapter 3.2.5 for a
description of co-occurrence). Using this tool, the researcher can ask ATLAS.ti to show all codes that co-occur across all of the
primary documents. The result is a cross-tabulation of all codes. Compared to the Query Tool, whereby the researcher has to
determine and select codes or code families and the appropriate operator, the Co-occurrence Explorer by default looks for all codes
that co-occur in the margin area combining the operators WITHIN, ENCLOSES, OVERLAPS, OVERLAPPED BY and AND.
Instead of cross-tabulating all project codes, it is often more meaningful to apply filters for certain codes and documents in order to
concentrate on a more specific set of concepts.
20
After subjective evaluation of Figures 5 and 6, I judged significant codes as those having more than 20 associated quotations
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axis shows the 165 codes. In the graph are the 23 ―peaks‖ above 20 quotations. These
peaks represent the most significant codes from the data. The lines also show the
overlapping of the codes superimposed on them. The specific codes that constitute these
peaks will be discussed later.

Figure 5 – Second-order Analysis Clusters
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The takeaway from this graph is that there are 23 significant code clusters (peaks)
in the data. The same data are depicted in 3D (Figure 6) below. Figure 6 depicts the
165x165 matrix in 3D. The various code clusters stand out in this Figure, indicating
resonance around certain concepts.

141

Figure 6 – Second-order Coding Analysis 3D
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This figure is merely another depiction of the 23 code clusters (peaks) in the
coding data. It must be noted that from the 3D image of Figure 6, one can see that the 23
code clusters (concepts) are tightly coupled or grouped. The researcher believes that this
tight grouping demonstrates the validity of the second-order analysis. Figure 6 reflects
the fairly consistent code density and frequency, i.e., the 3D pattern is reasonably
symmetrical.
Developing the co-occurrence is an initial step in the second-order analysis
process. So far, the analyses show that there are 23 code clusters (concepts) that have at
least 20 associated quotations. Next, in the second-order analysis, it is necessary to
further consolidate those 23 code clusters into a smaller group of themes to begin the
final stage of the second-order analysis.
Results
At this point, the analysis is primarily a co-occurrence correlation of codes that
have similar quotations (Figures 5 and 6 above). There are also other considerations
specifically that the analysis should be more than a mere quantitative analysis of the
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codes. Code density and other qualitative analyses enable the researcher to identify
themes and concepts through memoing, density, and other more judgmental processes.
The co-occurrence process analyses codes with regard to their relationships with each
other. This results in an analysis that is well integrated; however, there may be codes that
stand alone when offering independent insights.

In the bottom-up process, this

dissertation conducts both, a co-occurrence and a qualitative assessment to identify the
―bottom-up‖ results.
Bottom-up Process
Continuing with the bottom-up process, the results were identified by analyzing
the 23 code clusters identified through the co-occurrence analysis. Once those clusters
were identified, they were examined to determine the importance of the concept
underlying each cluster. This approach leads to constructive results contributing to the
research.

The process began with identifying the clusters, then, running the co-

occurrence analysis tool again to further refine the actual theme.

Figure 7 – Major Code Clusters
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Examining the code clusters, using the actual 165x165 matrix data, indicated the
major clusters as shown in Figure 7. An examination of Figure 7 provides insights into
the second-order codes that emerge from the data. These are:



Crisis response



Extreme event characteristics



Felt emotions



Sensemaking



Situational context

At this point, the second-order analysis has refined the initial 23 code clusters into five
aggregate third-order codes; however, this analysis is not sufficient. Further analysis is
needed to determine if other important codes exist, or whether they are either masked or
perhaps have less than 20 associated quotations.
Note that the code ―extreme event characteristics‖ was used to label quotations
that indicate an interviewee‘s discussion of the characteristics of the actual extreme
event. This code was generated by the researcher to ensure that the events analyzed in
this dissertation met the definition of an extreme crisis as described in detail in Chapters
2 and 3. For purposes of identifying second-order codes, this code is not applicable to the
analysis itself. Thus, that code was eliminated from the second-order coding analysis.
It must be noted that in Figure 7 (above), several codes are not just important
concepts on their own, but they are very similar in content. For instance, in ―Crisis
response‖ there are two similar codes, i.e., command and executive tasks. These codes
stand alone as important leadership codes. As such, the researcher elected to create a
code entitled ―Leadership‖ to the list of second-order codes.
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Next, a qualitative analysis of the coding may reveal concepts beyond those
discovered in the co-occurrence method. A network view of the highest density codes in
the code hierarchy provides a qualitative perspective of the coding.

Linkages are

established between the higher order codes in the hierarchy along with their densities.
Figure 8 – Network View for Higher-order codes, is the network view for these high
order codes.

Figure 8 – Network View for Higher-order Coding

In Figure 8, many of the second-order codes are identified in the co-occurrence
analysis as important codes (including the importance of the ―Leadership‖ code). It must
be noted that the density for decision-making is very high, i.e., 22. This means that
decision-making links to 22 other codes. One potential explanation for the second-order
code of decision-making not revealing itself in the co-occurrence analysis is that, its
associated quotations were amortized over 22 other codes and the threshold of the 20
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quotes used in the co-occurrence analysis is too high to capture decision-making. In
summary, the results of both, the co-occurrence and qualitative analyses reveal the
following third-order codes:



Felt emotions



Situational context



Crisis response



Sensemaking



Decision-making



Leadership

The remaining subsections of this Chapter describe the second-order themes that
make-up the third-order codes (aggregate dimensions) of felt emotions, situational
context, crisis response, sensemaking, decision-making, and leadership.

In some

subchapters, the researcher provides a brief literature review to improve linkages with the
results. Then, the results will be discussed in Chapter 5 along with the theoretical
implications. This process of describing the second-order themes begins with an analysis
of the role of felt emotions in extreme crisis.
Felt Emotions
Analysis
Felt emotions are a significant concept discussed by many of the interviewees. As
shown in Figure 9, Psychological – Felt emotions, all of the data samples include some
discussion of felt emotions. As depicted in Figure 9 below, from the interview data in the
various ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Units, felt emotions are particularly significant in the
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Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima cases where loss of life and unfathomable conditions
(Yammarnio, et al. 2010) existed.

Figure 9 – Psychological - Felt Emotions
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Figure 9 indicates that the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima cases were the
most significant with regard to the felt emotions involved. These two cases suggest that
there are unique insights on the role of felt emotions for extreme events. These insights
will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Given that there were 707 quotations coded under the ―Felt Emotion‖ code, felt
emotions are clearly a major concept in extreme events. Many of those impacts of felt
emotions are discussed in Chapter 5.
As discussed in Chapter 2 earlier, extreme events are usually unfathomable and
unpredictable, and they have transboundary aspects. In the Fukushima and Deepwater
Horizon cases, the interview and transcript data reflected the impact of felt emotions on
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the leaders involved. Many of the interviewees discussed the deaths that occurred in
those two cases, as well as the major explosions and fire, and the threats to further loss of
life along with how those circumstances altered their cognitive abilities. It is under these
circumstances that leaders or their followers may be struck with felt emotions that are of
interest in this research. The types of felt emotions experienced by the interviewees
were: panic/calmness, awareness, success, heroism, hopefulness, humor, optimism,
outrage, skepticism, and trust. Each of these felt emotions is reviewed in the following
subchapter.
Panic and Calmness
Several important considerations of panic emerged here. First, during the extreme
events, leaders revealed that they personally had to resist the urges caused by panic.
Many interviewees talked about the need to control panic by remaining calm and
suppressing the urge to flee. Second, a unique phenomenon emerged from the interviews
related to protecting oneself from external sources or ―interferences‖ due to panic
generated by external organizations. Finally, many of the interviewees provided specific
insights on issues that leaders needed to consider when controlling the panic of the both
their leaders and their subordinate workers. Specifically, the interviewees discussed the
need for leaders to be self-aware, to maintain situational awareness, and support and
protect workers.
My data implied that the onus is on leaders to control both their own panic, and
that of the workers during an extreme event. Many of the interviewees in the above cases
spoke of the need to remain calm even during fight-or-flight conditions. When faced
with stressful conditions, many of the leaders shared techniques that they used to control
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panic.

After reviewing those panic control techniques, a grouping of techniques

emerged: leader self-consciousness, situational awareness, and protecting workers. From
the interviews, it appeared that the leaders were successful in controlling panic by
resorting to these techniques. In fact, one interview clearly reflected the individual‘s
thoughts on controlling panic:

It appears to be necessary for an extreme event leader to understand that all eyes
are on them immediately upon the disaster. A conscious leader remains aware of
the need to maintain calmness themselves, the staff‘s emotions, and the site
conditions. A conscious leader understands that the staff‘s trust in the leader
resets to almost zero at the instant of the event and rebuilds with every decision,
emotion and action shown by the conscious leader. (Ref. RW.)

Heroism
In extreme events, interviewees discussed many acts of heroism. Throughout the
interviews, there were nearly 72 quotes directly related to heroism. The interviews
highlighted a significant difference between military and non-military situations. There
were several quotes that highlighted the severity of the Deepwater Horizon and
Fukushima cases, in particular. In the Deepwater Horizon case, 11 workers died on the
rig, while in the Fukushima case, two workers died on site due to the tsunami along with
several workers who lost family members and houses in the tsunami. This area of
research, i.e., military versus non-military, is explored in detail in Chapter 5 and is an
area for future research.
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Hope
My second-order analysis, another significant emotion, ―hope‖, was revealed.
Given the unfathomable aspects of extreme events, not only do workers sometimes need
hope, but the Transboundary nature of extreme events calls for ―hope-giving‖ to the
public. Interviewees provide numerous examples of the need to infuse both the workers
and the public with the hope that the situation will improve. Interviewees also provide
examples of hopelessness. A brief summary of the points expressed by the interviewees
is mentioned here:



Hope is the essence of information people want (Interviewee SS speaking to her
workers during a hurricane response).



One interviewee explained, ―I think it becomes, in the worst time of a crisis, a
fragile environment from a leadership standpoint that you‘ve got to hold together
and that‘s everyone‘s mindset around you‖. He goes on to elaborate, ―I recall
vividly the yearning in their eyes for leadership” (emphasis added). Ref. RW



When operators were isolated during the Fukushima event, phone calls home
served as more than a mechanism to communicate; those phone calls served as
hope that at some point normality would return to their lives.



An interviewee gave up all hope after the last reactor exploded. Their work
seemed futile and continuing with their work seemed futile as well.



The equipment that was dispatched to the site was not only the equipment to be
used in controlling the event, it also represented hope. When it did not arrive, the
leader experienced hopelessness.



After the final reactor exploded, this leader expressed the hopelessness he felt.



Even something as simple as establishing room lighting was a source of hope.
The lighting represented more than light; it represented success and hope.



The leaders were offered encouragement by the emergency response center in
Tokyo who told them that help was imminent; yet time again that help did not
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arrive as promised.


The significance of ―praying to God‖. Many of the people did not hold strong
religious views prior to the event; however, in these circumstances, religion
emerged.



At Fukushima, the younger operators wanted to leave the control room.

In

dispensing encouragement, the leader appealed to their sense of duty. It must be
noted that the cultural aspect of bowing and apologizing to the workers while he
spoke did imply that the leader was asking and begging for help.


The Presidential visit to the Three Mile Island accident also included the First
Lady on the trip. This visit was not only to inform the President, but to give
comfort and hope to the citizens.

Trust
As a felt emotion, trust and its impact during crisis situations are extensively
studied across domains.

In this dissertation, it is important to provide special

considerations of trust in crises involving extreme events. There are 52 quotations in the
ATLAS.ti data related to the code ―trust‖. Some of those quotes involve life, death, or
unfathomable circumstances. Given below is a brief summary of the points expressed by
the interviewees:



Despite not knowing his rescuers, a victim trusted them.



A Governor was new to his position – when the time of need arrived, the
Governor leaned on people who he knew prior to his position and trusted them
above those leaders who were in established State roles.



An interviewee remarked that familiarity bred trust.

As the military gained

experience in providing humanitarian assistance, they gained trust and improved
communication.
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Leader competence as a fundamental building block of trust was discussed
extensively.



One interviewee mentioned that an element of trust was shown by being present
on the ground and displaying competence. Followers can often tell if the leader is
competent. Further, the leaders must be willing to do those things that they ask of
their followers.



The leader was the first to volunteer for the hazardous task. Even though he
ultimately did not participate, his willingness to volunteer paved the way for the
others to volunteer.



In one case, the corporate leadership asked for trust from the onsite leaders. Also,
the corporate leaders conveyed hope to their counter-parts onsite and asked for
their trust.



The leader sought to know the personal issues plaguing his workers. According
to interviewee MA, this helped limit the trust debt during the extreme event.



The importance of safety culture was deeply established throughout the
organization prior to the event.



The leader took responsibility for all mistakes. He used that as a mechanism to
build trust and motivate.



A prior relationship with the fire department was essential in encouraging the
department to face this hazardous situation.

The interviewee had a weak

relationship with the subcontractors and they did not stand by him during the
extreme crisis.

In summary, as expected, ―trust‖ as a felt emotion appears as a crucial component
of extreme crisis leadership.

There were other felt emotions discussed by the

interviewees, and those emotions are discussed next.
Other Felt Emotions
As discussed above, the interviewees discussed a number of felt emotions that
occurred during the extreme event. Besides the emotions of trust and hope, there were
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other emotions discussed, i.e., awareness, success, humor, optimism, outrage, and
skepticism. These emotions were mentioned in the interviews; however, other than
―awareness‖, none of these rose to the level of panic and heroism in the discussions.
Clearly, awareness, and more importantly, unawareness, was a key concept
mentioned across the interviews. Interviewee RW suggested that a conscious and aware
leader was essential to the successful outcome of an extreme event. RW suggested that
awareness also fed sensemaking. RW alluded that if the leader was not aware, then
sensemaking and decision-making were not likely to occur. That is, if the leader is not
aware of the actual situation then the leader‘s ability to analyze, assess, and direct
(elements of sensemaking and decision-making) are either limited or non-existent.
Awareness and unawareness have been discussed as part of sensemaking and decisionmaking in the subchapters of Chapter 4. As for the impact of leadership celebration as a
felt emotion, the interviews revealed that in the Fukushima case, at times the leaders
performed celebrations after successful activities and these celebration moments were
effective in assuring workers (Ref. MA).

I was not particularly worried (about their motivation), but for the first two days, I
tried to make myself clear to them what we were going to do. From the third day,
after connecting one cable, we all celebrated by clapping hands. Also when they
heard a motor was installed, or a test-run was completed, we clapped hands. We
worked on preparation for getting equipment from the Fukushima Dai-ichi, and
when a helicopter landed with the equipment, we all celebrated. There was a
sense of achievement. I don‘t remember this but it seems that I always said
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―thank you‖ when one task was completed even though I was yelling when I was
instructing. I was happy to have heard of that. I think this is something that kept
the workers motivated for the first four days to one week. (Ref. MA.)

As with celebrating success (discussed above), the use of humor as a motivational
tool did surface even in dire circumstances. In fact, the leader in the next Fukushima
example used humor effectively as a tool for sensemaking.

Through humor he

acknowledged the desperate reality that the group faced. It must be noted that in the
midst of the Fukushima accident, the operators exceeded their emergency response
training.

Normally, once the event progressed beyond a certain training point, the

instructors would say: ―Freeze the simulator here‖. After the actual event exceeded the
simulator‘s ―freezing‖ point, the control room supervisor reflected in the interview: ―To
my surprise, under that situation, still some operators were bold enough to say that we
stopped right around here if it had been a normal situation. I did not have my instructor
behind me but I wished I have had him there and heard him saying, ―Freeze.‖‖ (Ref. IZ.)
In Chapters 2 and 3 the researcher has included discussions on ―optimistic bias –
escalation of commitment‖ (Joffe 2003). The interviews include a significant example of
this concept. The concept of ―optimistic bias‖ was most notable in the Fukushima case
where an incorrect response strategy seriously complicated the event.

It must be

understood that implementing an incorrect strategy immediately and incorrectly holding
onto the strategy despite indications to the contrary (optimistic) causes wholesale failures
in event response. Additionally, the Fukushima operators held onto the strategy even
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when the speed of events exceeded the speed of their response as seen in this interview‘s
statement:

Then the leaders started shouting, really shouting, or scolding. He told us, ―You
know, we can never repeat this program for Unit 2 and Unit 3‖. Our mistake was
that we were always acting under assumption of prediction, very bad prediction.
―From now, you must report to me exactly what you were doing and what are you
going to do by when‖. He also scolded to headquarters through the TV monitor,
―This request or command is to you, as well‖. And the people said, ―Yes, very
small, very low‖. (Ref. IN.)

This dissertation has a few instances of leaders who were overly optimistic in
their assessment of the events; however, in this one example above, the consequences of
the blind spot caused by optimistic bias were severe and it greatly complicated the
outcome of the event.
Public outrage, like the panic of the workers, was another emotion discussed by
one interviewee (refer to the issue of social amplification of risk in Chapter 2). As public
concern increased, so did the political involvement in the event‘s leadership. Quote:
―From the White House perspective, on these domestic events, and you have public
outrage like (hurricanes) Katrina and Sandy, you‘re really just looking for the governor,
for the Stafford Act, how else would they get involved if there‘s a high public concern?
If the State … you talked earlier about the White House gets involved and if the federal
government fails‖. (Ref. JB.)

155

In many interviews, the feeling of skepticism while perhaps not a true felt
emotion certainly is related to felt emotions. Though this issue will be discussed later in
this Chapter since it relates to defiance, here is an example from the Three Mile Island
event:

Interviewer: ―So in terms of deference to expertise, you were a bit skeptical about
expertise? Interviewee: ―Yes I was. I became skeptical. Initially, I was like
everybody else. If you let these guys run this sophisticated reactor, anything they
tell us must be accurate. Well, as I recounted in the case of the Lieutenant
Governor, that was dissipated within a couple of hours. These guys simply lied to
us. Well that‘s … no, it isn‘t too strong. They told us things that weren‘t true.
Now, maybe they were well-intended, and maybe they were simply incompetent,
but there was no question that we were misled badly in the early stages of the
accident. The worry was over whether what we were releasing was factual, but
our skepticism was established very early on so that this carried through all of the
events that transpired over the next week or 10 days that we were very careful to
examine‖. (Ref. DT.)

Summary of Felt Emotions
There were 707 quotations related to felt emotions within the interviews. This
number suggests that there is a major link between the felt emotions experienced by
leaders in an extreme event along with the emotional links associated with situational
awareness, sensemaking, decision-making, and crisis response.
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Obviously there is

significant co-occurrence between these concepts. As each of these concepts is analyzed,
the role of the felt emotions is included in the analyses. Ultimately, Chapter 5 seeks to
integrate the results and provide some overall conclusions.
This subchapter highlights that the felt emotions were most prominent in the
Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events; however, nearly all interviews contained
some related emotions.

Those felt emotions included: panic/calmness, awareness,

success, heroism, hopefulness, humor, optimism, outrage, skepticism, and trust.

In

summary, the interviewees indicated that:



The unfathomable circumstances (Yammarnio, et al. 2010) involved in the
extreme events can create panic among leaders and workers. The interviewees
from both the events expressed the need for the extreme event leaders to control
panic. The interviews revealed several insights to help do so, including: 1.
protecting the situation from external interferences; 2. being self-aware; 3. being
aware of the situation, i.e., sharing calmness not panic; and 4. supporting the
workers‘ welfare.



Throughout these interviews there were countless recollections of heroic acts,
including 72 quotes directly related to heroism. The interviews highlighted a
significant difference between military and non-military situations.



The emotion of hope was very dominant in the interviews.



Another dominant emotion was the feeling of trust among the leaders and
subordinates.

157

Situational Context21
Throughout the interview process, each interviewee discussed the situation at the
scene of the event they were involved in. Because each event was somewhat different, it
was necessary for the coding process to enable the conditions for each site, yet
acknowledge that according to the process suggested by Friese (2012), the codes would
have to allow for the consolidation of the quotations.

Therefore, the researcher

developed a hierarchy of codes under the general code heading ―situational context‖.
This higher-level code was then broken down into a series of first-order codes and
ultimately second-order and third-order codes.
Analysis
A pattern emerged as the researcher reviewed the first- and second-order codes.
Most of the codes and associated quotations fell into two major categories: the issues
associated with the scope of the event, and those associated with the magnitude of the
event. This subsection covers the scope and magnitude under the overall ―situational
context‖. Each of the first- and second-order codes associated with situational context
are described below.
Scope
From the interviews, the scope of the situation included areas such as
technological issues, cooperation, safety context, and support for workers. Next is a
discussion for each of the scope issues.

21

Situational context basically refers to the situation on the ground of the event. It is a collection of interviewee quotations that
describe the scope and magnitude of the event.
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Technological Issues
Interviews from each event reveal technological issues. Some of these
technological issues were common among the events. For instance, in all three technical
events (Deepwater Horizon, Fukushima and Three Mile Island), interviewees discussed
the technical complexities of these facilities and the complications that these complexities
caused during the extreme events. In each of the events, interviewees discussed the
challenges created by pushing the boundaries of the technology. Events were greatly
complicated by the site conditions, including unknown information, missing information,
lack of planning, disagreements, old equipment, lack of workers, and the expanding
scope of the event being greater than their comprehension. Another common issue in all
three technical events was the social bias against technology. That social bias manifested
itself in public fear, which resulted in an expansion of the scope of the events to include
public outrage. The social bias also complicated the communication of technical issues
to the public.
Interviewees discussing non-technological events, such as hurricanes, focused the
technological discussions on urban versus suburban impacts. They suggested that the
urban technological impacts are greater than the suburban impacts. In the urban context,
hurricanes, forest fires, and other natural disasters wreak significant damage on
technological infrastructure. According to some interviewees, the key technological issue
for leaders managing these events is to manage the expectations of the victims, i.e.,
provide the victims realistic recovery periods for infrastructural repair and restoration of
services, such as the Internet, electrical power, water services, etc.
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At the senior

government level, the Situation Room interviewees focused on more strategic technical
issues such as:



The need for consistent decision-making



Gaining cooperation among organizations



Matching resources and capability with needs



Getting the right people involved and keeping the wrong people out of the
leadership



Using simple language



Determining the level of resources for the response



Preventing events from cascading



Familiarizing leadership technically through the use of experts and technical
interpreters



Encouraging community reliance/planning

Also, the Situation Room leaders discussed the evolution of these extreme events
where events that were once considered extreme, such as hurricanes, were now seen as
being more routinely managed; yet there were new extreme events emerging to replace
those. Those new extreme events included events, such as major land fires in places
where major fires had never occurred or cyber-attacks or even potent pandemic events,
e.g., H1N1 virus.
Cooperation
For the second-order concept of ―cooperation‖, each of the events had unique
issues related to the cooperation among entities during the response. According to the
interviewees, the lack of, or inadequate, cooperation often resulted from role confusion
and consequently in miscommunication at times when close communications were
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particularly important. In each case, the breakdown of cooperation exacerbated the
recovery from the event. A summary of the breakdowns in cooperation for each event is
explained below.
Deepwater Horizon interviewees and data highlighted two sources of role
confusion (cooperation).

First, it was not clear among the crew whether legally,

Deepwater Horizon could be considered as an oil rig or as a vessel. This confusion
resulted in the lack of clarity in whether the vessel‘s captain or the ―oilman‖ was in
charge. As a result, during the disaster, it was not clear who was giving orders about
Mayday calls and evacuation to the crew. Second, there were a number of entities
responsible for operations on Deepwater Horizon. There was an owner company, a
drilling company, and a leasing company, all of whom had roles and responsibilities.
These roles made it difficult to coordinate activities including operational, training,
evacuation drills, and other day-to-day activities. The lack of clarity regarding roles and
responsibilities was exposed greatly during the event.
According to interviews, during the Fukushima disaster there were breakdowns in
cooperation among many organizations. Interviewees stated that there were breakdowns
of cooperation within the government, between the government and the utility services,
within the utility companies, and more importantly, between the emergency response
center at the site and the control rooms within the reactors. Strategically, organizational
stovepipes hampered the response. Interviewees discussed the failure of the government
to provide adequate information to limit public panic, the frustration of a slow response
system, the lack of accurate information, a poor communications structure, and the
challenges of democracies in controlling harmful information, all of which compounded
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the event. Importantly, the interviewees were concerned that the regulator did not have
representatives at the site to provide a safety perspective. There was also the possibility
that without the legal authority to compel the workers to remain at the site, all the
workers would leave or be withdrawn by the operating company leaving the site
unstaffed resulting in further reactor damage and radiation release.
Interviewees discussed several cooperation issues that occurred during the Three
Mile Island accident.

There were communication and trust breakdowns with the

company that owned and operated the plant. There were distractions caused by outside
politicians who unnecessarily wanted information merely to indicate their involvement in
the response. There were miscommunications that led to an unnecessary evacuation of
100,000 residents, which then caused more infrastructure complications, and there was a
concern that other nuclear facilities would have similar accidents. Interviewees discussed
the consequences of poor technical and management leadership at the facility. All of
these issues caused coordination challenges for the people actually responding to the
event.

There were some examples of positive cooperation issues noted by the

interviewees e.g., the Presidential site visit at Three Mile Island, gaining the cooperation
of the correct experts, and the recognition that the Federal government should allow local
responders to lead the response.
For the interviews discussing hurricanes as an extreme event, the interviewees
highlighted the need for ―intelligence led management‖. (Ref. JH.) That is the necessity
for leadership to get in front of the event, for leaders to set expectations for everyone
involved in the response and impacted by the hurricane, to match resources with strategy,
and the need to be transparent with the media and public.
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At the White House Situation Room level, interviewees discussed a number of
strategic cooperation issues. Most notably, from a strategic perspective, the interviewees
talked about the need to match the speed of response with the speed of the event,
including matching the available resources and capabilities to the needs of the event
response. All of the interviewees discussed the importance of local control and local
command including the value of domestic resilience for community-preparation. Some
interviewees discussed the need for leadership to have a team of people around them that
they were comfortable with and could trust. In one event, an interviewee discussed an
anecdote where social justice trumped local control. Note: This issue of social justice
versus technical justice was discussed in Chapter 2.

The other coordination issues

discussed by interviewees included:



Decision-making – the need to get expert advice



Leadership – the need to co-locate commands if necessary



Rumor control



In the cases of international response, to be conscious of ensuring the host
country is most appreciated for their response



Clarity, speed, normalization, integration, prioritization of communications



Unity of effort through the use of consistent coordination models and adjusting
the model to fit the specific event, using familiar and established relationships



Acknowledging the reality that the federal government is not in charge and the
value of local community relationships

In summary, all of the interviewees stressed the importance of organizational and
individual cooperation during these events.

In all cases, the interviews provided

examples where less than adequate coordination complicated the event response.
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Breakdowns in cooperation were generated through both organizational and individual
weaknesses.
Safety Context
The second-order code of ―safety context‖ combines a number of first-order
codes. Safety context include the first-order codes of: natural versus artificial (manmade) events, training, site conditions, turnover, safety culture, safety system status,
distraction, fatigue, and procedures made up the safety context code.

Interviewees

provided hundreds of quotations in this area. A summary of the discussions follows
below.
Regarding the safety context on the Deepwater Horizon, data and interviews
illustrated that there were many safety barriers that failed, and those failures contributed
to and complicated the accident. Those barriers included safety training, safety culture,
site safety conditions, crew distractions, worker fatigue, turnover, and safety procedures.
Interviewees talked about significant failures in each of those areas.
There were many quotations provided by the interviewees relating to the
Fukushima disaster. Regardless of their level of responsibility in the response, each
interviewee provided his perspectives on the breakdowns in safety processes during the
Fukushima disaster. Each interviewee, even the journalist interviewed (Interviewee YF)
expressed concerns regarding safety breakdowns, for example:



The journalist, Mr. YF focused on the fortitude of the Prime Minister and the
worry of a proposed doomsday scenario as a possibility, and the defiance
displayed by some leaders at the site.
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At the Fukushima site, interviewees passionately discussed their confusion
regarding what was happening. Significant concerns they mentioned included:
the need to implore workers not to quit; the role of their leader (note: this will be
discussed later in Chapter 4 under leadership); the lack of information; making
decisions without information; the fatigue associated with a long response; and
their failure to develop the correct response strategy.



At the senior government level, regarding Fukushima, interviewee GH focused on
the need to immediately repair infrastructure to support the response, discussed
the reluctance of some senior government leaders to travel to the site (note: this
will be discussed later in Chapter 4 under leadership), and enumerated the
challenges of disagreements between the government and the company.



Interviews with hurricane responders focused on the safety context areas in
discussing the differences between natural versus artificial (man-made) events.
Interviewee JH implied that natural events tended to have a larger impact on
normal life and the victim‘s needs were greater. Interviewee JH stated that key
strategy points were related to the use of intelligence information regardless of the
event, using the same emergency response organization, interlacing resources, and
strategies. Finally, JH suggested that the major difference was that artificial
(man-made) events tended to require more analytic capability.
In summary, with regard to the safety context of the Situation Room interviews,

the interviewees discussed their perspectives on the national level of safety.

They

provided quotations that give insights into the White House priorities. A summary of
their perspectives is:
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The value of frequent involvement in disasters



The cautious role of the US military in international response



Keeping with the normal response plan as long as possible but understanding that
these one-percent events would be novel



The technical limitations of government and companies



Resolutions of inter-agency concerns



Understanding the need to educate the leadership on technical issues



Taking the necessary steps to gain a unity of effort including repurposing
resources



Having an appreciation that all events are local and having an appreciation for the
use of local resources

Support for workers
The second-order code of support for workers consists of all the first-order codes
that are related to providing resources, mental and physical protection, and other issues
related to worker needs. In some cases, interviewees discussed support for victims.
These discussions are included in this code as well.

Below is a summary of the

interviews.
Support for the health and safety of workers was a significant source of quotes for
Fukushima (Ref. IN, IZ, MA). There was a significant difference in the concern for
worker health between the military and non-military interviewees. Discussions with
military interviewees (Ref. RW) revealed more of a willingness to focus on immediate
event response over the care for worker health.
Interviewee SS talked about supporting workers during hurricane responses.
Clearly the interviewee placed worker well-being above all other concerns. Further, the
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interviewee discussed the value of engendering the company‘s full support of workers,
for instance, the electrical line crews, in the field. Some techniques discussed included
providing call center representatives to answer questions and identify needs of the
workers, involving everyone in the company to support the response workers, and
supporting the families of the workers so that the workers‘ stress was relieved and this
enabled them to focus on recovery activities.
From the Situation Room perspective, interviewees discussed the comparison
between the victims of earthquakes versus tsunamis.

Earthquakes resulted in a

significant need for rescue and first aid, while tsunamis resulted in either life or death of
the victims. Interviewees focused on the helpful role of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental bodies in assisting those affected. Finding funding for the response was
clearly an important task at the Situation Room level. The topic of resilience was
mentioned throughout the interviews. Resilience thinking includes the realization that
victims can also serve as a resource for recovery. It then becomes critical that the federal
government help manage the expectations of the survivors.
Magnitude
This subchapter provides a summary of the interviewee reflections on the
magnitude or severity of the event.
unfathomable crisis conditions.

The magnitude ranges from the fathomable to

Each event (and non-event) is discussed from this

perspective.
According to the interviewees, the sights and sounds experienced during the
Deepwater Horizon event were far beyond what the crew had anticipated through their
training. Some safety procedures, e.g., life raft functionality, emergency disconnect
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switches, among other safety features, failed to function.

In fact, the interviewees

suggested that as a result, the fires and explosions actually defeated some of the safety
features, thereby contributing to expanding the magnitude of the disaster.
For the Fukushima interviews, interviewees expressed their disbelief at the
extreme conditions at the facility.

All interviewees discussed the impact of the

explosions, their fear and panic, their lack of understanding of the events, their personal
doubts and fear for their lives and that for the lives of others, and they expressed an
unbelievable sense that conditions were well beyond anything that they would expect to
witness during a nuclear event.
Interestingly, there was only one quote with the first-order code of ―unfathomable
conditions‖ for the hurricane interviews. That quotation involved setting expectations for
the victims of hurricanes. This was interesting because as depicted in data for this
dissertation, the classification of hurricanes as an extreme event was questionable. Also,
during JB‘s interview, during a discussion of rare events, the interviewee suggested that
hurricane response was more normalized then than in the past.
In the Three Mile Island interviews (Ref. HD, DT), there were a number of
quotations that co-occurred with other codes already covered, so those are not reiterated
here. However, there was one quote from interviewee HD who discussed the option of
the federal government to take over an event from a company should the company fail in
their event response. The interviewee surmised that this would be a ―nuclear option‖,
meaning an option of last resort and thus not likely to happen but that it would remain an
option for the Federal response.
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For the Situation Room interviews, there was significant amount of co-occurrence
in the discussions especially related to the characteristics of the one-percent (rare) events.
The other area of co-occurrence was in the need for advance planning for these extreme
events. Given the co-occurrence for this code, there were no specific quotes in this area
that were coded as ―unfathomable‖ conditions that had not already been addressed
elsewhere in this Chapter.
Summary of Situational Context
In summary, the five second-level codes (technological issues, cooperation, safety
context, support for workers and magnitude) reflected all of the quotations for the firstorder codes associated with ―situational context‖. Essentially, situation context reflects
the actual situation surrounding a given event. That situational context will influence the
response in a number of ways.

Subsequent to this, the researcher discusses the

correlation of these second-order codes with the literature through the third-level coding.
The purpose of this third-order coding is to allow for theoretical evaluation of the data
thereby better enabling theory construction. Correlation with the literature allows for the
identification of gaps, and theoretical extensions of the theories.

This process is

consistent with the Gioia et al.‘s (2012) process and the bottom-up, top-down process
used in this dissertation. First, a review of the five second-order codes as they relate to
the existing extreme event literature is helpful for the discussions in Chapter 5. My
literature review reveals:



The technological issues discussed by the interviewees are consistent with the
resilience activities discussed in the literature (Wachtendorf, 2009). For instance,
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ensuring a community is technically robust against the effects of a hurricane is
consistent with the resilience philosophy ascribed in the literature. Similarly,
ensuring that a nuclear plant or oil rig can withstand the technical challenges that
it may face is a resilience issue.

Thus, technological codes (second-order)

correlate with resilience as a third-order code.


The second-order coding of ―cooperation‖ and ―support for people/workers, are
consistent with the literature related to ―executive tasks‖ (Boin, 2009) which
refers to gaining cooperation among response entities which is a role of the event
response leader. As such, the second-order code cooperation correlates with
executive tasks becoming a third-order code.



The safety context second-order code is consistent with the literature regarding
readiness (Smits & Ezzat-Ally, 2003; Voogd, 2004).

Activities such as

developing an adequate safety culture, providing safety training, developing
safety procedures are readiness tasks. Thus, the second-order code correlates to
readiness as a third-order code.


Finally, the second-order code of ―magnitude‖ does not correlate directly with the
literature.

However, this researcher considers the conditions at the site as

essentially a demand for resources. That is, the severity of the conditions at the
site will generally dictate the resources needed for a response.

Crisis Response
In the codebook, crisis response is defined as ―quotes that refer to instances where
leaders discuss activities, thoughts, or comments related to the actual performance of tasks
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or conditions that contributed to the outcome of the event‖. Essentially, this refers to
instances when the interviewees maintain that they acted so as to bring about a crisis event
outcome. These actions were keys in deciding the event outcomes: either successful or
unsuccessful outcomes. There is one sole code related to crisis response ―outcomes‖. This
code is labeled as ―(in)effectiveness‖.
Analysis
My analysis is intended to highlight some of the more important interviewee
quotations for the code ―(in)effectiveness and to extract insights from the literature for
the each quotation. This process is consistent with the Gioia et al.‘s (2012) bottom-up
and top-down approaches that have been used throughout this dissertation. The summary
subsection below provides general description of the results and the insights that are
further developed in Chapter 5.
Confirmation of Existing Theory and Limitations
This subchapter provides a summary and an analysis of the literature associated
with crisis response. I reviewed existing crisis response theories and their limitations.
The intent of this review was to determine if the data in this dissertation provides any
evidence to support, refute, or illuminate those theories. A summary of the analysis is
provided here:

Adaptive Leadership theories and Sensemaking theories - Evidence provided by
some interviewees suggested that Adaptive Leadership and Sensemaking theories are
viable and important insights into crisis leadership. For sensemaking, among many
quotations discussed in the ―Sensemaking‖ subchapter, there were a number of
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sensemaking related quotations provided during the interviewees‘ discussion of crisis
response. For instance, examine the quote: ―I had a mind-set that I would not say no to
their decisions because I did not know all the parameter on the reactors. I just remember
asking them to wait when they wanted to stop something‖ (Ref. MA.). Consistent with
the thoughts of Mumford (2005), this quotation refers to the interviewee‘s establishment
of a prescriptive model in his thinking.
Next, several interviews provided confirmation of the importance of adaptive
leadership in the interviewees‘ experiences. There were countless quotations reflecting
the need for adaptation in responding to events. In these quotations, the interviewees
discussed the use of judgment, leaning forward (adapting), innovating, repurposing
(adapting), using people as resources (adapting), and authoritative leadership. These are
all the principles of adaptive leadership. One specific quote highlights the importance of
adaptive leadership:

Leaning forward by making everything available, saying hey, something bad‘s
coming your way, money‘s no object, get things in place, right. That‘s what a
presidential emergency declaration does for you. Then when it comes through
you‘ve got everything lined up, so that you immediately can staff the Stafford Act
and again everything pops up.

The only thing that slows you down is the

leadership, right, it‘s not the playbook. Playbook is in play and you‘re running.
We‘ve got people who‘ve been incredibly trained, they have experienced crisis
and they‘re mature, they‘re steeped in an understanding of emergency
management. (Ref. JB.)
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Readiness and Failure theories - Some interviewees provided examples that
confirmed limitations in terms of Readiness and Failure theories. Specifically for the
readiness theory, many interviewees provided examples of situations where the
responders were unprepared despite all the prior work related to preparedness. Their
examples implied that there were limits to their ability to predict and prepare for these
Black Swan events. These quotations illustrate the points made by Quarantelli (1988)
that despite the usefulness of readiness, prior planning is not enough for extreme events.
As one example, an interviewee talked about his complete lack of preparedness in
responding to an unfathomable condition: ―It was a terrible moment. This is mainly
about Unit 3. For Unit 3, my colleagues tried to make a hole in the reactor building to
avoid the explosion, but we didn‘t have suitable tools‖. (Ref. IN.)
Another theory where a limitation was identified is the failure theory (refer to the
discussion of failure theory in Chapter 2). As in the example for the readiness theory,
given the unlimited combinations of events, neither high reliability nor normal accident
theories can predict all of the potential events that can occur, particularly with regard to
latent organizational weaknesses. Many interviewees expressed situations where latent
organizational weaknesses were greatly exposed and led to extreme complications in
responding to the event. In the Deepwater Horizon case, the Captain‘s lack of knowledge
of the emergency procedures and the confusion regarding crucial authorities led to
significant complications during the event.

Specifically, the Materials Management

Agency‘s interview of the Captain and the ―Oilman in Charge‖ highlighted these latent
organizational weaknesses:
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Interview of Deepwater Horizon Captain22:

Q. Where are the safety procedures located on the vessel?
A. I don‘t recall.
Q. So you don‘t remember whether there was a paper copy, computer?
A. Most of those small details I just don‘t recall.
(Ref. CK.)

Q. Now, you said there is a power point presentation on the safety management system?
A. Yes.
Q. What is in this power point presentation?
A. I‘m sorry, I don‘t recall the details.
(Ref. CK.)

Q. Everybody on board a vessel needs to know how safety is managed on the vessel
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Would the information of the Safety Management System be in this power point
presentation?
A. Honestly, I don‘t recall what exact details are in there.
(Ref. CK.)

Interview of Oilman in Charge:

Who has the authority to activate the system?
A. Well, there is the drill floor and it would either be the driller or the tool pusher, myself
and I guess at times, you know, during a real emergency, even the captain.
(Ref. JH.)

22

From Materials Management Hearing Transcripts (130819_001 Captain Curt Kuchta testimony) (Completed 08/27/13)

174

Q. Okay. Can you please tell me what procedures were in effect that would have avoided
people being in the areas where they were killed?
A......you have to have people there....we always notify our personnel when we have a
high content level of gas and get them out of any space, shut down anything during
drilling. Normally you don't get...gas back there when you‘re displacing the riser....but
when mud was coming up at a high rate somebody knew that there was well control
problems—
Q. Before there was an explosion somebody knew that there was a problem with the well
control. Maybe not you, but somebody on the rig knew that they had problems right?
A. That key time when there was mud coming out, have obvious flow from the well, did
Transocean have any written policies on getting those men...out of that area that's
anticipated there will be gas....no policy but we make sure that people get out....
(Ref. JH.)

Setback Management theory - Within the crisis response literature (refer to
Chapter 2), Lettieri et al. (2009) concludes that more research is needed on Setback
Management, including policy mapping, capacity mapping, and incident command. A
number of interviewee quotations reflect instances of setbacks in the events. Specific
research on these instances could advance this stream of literature. For example, one
interviewee discussed the complications of organizational infighting that is not discussed
in the literature. Another dilemma discussed by the interviewees expressed the need to
implement an incorrect strategy as their only option. They understood that the strategy
was incorrect, but it was the only option available to them (Ref. IN). This concept of
implementing an incorrect strategy is not covered in setback management literature.
Also, in the Fukushima case, interviewees expressed their disappointment regarding the
untimely arrival of safety equipment on-site. This disappointment reflected the setbacks
that they had experienced.

Setback management literature does not discuss the
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consequences of ―disappointment‖.

Thus, these interviews confirm the assertion of

Lettieri, et al. (2009) that much more research is needed for Setback Management.
Surprise Management theory - The theory of surprise management is another area
where these interviews suggest that an extension of the literature is necessary. While
interviews confirm Farazmand‘s (2009) assertions regarding the importance of goals and
missions, some quotations suggest some extension of those concepts is needed and is not
yet considered in the literature. For example, more work is needed on the downside of
over-eagerness, the role of logistics, and the communications mechanisms used to convey
changes in strategies to event responders.

Farazmand (2009) reflects that surprise

management, ―Aims to read and act in an anticipated fashion, remove or minimize
potential threats and clear obstacles to achieving goals and missions‖ (p. 407). In these
interviews there were a number of extensions of this concept espoused, for instance, by
one quote:

Actually, I had to change the priorities once along the way. I later learned that the
workers on the ground were very confused by this change of instruction; because
for those who were connecting the cables, it was not possible to change the cable
route all of a sudden. This is true. So I needed to be more cautious with the people
working on the site when I changed the priorities. I still needed to change the
priorities. If I had been persistent with my words, everyone would have been
confused, so the priorities needed to be changed. However, I needed to be more
cautious and considerate about those who had been working on the timeconsuming task when I made a change in the priorities. (Ref. MA.)
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Non-linear Leadership and Escalation of Commitment theories - These are two
related crisis response theories that were confirmed by the interviews.

Also the

interviews implied a necessary extension of the theories is necessary. For example, Nonlinear Leadership is discussed by Comfort (2002); Farazmand (2009); and Schumpter
(1942), among others (refer to Chapter 2).

Within this research are a number of

illustrative quotations related to the need for non-linear leadership. In these instances,
interviewees discuss the unfathomable conditions and their difficulties of leading others
through those conditions.

Clearly, there was a breakthrough point where the event

became extremely complicated, beyond the interviewees‘ abilities to control the event
(Ref. IN).

In the second case, the interviewee confirmed the thought of Weick &

Sutcliffe (2007) that managers needed to think strategically and non-linearly to manage
the expectations. They did so through ―buying back decision space‖. The specific quote
is:

Also, even though there was no water, they tried to cool them off as much as
possible by circulating water. They gave us extra 18 hours by doing all these.
We started cooling off the reactors just then when the restoration team was done
with changing motors and putting power supplies back. We had only two more
hours left before the pressure reached the designed pressure after all. While the
operation team worked really hard to save time, the restoration team collected
necessary equipment and installed it. (Ref. MA.)
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In another interview, the interviewee discussed the importance of preventing a
cascading breakthrough. This interview was in relationship to stopping the spread of an
infectious disease, the specific quote is:

Regarding the mitigation effort - that was to say what can the federal family and
state, and local communities bring the mitigating and one that was closing schools
are cancelling big events or wash or cover your cough that whole thing and stay
home if you‘re sick also part a mitigation with was medications, antibiotics to
treat symptoms and those sorts of things the third effort was on vaccine as we
leverage the global vaccine market to create a vaccine and to innovative distribute
and ship it. (Ref. RR.)

In a related theory, i.e., Escalation of Commitment, interviewee quotations highlight the
principles espoused by Parashevas (2006) regarding the phase transition of extreme
events:

We were focusing on the scram function. I was checking if everything was done
as in the exercises, and receiving reports. From time to time, I was checking the
manual if they were not missing anything written there. I was making sure
everything was done by the proper procedure until we got hit by the tsunami.
(Ref. IZ.)
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Enacting Organizations - This research suggests the potential for theory extension
with regard to Enacting Organizations as discussed by Daft and Weick (2001); and
Argyris (1977), (refer to Chapter 2). The enacting organization theory suggests that
single and double-loop mechanisms exist and they provide responders with feedback to
their enacted mental models.

My dataset, includes a number of quotations where

interviewees implied that their mental models were formed solely through instinctual
responses. Instinct played a significant role in the enacting feedback loop for some
interviewees. In this area of instinct, interviewees provided a number of examples where
instinct was the sole basis for their enactment. For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon
case, the Captain suggested that not only was instinct important but that the company had
codified instinct in the emergency procedures: ―The safety manual stresses just all of the
stuff that we do instinctively in the event of an accident‖. (Ref. CK.) Again in this
research, the role of instinct seems an important concept with regard to emergency leader
response.
Potential Gaps in the Data Analysis
My analysis of the interviews indicates that there are several theoretical constructs
(or codes) that are not explicitly discussed within this dissertation, yet they are discussed
by the interviewees regarding crisis response. These constructs could represent gaps in
my data analysis. Those constructs are:



Psychological or physical proximity



Be on the scene (of the event)



Offer credible answers



Self-complexity/self-concept
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Confidence and uncertainty in judgmental forecasting



Idiosyncratic theory



Fragmentation of control

While some of these constructs above may be related to other constructs that are
discussed in this dissertation, there may be some uncertainty regarding how thorough the
discussion is regarding those constructs in this list. For instance, the construct ―offering
credible answers‖ (in the list above) could be contained within the decision-making
discussion in Chapters 2 and 5, but it is not discussed explicitly. Also, the construct
―confidence and uncertainty in judgmental forecasting‖ could be contained within the
sensemaking discussion.

Finally, the ―fragmentation of control‖ construct could be

contained within the leadership discussion. Nevertheless, without re-coding all of the
data, omission of these constructs represents a limitation in this dissertation. Otherwise,
all of the constructs referred to by the interviewees for the code of ―(in)effectiveness‖
have been discussed in this dissertation.
During the interviews many of the interviewees discussed concepts such as
procedures, logistics, and the prioritization of recovery efforts. Because these issues are
treated in the literature as management practice issues and not theoretical issues (refer to
Chapter 2), there is limited discussed on these concepts in the various crises theory
literature. Nevertheless, from the bottom-up perspective, these management issues were
discussed in the interviews so they are considered in the bottom-up assessment despite
not being concepts covered by the literature. Even though they are management issues
are not theoretical issue per se, Chapter 2 does contain a limited discussion on some of
these management issues.
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Summary of Crisis Response
A thorough analysis of the crisis response codes, quotations, and literature was
explored in my analysis of the interviews. This analysis resulted in several conclusions
regarding the management aspects of crisis response theory. Those conclusions were
supported by interviewee quotations. With regard to the consistency of these results to
existing theories, the conclusions provided evidence that confirms several crisis theories.
For some crisis response theories, limitations were confirmed, in several cases existing
crisis response theory is confirmed and extended, and there were several crisis response
theories that were confirmed and where gaps or the possibility for theory extensions were
identified. The results of the crisis response analysis will be discussed further in Chapter
5.
Sensemaking
Sensemaking literature and the elements of sensemaking are discussed in Chapter
2.8. Sensemaking is one of the six major crisis concepts identified through the cooccurrence review of the data. The purpose of this subchapter is to present the results of
an analysis of those elements of sensemaking that come from the interview data. This
subchapter conducts a detailed analysis of the elements of sensemaking (as described in
Chapter 2.8) to conduct a comparison from the bottom-up review of the data compared to
the top-down approach that comes from the literature.
Analysis
There were 13 codes generated for sensemaking in ATLAS.ti with over 100
associated quotations. As discussed in subchapter 4.2, sensemaking is one of the six
important concepts generated from the interviews. Data from this subchapter confirms
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the importance of sensemaking as an element of extreme event leadership. These results
generally suggest that the Fukushima and Three Mile Island events had more positive
sensemaking interviewee reflections than the Deepwater Horizon case.
Sensemaking Overview
The results in this subchapter disaggregate the elements of sensemaking into two
groups to improve homogeneity of the review. One group of sensemaking elements
(from Chapter 2) consists of:



Positive evaluations23



Pessimism



Pluralistic ignorance



Collective sensemaking



Optimistic bias



Institutional effects



Updating



Doubt



Felt emotions

The second set consists of another set of elements created by Weick (1988; 1995), (also
from Chapter 2) regarding:



Commitment



Identity



Expectations

23

Kayes defines sensemaking characteristics as: positive evaluations, pessimism, pluralistic ignorance, collective sensemaking,
optimistic bias, institutional effects, updating, doubt, and felt emotions.
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I reviewed each sensemaking code against each set of sensemaking elements to
determine which elements of sensemaking were applicable to the interview. First, all
cases are reviewed as a group, then the non-event cases are reviewed, then the Fukushima
case only is reviewed (to provide a single-case example), and finally a review of the
interviewees reflections as ―in-crisis‖ or ―post-crisis‖ reflections are covered.
Sensemaking Results – All Cases
I reviewed all cases (actual events and situation room interviews) for
sensemaking quotes that were related to the appropriate element of sensemaking. From
my review, the data suggested:



Positive sensemaking evaluations - is significant for Fukushima and Three Mile
Island



Pessimism quotes - are evenly distributed across all cases



Pluralistic ignorance - is most significant for Deepwater Horizon



Collective sensemaking - is significant for Fukushima



Optimistic bias is - consistent among all cases



Institutional effect - is consistent among all cases



Updating - is significant for Fukushima



Doubt - is significant for the Deepwater Horizon case



Emotional – is consistent for Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events and nonexistent for the Three Mile Island event

This data are consistent for the emotional element of sensemaking as discussed in
Chapter 4.3 that indicates a high degree of emotion for these two events. Clearly, the
Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events generated the most emotion among the
interviewees. What is most interesting among this set of data is that the more positive
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elements of sensemaking, i.e., positive evaluations, collective sensemaking, and updating,
were significant for the Fukushima event.

The negative elements, i.e., pessimism,

pluralistic ignorance, doubt, and emotions, were significant for Deepwater Horizon.
Discussions with the interviewees were consistent with this data. In the Fukushima case,
the interviewees generally reflected a positive attitude in responding to the event up until
the explosion of the reactors. In the Deepwater Horizon case, there was little discussion
of positive sensemaking by the interviewees.

Discussions indicated an immediate

recognition by most people that a rig evacuation was necessary and that there was little
opportunity for successful resolution of the event after the emergency disconnect device
failed. Also, for the Deepwater Horizon case, the level of pluralistic ignorance was
significant given a general lack of sensemaking during the event. It is critical to note that
an analysis of all the data with regard to the ―in crisis‖ and ―post crisis‖ data will be
provided at the end of this subchapter.
The same data was analyzed against the sensemaking elements suggested by
Weick (1988; 1995): commitment, identity, and expectations. Overall, the results for
these elements were inconclusive. Each element was essentially evenly distributed in the
data. This suggested, as discussed in Chapter 2.8, that these elements of sensemaking are
better evaluated at the individual level versus the case level. For instance, Weick (1995)
discusses the element of ―identity‖ in his assessment of the Mann Gulch firefighters when
they dropped their fire implements to run from the fire (1949). According to Weick
(1995), at that point the firefighters lost their identity as firefighters. It appears that
Weick‘s (1995) single case study approach to these types of analyses is more appropriate
than a multiple case study analysis.
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Sensemaking results – Non-event cases
Some interviewees discussed non-actual event cases e.g. situation room
interviewees.

Their interviews were analyzed against the first set of sensemaking

elements and their interview data suggested:



Positive evaluations – all interviewees discussed the benefits of positive
sensemaking activities



Pessimism – a few interviewees mentioned the value of being pessimistic in
sensemaking, but there was not a significant emphasis on looking for the darkside of the situation



Pluralistic ignorance – a few interviewees reflected or considered that there could
be less than adequate understanding of the event across the responding
organizations. There were only two quotes related to this element



Collective sensemaking – most interviewees talked about the value of sharing
perspectives of the event



Optimistic bias – there were no quotes from the interviewees that considered
over-optimism



Institutional effect – all interviewees discussed the challenges of aligning
organizations, especially the government, into an effective response structure



Updating – all interviewees mentioned the value of continuous updating of
information as a mechanism to improve sensemaking



Doubt – a few interviews mentioned the value of building in doubt to the
sensemaking process. This was not a significant element of the discussions



Emotional – as might be expected from interviewees who were not directly
involved as first responders, their acknowledgment of the emotions involved in
sensemaking was low

185

Overall this analysis suggested that sensemaking at the senior official level is
more positive than that observed at the first responder level. Further, the data could
suggest that senior level officials could benefit from better understanding the challenges
of the first responders.

As discussed earlier in this subchapter, even the positive

evaluations have unintended consequences in that they can create blind spots.
Sensemaking Fukushima Only Case
In an attempt to determine whether a case-study approach provides a different
perspective for this analysis, the researcher analyzed the Fukushima case against both
sets of sensemaking elements
The results suggest:



Positive evaluations – all of the Fukushima interviewees discussed the value of
positive evaluations of sensemaking



Pessimism – the level of pessimism was consistent among interviewees



Pluralistic ignorance – the level of event misunderstanding was more significant
for the first responder interviewees



Collective sensemaking – generally consistent among interviewees



Optimistic bias – this was stronger for the first responder level suggesting that the
first responders were more hopeful than the senior officials



Institutional effect – this was consistent among interviewees



Updating – interestingly, the first responder interviewees were more likely to
mention the need to update their understanding of the situation. Perhaps, this was
because they had more information about the local conditions than the senior
officials were aware of about the local conditions



Doubt – again, the first responders were more likely to build doubt into their
situational (sensemaking) analysis
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Emotional – as expected, emotional assessments were more likely among the first
responder interviewees

From my analysis of the second set of sensemaking elements, i.e., commitment,
identity, and expectations, there were inconclusive results. There were references to each
of the three sensemaking elements in the interviews. Again, this analysis suggested that a
more individualistic approach is needed to assess these elements.
In-crisis versus Post-crisis Analysis
All quotations were assessed to determine if the interviewee was reflecting on his
comment as being part of an ―in-crisis‖, situation i.e., during the crisis, or a ―post-crisis‖
scenario, or even making rhetorical reflections.

Also, for the national leaders, i.e.,

Situation Room leaders, an attempt was made to determine if their reflections were based
upon actual experiences or if they were post-hoc.
Generally, the interviewees who were the first responders reflected their
comments as being made with reference to ―in-crisis‖ situations rather than post-hoc
ones.

For those interviewees who were not first responders, their reflections were

generally post-hoc or post crisis. These results are not surprising and therefore offer little
value in advancing this portion of the literature.
Summary of Sensemaking
The data suggested that the actual event cases reflected more emotion in terms of
sensemaking by the first responders than the senior level officials did in the non-event
cases.

There were inconclusive results regarding the second set of sensemaking

elements, i.e., commitment, identity, and expectations. Also, there were inconclusive
results for ―in crisis‖ and ―post crisis‖ reflections by interviewees.
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Similarly, the

Fukushima case analysis did provide some insights on multilevel sensemaking; however,
the overall results seemed consistent with the ―all data‖ events. The implications of these
results on an integrated model of extreme event leadership are incorporated into Chapter
5.
Decision-making
Analysis
An analysis of the interviewees‘ quotations associated with decision-making is
provided in this subchapter. The researcher discusses the individual decision-making
concepts raised in the interviews after describing the qualitative process. From that
discussion comes a set of second-order codes (Gioia et al. 2012) that provide the
foundation for the third-order (Gioia et al. 2012) codes and associated literature review as
will be seen in Chapter 5.
As a preview, the data reflected nine fundamentals of decision-making which
have been deduced from the interviews. These nine fundamental precepts are essentially
the bottom-up review of the data.

Regarding the literature link, i.e., the top-down

analysis (Gioia et al., 2012), the second-order coding raised in this subchapter suggested
that there are additional literature streams that were not covered in Chapter 2 that should
be considered when discussing the results. These additional literature streams include the
literature associated with naturalistic decision-making, recognition primed decisions, and
macrocognition. Consistent with the process described by Gioia et al. (2012) the results
of this analysis, which have been used in Chapter 5, were used to build upon the existing
literature streams.
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Many interviewees discussed the factors associated with decision-making. Each
interview quotation was coded with regard to the essential factor(s) that drove the
decision or the indecision. Consistent with the process, these codes were linked together
to create a network analysis of the overall decision-making structure.

Figure 10 –

Decision-making Network depicts that coding structure. Ultimately there were nine
codes reflecting 89 direct quotations regarding decision-making. Associated with those
nine codes are a set of sub-codes. Specifically for two codes (decision_making_anchoring
and decision_making_indecision), the researcher provided a set of sub-codes which were
consolidated into the higher-order codes. The sub-codes are discussed here.
Decision-making is one of the six crisis concepts identified in subchapter 4.2. As
shown in Figure 10, there are nine factors that are parts of the decision-making structure.
In the next paragraphs, the researcher discusses each of those nine factors. For the two
codes that include sub-codes, the researcher discusses them as well.

There is no

particular hierarchy for these factors; therefore, the order of discussion is not germane.
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Figure 10 - Decision-making Network

Decision-making – Indecision
Interviewees talked about indecision in extreme event situations.

These

quotations were coded as ―decision_making_indecision‖. This is one of the two codes
which include sub-codes. There are four sub-codes as a part of indecision. Figure 11 –
Indecision Code Network depicts this sub-network structure.
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Figure 11 – Indecision Code Network

The factors that influenced indecision are depicted in Figure 11. These included
instances where there was a lack of leadership, a personal fear of the hazard involved, a
general fear of the uncertainty and consequences of the decision, or a lack of information
needed to make the decision. Examining these sub-codes exposed an interesting concept
around indecision based upon uncertainty and fear of the consequences of the decision.
According to the network analysis, both sub-codes of lack of leadership and lack of the
proper information are common root causes for indecision. Thus, as a focus on the two
sub-codes of fear, the researcher presents the following examples of quotations to provide
insights into these unique root causes.
Some interviews discussed instances where decision-makers were fearful of the
hazard involved in the event and that this fear resulted in indecision by that decisionmaker. An example quotation: ―Their fear of the radiological environment took me
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aback in this instance and began to affect some of their decisions within the first, I'd say,
few days‖. (Ref. RW an on-scene leader).
In this instance some leaders were hesitant to lead through a radioactive event.
This fear affected their decision-making abilities.

In another instance, a leader

recognized this and suggested that those leaders step aside, if they could not overcome
their fears. Clearly, some leaders were ineffective in their command, and the leader was
offering a safe way out of the circumstances. For this sub-code, the interesting concept
was that of personal fear of a particular hazard and how that could affect leadership
abilities. This issue is discussed in subchapter 4.8 Leadership. In a related sub-code,
there were interviewees who discussed occasions of indecision based upon the decisionmaker‘s fear of the subsequent consequences for instance:

Mr. M. argued for expanding the evacuation zone because the radiation
monitoring system strongly indicated that they should go beyond, even beyond 30
kilometers radius. At that time, the Japanese government had expanded that
radius to 30 kilometers. When Mr. E. chaired that meeting with Mr. K., and Mr.
M and several other people and Chief Risk Officer, Prime Minister‘s Officer,
former metropolitan police agency chief and the others, they simply could not
make a decision on as to what should do, what the government should do. (Ref.
YF.)

In this instance, the leaders were fearful of the panic that an expanded evacuation
might cause; therefore, they were indecisive in making the decision about expanding the
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evacuation zone. This concept of indecisiveness is not new; however, the interviewees
discussed the non-linear impact of indecision during extreme events. This refers to the
implications of not expanding the evacuation zone that diminished the level of trust by
the people of the government. It caused a disagreement with the Americans on the need
to protect citizens (the Americans did decide to expand the American evacuation zone to
50 kilometers).

Interviewees suggested that the leaders failed to consider the

consequences of their indecision. These concepts, i.e., fear of consequence, failure to
consider the consequences of indecision, are considered here in the analysis of the
decision-making literature. The other issues, lack of leadership and less than adequate
information, were considered in the literature review.
Decision-making – Anchoring
Anchoring of decision-making is another code that consists of sub-codes. Figure
12 – Decision-making Anchoring, depicts the sub-codes such as: growing fact base,
anchoring fact based, failure due to incorrect facts, formal authority, rule-based decisions,
more facts not always better, and some facts must be sacrificed. These sub-codes are
explained below.
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Figure 12 – Decision-making Anchoring

Many interviewees discussed the need to anchor decisions in facts.

Those

discussions included suggestions regarding the non-linearity of extreme events, the need
to base decisions in fact, the downsides of facts in decision-making, the authority
structure for decisions, and the need to grow the fact base (updating and doubt as
discussed in the subchapter on situational awareness).
One interviewee (RW) discussed his insight that many of the decisions made
during the Fukushima event seemingly were rule-based decisions. He suggested that
with extreme events the decision-makers made conservative decisions that were within
the rule base, but when there was an extreme event that could not be the basis for the
decision. He suggested that the ―whole decision set changes and you have to recognize
that you are in that, that you‘re now the leader inside that scope of change‖. (Ref. RW.)
Non-linearity of decision-making is an interesting concept that is explored in the
crisis decision-making literature review later in Chapter 5.
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In a related discussion,

interviewee RW discussed the need to overcome the consequences of decisions and act
regardless of those consequences even to the point of sacrificing some people. He stated:

You likely will have to, and when you say risk, it can be life or death. It can be
potential injury. It can just be putting them in an extreme situation that isn't going
to kill them, but nonetheless it's going to stress them and you're making a decision
to do that because it has to be done. You have to do it. (Ref. RW) Note:
Interviewee RW is a military commander. Throughout the interviews, his attitude
of sacrificing some people for the greater good permeated the differences between
civilian leaders and military commanders.

Regarding the use of formal authority for decision-making, there were a number
of different concepts discussed by the interviewees. In two cases, the interviewees
believed that they were the last decision-makers standing; therefore, they made the
decisions regardless of their decision-making authority. The clearest instance of this
thinking came from a leader in the control room at Fukushima. His thought was:

When I was a young operator, I remember this shift supervisor was saying that
when you were in that position, you were the final decision-maker. However,
when I really had that situation, I did so not because I remembered that, but
probably because my instinct told me to do so. At that moment on that day,
although I had my senior supervisor next to me, I was the supervisor of the day; I
was the last person of last resort. It is not something I learned from someone, but
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more like Bushido (the spirit of the samurai). I have read a lot of Bushido related
books. Basically, I had a feeling that I had to take the responsibility to be the last
person to last resort. Therefore, in the main control room, I was the decisionmaker. I think that was the basic thought in mind. I can‘t explain what that was
based on words. (Ref. IZ.)

What is interesting in the quotation above is that the operator based his authority
upon his instincts. As noted in other subchapters, the instinctual emotion appears in a
number of these extreme events. Another example of authority-based decision-making
comes from a Situation Room leader:

The distance from the facility where the Japanese said 20 kilometers and we said
50 miles. I remember that day where the president asked the chairman and others,
he said, ‗What would we do if that happens here in the United States?‘ Everybody
said, ‗This is the advice we would give our citizens.‘ He said, ‗That‘s the advice
we need to give in Japan.‘ The rub was it wasn‘t the advice that the Japanese
government was giving to their people. The politics around that was necessarily
complicated, but I think he made the right choice by just simply saying, ‗Let‘s not
further complicate the decision. If this is the advice we‘d give our folks here, let‘s
give our folks there the same advice,‘ which sounds really simple. It got really
complicated. The leadership lesson there is: do not try new tricks in the middle of
a dance that the processes and everything from the regulations and all of that that
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we use here on a daily basis can apply overseas when it comes to protection of the
American public. Once we settled in on that, it got less complicated. (Ref. RR.)

Two powerful insights come from this quotation. First, as discussed under the
sub-code ―fear of consequences‖ as the Japanese were indecisive in their decisionmaking for Fukushima evacuations, the Americans moved forward even in the face of
uncertainty.

As stated, moving forward in the face of uncertainty caused major

complications, e.g., international disagreements. The above quotation implies that the
Americans did resort to rule-based decision-making. Second, is the insight from the
interviewee that decision-makers should not ‗try new tricks in the middle of the dance.‘
(Ref. RW)
The last four sub-codes all involve fact-based decision-making. Interviewees
discussed the need for fact-based decision-making while speaking also about updating
and doubt in decision-making. Further, there was one caution raised that more facts were
not necessarily better for decision-making. In that context, a Situation Room leader said,

My whole point to that whole thing is decision-making in the immediate
aftermath of a bad event is difficult, and you‘re doing it oftentimes with less than
full information. Decision-making during the recovery phase of an event and
Fukushima is another good example is equally difficult and complicated. You
would think that with more information comes more clarity. Sometimes more
information comes more confusion which is counterintuitive.

It‘s like golf that

way; the harder you swing, the less far the ball goes. It doesn‘t make sense. It is
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an important point. I‘m not sure how to characterize it for you other than to say
most people don‘t see it that way. You think with clarity comes precision. Not
necessarily. (Ref. RR.)

With regard to fact-based decision-making, one interviewee, a former Attorney
General and Governor, stressed the importance of interrogating the facts and the source
of facts. He was adamant about the need to keep pace with the facts when making
decisions. A first responder during the Three Mile Island event characterized the leader‘s
dedication to the facts as:

I felt I was being interrogated when we started, what‘s the basis for this, because
he was interested in just the facts. He didn‘t want opinions. He wanted to know
what the facts are and I‘m willing to make the hard decisions. You tell me the
facts and I guess, I realized or he made it clear that under our constitution, the
governor is the one who can declare a state emergency, not the N.R.C. can, and
we don‘t have any troopers or anything out there. (Ref. HD.)

In sum, the code of ―indecisions_anchoring‖, raises a number of theoretical issues
to pursue in the literature review. Those issues included anchoring decisions in facts, the
non-linearity of decision-making, sacrificing some to save many (consequential
indecision as discussed in the indecision code), decision authority (last person standing),
and decision-making in the face of uncertainty, i.e., proceeding in the face of uncertainty.

198

These are important issues that suggest far reaching implications for the decision-making
theories.
Decision-making – Communications
A number of communications issues were raised by the interviewees. Some of
those issues have been discussed in other subchapters, i.e., there are some co-occurrences
with regard to communications.

These co-occurrences include quotations involving

communicating the reality of the situation to the public (Ref. OD), and communicating
expectations to the public regarding their own resilience (Ref. CF & RR). The issues not
discussed previously include the importance of communicating expectations quickly,
seamless communications, and the differences in communications among different
governmental structures. Specific examples in this regard are provided below.
Rapid communication is important in conveying the President‘s expectations
throughout the response structure (Ref. RR).

This same interviewee discusses the

imperative of matching the speed of response to the speed of the event. The need for
alignment of rapid policy and communications was discussed extensively by interviewee
RR. A specific example is derived from a Situation Room leader interview:

We struggle with that as part of the AAR (after action review) around hurricane
Sandy.

Really it‘s just improving communication mechanisms so that, for

instance, if the President convenes all of the key cabinet secretaries around a
response that hits the most populated area of the United States. We have got to be
able to communicate the decisions that are being made in those high level
meetings quickly down through a system that allows people to understand the
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intent at the highest level of the government, all the way down to those people
who are out there aiding as a result of the incident. (Ref. RR.)

Another area of concern raised in the interviews focused on the need for seamless
communication. As maintained by interviewee OD who worked both in the Situation
Room and the Red Cross, there was a specific need to value prior relationships to
improve communications:

After the actual framing of the messages and the decisions that have to be made
around what will and what won‘t be shared. That‘s going to be very dependent
upon the organization and agency that you‘re working for. That is always a very
delicate conversation, whether it‘s here at the American Red Cross, over at the
National Security staff, or even at the FEMA level. It‘s critically important that
the

relationship

between

the

disaster

management

and

the

external

communications press or communications department is seamless.

It‘s not

establishing relationships on the day the event happens. This is something that
has been rehearsed, practiced, thought through, well in advance of the disaster.
(Ref. OD.)

Finally, the differences between the State government organizational structures
require different communications strategies. According to the interviewee, the decisionmakers must understand the differences between their situations and those of other
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entities, and decision-makers must understand the situation as it exists on the ground.
The specific quote is:

The dynamics of New Jersey are different than the dynamics of New York. You
saw that play up between Bloomberg and Cuomo. In New Jersey, Christie is the
unitary executive. He most of those people in that state that have a position of
leadership were appointed by him. There was no question who was making the
decisions. On the other side of the street, when you look at New York and New
York City, you realize that there was a tension between the mayor and the
governor. When you look deeper into New York City, you realize that it wasn‘t
just a city; it was actually five little cities that were all big. You had high rise
structures with no power and elderly people that couldn‘t get up and down the
stairs. There was this lot of disparity around the boroughs in New York. Once we
realize that we need to all treat those as separate entities. In other words to yes,
absolutely work with the mayor but also work with the borough presidents
because if you don‘t, the mayor may not either have the insight or the
appreciation of the uniqueness of the needs. (Ref. JH.)

Thus, for communicating the decisions, these interviewees highlight the following
concepts as important considerations to be undertaken by decision-makers. These issues
will be reviewed in the decision-making literature review.



Sharing reality



Communicating expectations
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The importance of communicating expectations quickly



The importance of seamless communications



The differences in communications among different governmental structures

Decision-making – Escalation of Commitment
Interviewees raised three issues regarding ―escalation of commitment‖ as
described in the literature (Parashevas, 2006). Interviewees illustrated what appear to be
examples of the theory of Escalation of Commitment. One of the examples is consistent
with the Path-dependence Model and the Escalation of Commitment.

The specific

interview statements include:

When considering Japan‘s energy situation, we needed to distinguish the
Hamaoka plant from the other cases. I made sure probably three times that the
Hamaoka was an exception, and that we were shutting down the plant for a
technical reason. Prime Minister Kan said yes. We could not shut down other
nuclear power plants in the same way as the Hamaoka. Because of the wrong
decision on the Genkai, we had to face the Ohi nuclear plant debate. It is still
going on. (Ref. GH.)

That‘s really the power of how do you optimize the organization‘s capacity. Most
people will tell you, ‗We‘ll just do the mission creep thing.‘ We start off as an
organization that does things. Now we‘re doing everything under the sun which is
the wrong approach because you‘re going to do it poorly. It‘s not sustainable.
(Ref. RR.)
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In a disaster, it is easy to get to this illusion that people that are victims need
somebody to take care of them. They need somebody to empower them and give
them permission to take care of themselves. (Ref. CF.)

The concept of escalation of commitment will be pursued when reviewing the decisionmaking literature in Chapter 5.
Decision-making – Incorrect Basis
This code was created during the interviews when interviewees discussed
situations where decisions were made for the wrong reasons. Those reasons included a
political bias, a role basis, (e.g., the Red Cross does not build houses (Ref. RR)), and the
resilience of the victims/survivors, i.e., the need to see them as a source of help, not as
victims. All three of these quotations co-occur with other codes. Thus, those quotations
are not covered here but were incorporated with the co-occurring codes. Even though
this code could have been deleted, it was not dropped for purposes of
completeness/integrity of this dissertation.
Decision-making – Instinct
There were two direct quotations that referenced the need to use instinct in
decision-making. One of those quotations was from interviewee IZ, who discussed his
position as the last person standing and his use of instinct in making decisions. The issue
of instinctual decision-making was discussed earlier and will be considered in Chapter 5.
The second quotation that discussed the last person standing or instinctual decisionmaking is attributed to RW who stated:
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You may be the last man standing and take one for the Gipper, but you can never
relent. So how a leader, when he‘s getting fatigued, so this has gone long, the
crisis seems to be out of my control, it‘s still the best decisions you can make.
You‘re still prioritizing. You‘re still trying to asses, figure out what you don‘t
know, empower other people to lead because you‘re falling behind, whatever it is,
and you do it until your dying breath. That‘s what I believe and that is, I think,
what the military probably tends to drill into most of us because of the combat
circumstances, and the ground forces know this, so you fight on. The concept of
stopping, stop leading … I‘ve been overcome so I‘m going to stop leading … that
is a non-starter. (Ref. RW.)

Decision-making – Inflexibility
There was one quotation coded as inflexibility in decision-making.

It was

generated when reflecting on the response generated for Hurricane Katrina by a Situation
Room leader. He reflected on a concept mentioned by interviewee RW who stated that
inside of an extreme event, rule based decision-making could be ineffective.

This

specific quotation from the Situation Room leader was: ―My sense of it and I wasn‘t
directly involved in the Katrina response. Just from an outsider‘s perspective, my sense
was that this strict adherence to protocols and rules absent flexibility and making decision
at the lowest level inhibited a flexible response.‖ (Ref. RR.) This reflection was later
incorporated into a new decision-making protocol by the Federal Government after
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Hurricane Katrina. Chapter 5 will address these new thoughts about decision-making
through a revised literature review.
Decision-making – Political Basis
Interviewees related instances where political involvement impacted extreme
crisis decision-making.
interviews.

There were five mentions of political influences in the

Three of the instances were related to Fukushima, one was related to

Hurricane Katrina and another had to do with Super Storm Sandy.
In the Fukushima case, the political decisions discussed by interview GH
mentioned the political involvement of the Prime Minister and his cabinet with regard to
shutting down and operating the reactor after the Fukushima accident. There was a
concern that if they shut one reactor down (because of seismic concerns) then all 50 of
the other reactors would have to shut down. That scenario did occur and all of the
reactors in Japan were shut down. The issue set a precedent and was the first step in the
path-dependence chain.

The path-dependence model has been discussed in this

dissertation in Chapter 2.
The second case involving Hurricane Sandy was discussed by interviewee RR,
who questioned the decision by the Governor of Louisiana to build an earthen berm in the
Gulf of Mexico after Hurricane Katrina. His challenge to that decision was based upon
the poor engineering basis for the berm. He suggested that it was a politically motivated
decision.

In the end, RR‘s summation was that sometimes politics trumped good

decision-making. This is an issue to consider in the literature review; however, that
summation is not unusual in decision-making, i.e., that politics plays a role.
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Nevertheless, Mr. RR made a significant point regarding the political side of the
decision-making equation when he stated:

Then there‘s a political side to events. I never gave much thought to that, really
didn‘t appreciate it a whole lot. In fact, I would tell you that most of my career, I
always felt like, ―Sh*@, here we go. We‘ve got a 95% solution but now we‘re
going to polish this thing until it‘s irrelevant on the political side‖. After almost
seven years over at the White House, I better understand it. I understand it has a
part to play. You can weave those two pieces together; the technical and
operational and the political pieces can all come together. It requires some level of
maturity. Looking over the pandemic to Haiti to the oil spill to Japan to Sandy,
the reason Sandy went so well is we had all of that other stuff under our balance.
I‘ve also focused on one another.

It‘s understanding less about them

understanding me and more about me understanding them and building and
spacing the dialogue to, ―Okay, let‘s talk to the operational piece and now let‘s
get to the political piece. Now let‘s get to the economic piece. Maybe there was a
bit of an evolution on everybody‘s part where I understand the political side of it.
I‘m not an expert in it. I don‘t necessarily like it that much. It has a role to play.
You‘ve got to carve out that space because if you don‘t it will just steamroll you
and they‘ll make less better decisions. (Ref. RR.)

The final mention of political influence in decision-making was related by
interviewee RR who discussed the impact of the upcoming Presidential elections during
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the country‘s recovery from Super Storm Sandy and the distraction that the elections
caused in the State and the Federal response. The decision to build and staff polling
locations was made at the Presidential level. The interviewee stated, ―That election, the
relative timing of the election in the event to your point added a layer of complexity we
wouldn‘t have otherwise seen. We wouldn‘t have to make those decisions‖. (Ref. RR.)
Again, these types of political decisions are not unique; however, in terms of extreme
event leadership, this instance appears to be an example, as discussed in Chapter 2, of
social or political justice trumping technical justice. That is, the social concerns (voting)
overrode the needs for a technical response and caused a distraction from the extreme
event‘s perspective.
Decision-Making – Gestalt Structure
During the interviews, there was one reference to establishing a ―Gestalt
structure‖ for decision-making by Mr. RR, a Situation Room leader. Also, there were
other interviewees who described a decision-making structure without explicitly
discussing a ―structure‖ or method. Mr. RR described a national government response
structure that focused on coordination of the responsible entities. He explained that
during the Haiti earthquake response, the United States had to modify or adapt its
structure to fit the Haitian circumstances. Specifically, Mr. RR, stated in part:

Haiti was a little different than the pandemic but from a leadership perspective it
was the same it was so to get there, assess, you know, all the gestalt of everything
you had and then figure out what is the best way to optimize and it turned on
Haiti, given that it was a sovereign nation and given that there different
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organizations have different relationships what I thought we can effectively was
to say here‘s a structure which everybody can have a role to play and we help
manage that structure until the point that it became sustaining on its own. We
really remain an active participant where necessarily, not leading it anymore.
(Ref. RR.)

In relating these points Mr. RR provided another example with the response to the
damage done by Hurricane Katrina. His point is that a decision-making structure was
important and it was important to assess the specific situation and adapt the decisionmaking structure to that situation. Thus, the points to consider with the literature review
in mind relate to having a structure and adapting that structure as necessary to the
circumstances.

If you went by the book, you said, ‗Yup, we did steps one through five and yet we
got people starving in the Super Dome‘. How do you explain that? Flexibility is
the key. I tell my people here all the time that, ‗Our job according to our mission
statement is to reduce suffering in the face of disasters.‘ You do that in a variety
of ways. It depends on who is suffering from what and how do you best fix it or at
least address it. (Ref. RR.)

There were a few other points made during the interviews that are not included in the
above quotations. However, many of them co-occurred therefore they were discussed at
least on some level. Those isolated points may be summarized as:
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Do not try new tricks in the middle of the game (Ref. RR.)



The differences in decision-making structure between New York and New Jersey
(Ref. RR.)



Like golf, swing hard does not mean better with regard to the quantity of facts
(Ref. RR.)



Treating victims as survivors and having them assist in the decision structure
(Ref. GF.)



The need to establish a decision-making model early on in the event (Ref. RR.)



Adaptation of that model where necessary, i.e., flexibility (Ref. OD)



Acknowledging the political realities of the situation (Ref. OD)

Summary of Decision-Making
A number of decision-making concepts are discussed here in Chapter 4 that were
not discussed in Chapter 2. These concepts should be considered and pursued in another
review of the literature.

Thus, the discussion on decision-making in Chapter 5

incorporates these third-order decision-making concepts raised here in Chapter 4 into the
decision-making literature. Also, that additional decision-making literature review will
give a focus on those concepts that are especially applicable to extreme events. In
summarizing the interviews from this subchapter on decision-making, the issues and
second-order concepts include:



Fear of consequence and the failure to consider the consequences of indecision



Anchoring decisions in facts



Non-linearity of decision-making in extreme events



Sacrificing some to save many (consequential decision-making)



Decision authority (last person standing) or instinctual decision-making
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Decision-making in the face of uncertainty (proceeding in the face of uncertainty)



Communicating expectations, sharing reality, communicating seamlessly, the
importance of communicating expectations quickly, and acknowledging the
differences in communications among different governmental structures



Escalation of commitment and path dependence models



Establishment and flexibility of an appropriate decision-making structure



Acknowledgement of political realities including social justice concerns

Leadership
Leadership was one of the most important concepts identified in this dissertation.
During the interviews there were hundreds of quotations associated with leadership.
Those quotations reflected good and bad leadership examples.

The goal of this

subchapter is to analyze the leadership quotations in a bottom-up approach to identify
those leadership concepts that are uniquely applicable to extreme events. Interviewees
discussed many typical leadership concepts e.g., encouragement of workers, or the
importance of leader mastery. In this dissertation, it is important to discover which
leadership concepts were the most important in these extreme events and how those
leadership concepts were influenced and how they influenced the outcome of the extreme
event. This subchapter is intended to provide insights that might extend the literature
discussed in Chapter 2 or discover new territories of leadership.
Analysis
With regard to leadership, I conducted a detailed analysis of the interviews. In the
aggregate, the perspective of all events indicates that the leader‘s level of (in)experience
is the largest contributor to the interview codes. After (in)experience is ranked the
leader‘s personality and character, leader mastery and leader trust are the most significant
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leadership codes.

Interviews indicate that the other leadership codes, e.g., age,

perfection, etc., are much less significant.
An analysis of the data suggests that the leader‘s level of ―(in)experience‖ has a
significant effect on the results. It is interesting that the code ―sensemaking‖ does not
appear as an associated code of ―(in)experience‖. The absence of the sensemaking code
could imply that without experience, sensemaking becomes more difficult. Another
interesting code that does appear as an associate code of ―(in)experience‖ and that is the
code of ―(in)effectiveness‖. This inclusion of (in)effectiveness relating to (in)experience
could imply that (in)experience is directly related to (in)effectiveness in extreme events.
On the other hand, in the code association with the ―personality and character‖
code, the two codes of ―crisis command‖ and ―felt emotions‖ are highly associated. This
could imply that a leader‘s personality and character are directly coupled with his/her
ability to command and reaction to felt emotions during an extreme event.

Also,

(in)experience, trust and (in)effectiveness are coupled together implying a direct
relationship between those leadership concepts. Finally, sensemaking is reasonably unassociated with the leader‘s personality and character. However, it must be stated that
interviewees did mention the concepts of leader, personality, experience, trust, and
effectiveness more during their discussions as compared to sensemaking.
Leadership Perspective – Events
As a significant insight from the interviews, it appears from the data that each
event suggests a unique set of leadership traits. The data indicates that for each event,
interviewees discussed separate leadership traits that were important for that event. I
disaggregated the data on leadership between the events, i.e., Fukushima, Three Mile
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Island and Deepwater Horizon, the Situation Room and other interviews. Clearly, the
largest number of quotations regarding leadership is derived from the Fukushima and
Deepwater Horizon events which eclipse all the other interviews in terms of leadership
quotations. Further, each event and the Situation Room interviews result in unique
models of leadership. While similar situational influences apparently exist, each set of
interviews resulted in differences in the significance of the leadership concepts; therefore,
each event was reviewed separately to discover the important leadership concept for that
unique event.
In the Deepwater Horizon event, the interviews indicated that (in)experience and
mastery were the two most significant leadership traits discussed by the interviewees. An
analysis of the codes was completed. That analysis found that leader (in)experience is
the most insightful of the codes for Deepwater Horizon. The results implied that there
was significant impact from the felt emotions associated with the event, significant
inexperience of the leaders, little mastery of the safety procedures, and significant
unawareness of the conditions. In the Fukushima event, the interviews indicated that:



As in the Deepwater Horizon event, the felt emotions dominated the leadership
code in their influence on the leader.



Leaders needed to be perceptive but not overly involved in solution finding.



Leaders under normal conditions were not necessarily good crisis leaders – some
high-risk organizations would perhaps not consider this factor.



Leaders, especially first responders, would need to be strong against interference
– engendering respect, trust, and admiration (also possessed strong mastery and
leadership skills).



Leaders would be required to be emotional – to the point of admonishing
subordinates when required.
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Some leaders lost focus because of weariness and frustration.



Some operators expressed disappointment in their leader‘s reaction, and this
disappointment led to a loss of confidence in the leaders.



Aggressiveness, skills, physical and mental fitness were deemed important
leadership traits.



Strong mastery and calmness led to leader credibility.



First responder leaders displayed calmness and acts of humility.



Leaders assumed full responsibility for mistakes of everyone and expressed this
claim.



Interviewee felt embarrassed for a peer leader regarding that peer leader‘s
ineffective decision-making (the interviewee did not want to criticize his
colleague‘s performance).



Leaders who were compassionate were effective.



Leaders who had strong personalities and character were effective.



Leaders may change personalities under stress.

Summary of Leadership
A series of analyses for each of the events was completed As diagnosed, each
event revealed a unique modality of leadership.

This implies that extreme event

leadership is variable and based upon the situation. Refer to the discussion in the
decision-making and sensemaking subchapters, which maintain that extreme events can
involve non-linear leadership thinking. This diagnosis was not surprising given the
specifics provided in these subchapters.

First, the researcher diagnoses an overall

perspective of leadership for all of the events and then, breaks down the leadership
modality for each event. Ultimately, the researcher diagnoses the events to determine the
unique leadership modalities.
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An analysis of the interview data in suggested that the leader‘s level of
(in)experience has a significant effect on the data concerned.

Closely ranked and

following (in)experience are the leader‘s personality and character, leader mastery and
leader trust. Interviews indicate that the other leadership codes, e.g., age, perfection, etc.,
are much less significant.
My literature review related to leadership suggested that future researchers could
investigate the relationships between leadership and the threshold effect, instinct,
transboundary effects, locus of leadership, role of felt emotions, and comparisons with
dangerous military contexts.

These constructs and the insights garnered from this

subchapter are discussed in Chapter 5, as are all six of the crisis concepts derived through
the process mentioned by Gioia et al. (2012).
Integrated Summary of Results and Implications
Integrated Results
There were six major (third-order) crisis concepts identified from interviews
conducted for this dissertation. Those six crisis concepts included: (1) felt emotions, (2)
situational context, (3) crisis response, (4) sensemaking, (5) decision-making, and (6)
leadership.

By far, the concept of felt emotions was discussed the most by the

interviewees. Some interviewees faced unfathomable conditions, and as a result, their
interviews were dominated by discussions of their feelings and the consequences of those
feelings on their sensemaking, crisis response, decision-making, and leadership abilities.
Therefore, there was significant co-occurrence between these concepts throughout the
interviews. This was especially the case for the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon
events; however, all interviews contained some discussion of felt emotions. Interviews
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indicated that the felt emotions included: panic/calmness, awareness, success, heroism,
hopefulness, humor, optimism, outrage, skepticism, and trust. The results indicated that
the levels of felt emotion were related to the extremeness of the events and the situational
contexts both of which influenced these individuals‘ abilities or inabilities to respond.
Interviewees related that the situational context challenged the in-situ readiness of
the organization and its leaders immensely.

Further, the non-linearity of the

unfathomable conditions significantly tested their resilience and their abilities to execute
leadership tasks, e.g., sensemaking. Data from this sub-chapter confirmed the importance
of sensemaking as an element of extreme event leadership. These results generally
suggested that the Fukushima and Three Mile Island events had more positive
interviewee-reflections regarding sensemaking than the Deepwater Horizon case;
nevertheless, data suggested that the actual event cases reflected more emotions regarding
sensemaking from the first responders. There were inconclusive results regarding some
sensemaking elements, e.g., commitment, identity, and expectations. A deep analysis of
the Fukushima case analysis did provide some insights on multilevel sensemaking;
however, the overall results are consistent with the ―all data‖ events analyzed.
With regard to crisis response theories, the results indicated that the sub-codes
related to procedures, logistics, and prioritization were significant factors in terms of
event response.

The conclusions provided evidence that confirmed several crisis

theories. For some crisis theories, the limitations were confirmed and in several cases, the
existing crisis theory was confirmed and extended. There were several crisis theories that
were confirmed or where gaps or the possibility for theory extensions were identified.
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Interviewees discussed their abilities and the importance of decision-making
throughout the interviews. Some of the issues and concepts that were raised included:
anchoring decisions in facts, causes of in-decision, the non-linearity of decision-making
in extreme events, decision-making, authorities for decision-making, communications of
decisions, flexibilities needed in decision-making, escalation of commitment, and the
need to acknowledge the political realities of the decisions. As leaders, the interviewees
reflected that each event revealed a unique modality of leadership. Complicating the
leadership factor was the amount of experience a leader possessed.
Implications
Chapter 5 provides a thorough discussion of the implications of these results on
an integrated model of extreme event leadership. Overall, the non-linearity of these
extreme events impacts almost all aspects of the crisis response. In events where the
situational context exceeds the organization‘s readiness and resilience, the leaders are
faced with unique sensemaking, decision-making, and leadership contexts. The interview
results suggested a continuum of responses that relates to the non-linearity of the
situation. That is, as the event progresses, the leaders are capable of offering an effective
response if the situation rests between their readiness and their resilience. For instance,
the Hurricane Katrina and the Three Mile Island events were within the abilities of the
organizations concerned. As the event progressed beyond these points, the influences of
the felt emotions (uncertainty and unfathomable conditions) began to vary. In the case of
the Fukushima event, leaders were moderately effective up until the point when the
reactors exploded. After the reactors exploded, their ability to execute a crisis response
dropped dramatically because of the influence of the leaders‘ felt emotions. In the
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Deepwater Horizon case, the situational context immediately exceeded the in-situ
abilities and resilience of the organization; therefore, leadership efficacy and crisis
response were minimal.

In the Deepwater Horizon case, the crisis response was

essentially limited to an immediate evacuation. At that point, the crew and leadership
were functioning primarily from their survival instincts; therefore, Chapter 5 will focus
on a review of instinctual decision-making.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

Overview
The goal of this Chapter is to merge the crisis management theories and the
research results from Chapter 4 into an integrated model that describes the characteristics
of extreme crisis leadership. Because researchers tend to use single case studies as a
research method for these types of phenomena, those case studies have generated useful
but disparate crisis management theories (Chapter 1).

The research presented here

considered a number of extreme events along with cross-case interviews to integrate
crisis leadership theories into one integrated model of extreme crisis leadership.
Overall, the results suggest that extreme events are unique, non-linear, and
abound with felt emotions that heavily influence a person‘s thoughts and behaviors.
Results demonstrated this non-linearity in the six crisis concepts of situational context,
felt emotions, decision-making, crisis response, sensemaking, and leadership. Table 9
below shows a general overview of the non-linearities in the crisis concepts. In this
Chapter, the discussion will develop the concepts depicted by the arrows in Table 9, stepby-step, building on each other, and describe the non-linear thresholds ultimately
culminating in an integrated model of crisis leadership. For example, in column one of
Table 9, the situational context crisis concepts has a continuum that ranges from
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―fathomable‖, through a non-linear threshold of ―extreme‖ to the far end of the
continuum called ―dangerous or unfathomable‖ events.

Table 9 – Non-linearity of Extreme Events
Situational
Context
Routine
(fathomable)

Felt
Emotion
Subliminal

Decisionmaking
Classical

Extreme

Supraliminal

Dangerous
(unfathomable)

Mortality
Salience

Sensemaking

Crisis
Management
Readiness

Leadership

Naturalistic Macrocognition

Elasticity

Non-linear

Situational
&
Warrior
ethos

Situational
&
Warrior ethos

Situational
&
Warrior ethos

High reliability
and Normal
Accident

Situational
&
Warrior ethos

Collaborative

Each step of the discussion introduces and develops the integrated model of
extreme crisis leadership.

Discussed first are three crisis concepts, i.e., situational

context, felt emotions and decision-making, as these concepts emerged or developed
extensively as a result of this research. The crisis concept of ―situational context‖
emerged as a new organizing crisis concept not explicitly addressed in the previous
literature, and it is discussed first. The crisis concepts of felt emotions and decision-
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making yielded new insights that emerged from the grounded theory process beyond
those discussed in Chapter 2 and thus require a deeper investigation and development of
the corresponding literature.

Finally, the crisis concepts of sensemaking, crisis

management, and leadership are also further discussed in terms of the new theoretical
insights discovered in this research.
Situational Context24
During the data collection process, there were many codes that captured the
interviewees‘ discussions of the severity (scope and magnitude) of the event as well as
their organization‘s readiness to cope with the severity of the event. As data collection
and analysis progressed, the third order code of ―situational context‖ was created to
organize the relationship between the actual event severity and the corresponding in-situ
coping readiness of the organization. Thus, the code of situational context reflects
whether an event is consistent with the organization‘s readiness, or whether the condition
exceeds the organization‘s readiness.
The crisis concept of situational context consists of three significant categories:
routine, extreme and dangerous. The first category, ―routine events‖, comprises those
events in which the organization can predict the event and has the in-situ ability to
successfully respond, i.e., fathomable events.

This situation is consistent with the

concept of readiness theory (Smits & Ezzat-Ally‘s, 2003), in that routine events are
predictable and organizations can adequately prepare for them. Included in the categories
of routine events are ―resilience‖ events. Resilience events exceed the predicted severity
of the routine events; however, these types of events are fathomable (Wachtendorf,

24

Situational context refers to the situation on the ground of the event. It is a collection of interviewee quotations that describe the
scope and magnitude of the event along with the in-situ response capability.
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2009). For resilience events, the organization can expand its abilities through external
assistance such as mutual aid agreements to match the severity of the event. These
situations are consistent with the discussion of resilience theory (Korac-Kakabadse, et al.,
2002).
The second category, ―extreme events‖, describes contexts where the severity of
the event exceeds the fathomable. Like resilience events, extreme events exceed the
organization‘s in-situ ability to respond or expand its crisis capabilities to match the
situation. Unlike resilience events, extreme events, e.g., failure, catastrophic and supercatastrophic, exceed the organization‘s ability to expand its crisis capabilities and reach
into unfathomable conditions.

Several existing crisis management theories apply in

extreme events, including surprise (Farazmand, 2009) and failure (Reason, 1997; Sagan,
1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) theories. Surprise and failure theories generally explain
how organizations respond to extreme events; however, the results in Chapter 4 identified
some new insights not currently covered by surprise and failure theories (those new
insights are discussed below).
The last category of the situational context is ―dangerous contexts‖ (Campbell, et
al. 2010; Yammarino, et al. 2010). Dangerous contexts include unfathomable events that
greatly exceed the organization‘s abilities and include conditions where the life and death
of those involved could be in jeopardy or where several extreme events combine into one
context (Campbell, et al. 2010; Yammarino, et al. 2010), like the Japanese tsunami 2011
and the Fukushima nuclear event.25 Table 10 shows the crisis concept of situational
context including the categories of events.

25

For purposes of refinement in this discussion, the dangerous contexts were subdivided into two categories. One category includes
situations where the leaders begin to fear for their lives and the other where loss of life is highly probable. The reason for this
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Table 10 – Continuum of Situational Context
Situational Context
Routine
Readiness
Resilience
Extreme

Surprise
Failure

Dangerous
Contexts

Catastrophic
SuperCatastrophic

Next is a general discussion of how the data for the code of situational context is
or is not consistent with the extreme crisis events theories. Generally, the results indicate
consistency with the literature regarding routine events. That is, routine events in this
study tend to proceed as described in the literature. Nevertheless, the interviews suggest
that in the 21st Century, new extreme events appear, e.g., H1N1 virus, cyber-attacks, and
unique environmental catastrophes, e.g., floods in places where floods rarely occur,
among others.

In fact, the data indicate that some extreme events are becoming

increasingly ―normalized‖ as readiness strategies improve. For instance, one interviewee
talked about the normalization of some extreme events:

It is like when we prepared to fight battles in nuclear battlefields, we don‘t have
that doctrine now. We will never go through a nuclear battlefield; we‘ll go

subdivision is to explain better the consequences of felt emotions by leaders. As discussed in the felt emotions section in this Chapter,
in a situation where leaders fear death, the felt emotions related to ―death anxiety‖ influence the leader‘s thoughts and actions.
Conversely, near-death situations are consistent with the felt emotion of ―mortality salience‖. In the integrated crisis leadership
model, these categories of extreme events are labeled as ―catastrophic‖ events and ―super-catastrophic‖ events respectively.
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around it. We just will say hey, you know there are other places to fight the
battle, so we don‘t have that doctrine anymore. In the same way, mutually
assured destruction as an existential threat was something you had to avoid at all
cost, and today, as you look at nuclear terrorism, you‘re looking at a really bad
Katrina, a really bad Fukushima, a really bad Sandy, right. It‘s not an existential
threat anymore, so you think about these one percent events. I think that‘s what
… for those we‘re only at a half percent now. I think that the landscape shifts.
Ref. JB.

Therefore, as organizations learn, extreme events become more ―routine‖, with
new extreme or even dangerous events created in different forms than in the past. This
phenomenon suggests an opportunity for organizations to consider both fathomable and
unfathomable events in their crisis planning scenarios. That is, once an organization
normalizes its predicable events, it can begin to study events that may be beyond the
fathomable, i.e. unfathomable. This phenomenon of normalization of events and creation
of new events provides an opportunity to expand the extreme crisis literature as well.
The normalization of events and appearance of new events provides fresh case studies for
researchers. As the uniqueness and transboundary nature of events evolve, the crisis
leadership literature should evolve along with these unique and transboundary events
thereby improving the relevance of the literature.
Another insight from my study reveals that at the dangerous context level, the
thoughts of the leaders can be dominated by supporting their workers‘ wellbeing. This
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emotional domination of the leaders‘ thoughts was especially evident in the Deepwater
Horizon and Fukushima events. For instance, in the Fukushima case:

Mr. Y, was very, very careful about the work allowed in Unit 3. Even when we
have a very small change of status, like the reactor pressure, he asked us to stop
the work and to call back to the Emergency Response Center. We repeated a
promise to do this. Fortunately, the explosion of the Unit 3 ... When the explosion
in Unit 3 occurred, probably 30/40/50 people were around the reactor ... I don‘t
know the exact number. Fifty people, maybe about 50 people were working
around Unit 3. It was a terrible moment for me. That TV conversation, or the
conference system, the DVD shows me putting my hands on my head. My
feeling at that moment was that I could be a martyr. So many people were
working. Mr. Y immediately started asking us to ask them to come back. And
people who came back had really the pale ... Some of them were bleeding. Ref.
IN.

Thus, it appears from my study that there is an opportunity to expand the surprise
(Farazmand, 2009) and failure (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997)
theories by including the significant felt emotional impacts revealed in this study. In
particular, at the dangerous context category of extreme events, where life and death
situations influence the leaders‘ thoughts and emotions, surprise and failure theories that
focus on creating predictable leadership outcomes can benefit from considering the felt
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emotions of the leaders. This life and death phenomenon is discussed in detail in the felt
emotions subchapter below.
In sum, I created the concept of situational context as an organizing code to
capture the severity of the event and the capability of the organization to respond. For
routine events, the results indicate that the factors involved in each situational context
studied here were consistent with the literature.

At the extreme event categories,

interviewees discussed the ―normalization‖ of extreme events into routine events, and the
creation of new forms of extreme and dangerous context events. Finally, my study
reveals that at the dangerous context end of the situational context continuum, felt
emotions often dominate the leaders‘ thoughts and actions.
Next is a discussion of the first of two expanded crisis concepts (felt emotions and
decision-making) that emerged from the data analysis and that require further review of
the literature.

This literature expansion was necessary to better understand the

implications of the data. First is a discussion of felt emotions. The data indicated that for
extreme and dangerous contexts, felt emotions heavily influenced the other concepts, e.g.,
decision-making, crisis management, sensemaking and leadership. The literature review
in Chapter 2 discussed felt emotions; however, the data in my study, especially those
interviewee quotations related to death anxiety and mortality salience, indicated that a
deeper understanding of these concepts is needed in order to more fully explain the
results.
Also, as each extreme crisis concept is developed, I begin to build the integrated
model of extreme crisis leadership.

For each extreme crisis concept, I explain its

associated continuum, including any non-linearities and describe various other
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characteristics of the continuum. For each crisis concept Table 10 is updated to show this
continuum and is carried forward to the next extreme crisis concept to step-by-step build
the integrated extreme crisis leadership model.
Felt Emotions
The results of this study show that there were many quotations that reflected the
interviewees‘ discussions of their felt emotions26 and the effect of felt emotions on the
interviewees‘ leadership abilities.

As this research progressed, the concept of felt

emotions expanded considerably from that considered in my initial literature review. For
instance, in the extreme and dangerous context events that I studied, there were 707
quotations related to felt emotions. Thus, for those contexts, felt emotions dominated all
of the other crisis concepts, particularly decision-making, leadership, crisis management,
and sensemaking.
The continuum of felt emotions (see Table 1127) ranged from thoughts of success
to worries about impending death i.e., mortality salience. Organizations generally plan
for routine events; therefore, the leaders‘ felt emotions are subliminal thoughts of
impending success during routine events. As a result, leaders‘ thoughts remain mostly
positive. If an event exceeds the routine or the fathomable, then subliminal feelings of
skepticism emerge. For example, in the Three Mile Island case, one interviewee stated,
―Our skepticism was established very early on so that this carried through all of the
events that transpired over the next week or 10 days that we were very careful to examine
everything‖. Ref. DT. In the resilience category of events, feelings of skepticism are

26

Extant research discusses how emotions, especially ―felt‖ emotions, can be detrimental to cognitive thought, especially in
sensemaking (Shrivastava, et al. 1988). Weick (1995) argues that felt emotion, which comes from arousal, influences cognitive
ability.
27
Throughout the discussion of the six crisis concepts, the continuums from the previous crisis concepts are included and shaded in
the Tables to facilitate the development of an integrated model.
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generally subliminal. As the event severity progresses beyond the organization‘s ability
to respond or expand their response, felt emotions, e.g., failure, death anxiety or mortality
salience, often transition from subliminal to supraliminal (Table 11).
As a result of interviews from this research, it is clear that for some events, the
threat of impending death was a significant factor in the extreme events considered.
Thus, death-related anxiety is worthy of study for extreme crisis leadership. From the
associated literature, it is concluded that the level of a person‘s cognition changes
depending on their awareness of a threat (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013). When thoughts of
threats are subliminal, the subconscious mind seeks out positive emotions and thoughts to
offset these subliminal thoughts. When subliminal, slightly positive emotions become
more positive and the individual gathers positive thoughts as an ―antidote‖ to fear (Beck,
1985). In reality, the mind attempts to block out negative thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al.
2013).

Research shows that through this collection of positive thoughts, the mind

broadens its cognition (Beck 1985).
Once the thoughts about threats reach supraliminal awareness, the mind narrows
its focus, although the amount of cognitive narrowing varies by individual (Fredrickson,
2003). Even the mere thought of death has a significant impact on cognition (Hayes et
al., 2010). These impacts are studied extensively in research associated with mortality
salience, death association, anxiety-buffer threat, and dispositional effects.

Table 11 - Continuum of Felt Emotions
Situational
Context
Routine

Felt Emotion
Success
(Subliminal)
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Resilience
Surprise
Failure
Catastrophic
SuperCatastrophic

Skepticism
(Subliminal)
Unawareness
(Supraliminal)
Failure
(Supraliminal)
Death anxiety
(Supraliminal)
Mortality
salience
(Supraliminal)

For example, in the Fukushima case, when the situation exceeded the organization‘s
ability to cool the reactors, the interviews reflected indications of unawareness or failure.
At that point, the felt emotions (failure) of the leaders became supraliminal:

When the explosion occurred at Unit 1, we hadn‘t established sea-water injection;
because fresh water was very limited. So the explosion occurred. We were very
surprised. We could not find out what happened. Because we felt only one very
significant jolt, radical jolt, and nothing more, normally, when we have an
aftershock, one big jolt and then a series of jolts; but this time, only one single
jolt. So we start to say, ―What happened?‖ Someone started saying it was an
explosion of main generator, because main generator contains hydrogen. Another
person started saying it was an explosion of hydrogen cylinders, to make up the
hydrogen to the generator.

Then we watched NHK, national TV program

monitor, and we found the reactor building, was a kind of skeleton. Still, I said,
―What is that?‖ Still, I didn‘t believe, or I could not believe ...Then the TV
monitor showed the moment of explosion, so we were forced to believe. The full
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or entire Emergency Center suddenly became very silent, and people were
looking at their feet.

This is the point where the surprise and failure theories can benefit by considering
the felt emotions of leaders during events, which begin to exceed the in-situ capability of
the organization.

For example, surprise management theory research suggests

(Farazmand, 2009) that ‗surprise management‘ requires: ―extensive, specialized and
rigorous training in various techniques with harshest conditions, strategies, tactics, and
scenarios; decision-making under stress and system breakdown conditions; practices that
signal the need for dealing with ‗impossibilities‘; and surprises that would only surprise
the non-experts‖ (p. 408). My research suggests that surprise management also requires
the abilities of leaders to face and to control their felt emotions during extreme events.
Expanding these theories to include the effects of felt emotions might allow for earlier
termination of extreme event if leaders are prepared in advance to accommodate their felt
emotions. As example, in the Super Storm Sandy case, a State Police Colonel (JH)
expressed the need to consider all the factors of intelligence in leading emergency
response:

I find that in some cases the communications is not fluid, the intelligence is not
favorable, the delivery of information is not timely and that culminates in one‘s
inability to then manage and control, not only information but in some cases, the
operation, i.e., to get out in front of it all and a source for concern.

It‘s

intelligence-led management at its finest and the ability to articulate that concisely
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and efficiently to all members that would ultimately be impacted, albeit a member
of first response community or a member that could become a victim or survivor
of the event.

In the ―dangerous context‖ category of events, i.e., catastrophic or supercatastrophic, the results demonstrate significant felt emotions related to the realization of
life or death. This was particularly relevant for the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima
events. In the Deepwater Horizon event, one leader described his fear (Shroder, et al.
2011), ―People were screaming, why don‘t we leave, I don‘t want to die. Doug tried to
remain calm, but he was scared. The rig was coming apart‖. In each of the life or death
circumstances discussed by the interviewees, their felt emotions were extremely strong.
Even after more than two years past the event, while interviewing the Fukushima
operators, they were overcome with their felt emotions. At times we had to stop the
interview so that the interviewees could collect their emotions. Clearly the events of
Fukushima impacted these seasoned operators very dramatically. One described his fear
during the event, ―It was a real nightmare. I have to say, I thought, at least three times, ‗I
will die soon.‘‖ Ref. IN.
As

I

reviewed

the

interview

results,

it

emerged

that

once

the

subliminal/supraliminal threshold was reached, codes related to felt emotion dominated
the data; therefore, a better understanding of the role of felt emotions in extreme crisis
leadership was necessary to complete a coherent analysis of the results. The discussion
of felt emotions in Chapter 2 was limited in the discussion of supraliminal awareness of
death as well as the pervasiveness of the related emotions throughout all interviews
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where participants encountered extreme events. Thus, once these insights emerged, I
conducted a review of the literature associated with death anxiety and mortality salience
(Table 11). These literature streams are quite encompassing, so I limited the literature
review that follows to research that directly discusses both phenomena.
Linkage to Literature
Subliminal v. Supraliminal Death Anxiety
As a result of interviews from my research, it is clear that for the dangerous
categories of extreme events, the threat of impending death was a significant emotional
factor for the interviewees. Thus, the literature associated with the effects of near death
or impending death on a person‘s thought processes and awareness is worthy of study to
better understand extreme events. This literature falls generally into two streams. One
stream is related to simple negative thoughts, such as fear, skepticism, doubt and near
death (near-death emotions are recognized in the literature as death-related anxiety). My
literature review in Chapter 2 did not explore death-related anxiety; therefore, a deeper
literature review was conducted and is presented in this subchapter. Another literature
stream is related to a person‘s thoughts of impending death. This emotion is recognized
in the literature as morality salience. Additionally, it is important in the study of deathrelated anxiety and mortality salience whether the emotions are subliminal or
supraliminal (Greenberg, et al. 1997). Once negative thoughts, e.g., death-related anxiety
or mortality salience, are supraliminal, a person‘s ability to think (cognition) is
significantly impacted (Greenberg, et al. 1997). These concepts are discussed next.
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Research shows that the level of a person‘s cognitive28 ability changes depending
on the person‘s awareness of impending threats, i.e., subliminal or supraliminal
(Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).

When thoughts of negative emotions, e.g., death, are

subliminal, the subconscious mind seeks out positive emotions and thoughts to offset any
subliminal negative thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).

When subliminal, slightly

positive emotions become more positive and the person gathers positive thoughts as an
―antidote‖ to fear (Beck, 1985). In reality, the mind attempts to block out negative
thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013). Research shows that through this collection of
positive thoughts, the mind attempts to broaden its level of cognition when under
personal threat (Beck, 1985). The mind‘s attempt to block out death-related anxiety is a
subconscious instinct (Beck, 1985). However, once the thoughts about negative emotions
(e.g., impending death) reach supraliminal awareness, the mind narrows its thinking and
awareness; this process is called cognitive narrowing (Fredrickson, 2003). Even a mere
supraliminal thought of significant personal threat, e.g., impending death, can have a
significant impact on a person‘s level of cognition (Hayes et al., 2010).
A person‘s thought of impending death, i.e., mortality salience, correlates with
that person‘s cognitive ability. As mortality salience increases, a person‘s cognition
decreases (Tremoliere et al., 2012). Even if a person has high cognitive abilities, the
person is not likely to suppress mortality salience; as a result, people experiencing high
mortality salience continue to think about death (Tremoliere et al., 2012) despite the
presence of supraliminal positive emotions or thoughts, under conditions of mortality
salience, those positive emotions are likely suppressed.

28

Further, the likelihood of

―Cognition‖ is a word that dates back to the 15th century meaning, ―thinking and awareness‖ (Revlin, 2013).
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utilitarian29 responses to moral conflicts decreases; therefore, under conditions of
mortality salience people are more likely to respond to moral conflicts in a manner that
protects their self-interest (Tremoliere et al., 2012). That is, when faced with imminent
death, moral judgments become clouded because of the natural fight or flight instinct.
Also, when consumed by thoughts of death, people tend to lose focus on even the
smallest of tasks, and this cognitive narrowing may prevent people from giving full
cognitive attention to moral conflicts (Tremoliere et al., 2012).
Simon et al. (1997) found that mortality salience has a motivational effect that
facilitates a mental shift from an analytic to an intuitive mindset. This mental shift
explains the examples in my research data (Chapter 4) where people act on instinct rather
than following proper procedures, authority, and use of morality.

We could not find the water level for a long time (in the reactors). We started
talking, Why, why, why?‖ Suddenly, another leader of the administration group,
the experienced guy, shouted that he got the information from his subordinate that
the fire engine was stopping due to the fuel because in the field, the radiation level
near the fire engines was very high, and they were afraid to add fuel. Mr. Y.
scolded to the person who was the general manager of the Emergency
Preparedness Department. He was in charge of this, to manage the fire engines.
Mr. Y. really scolded him: ―You are killing the people, allowing them to die.‖
This voice still ringing in my ears. (Ref. IN)

29

Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes utility, usually
defined as maximizing happiness and reducing suffering (Tremoliere et al., 2012).
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This quote illustrates that self-preservation and instinct guided the worker‘s
response rather than the greater good of the organization (this illustration becomes
important later during the discussion of leadership). In these impending death events,
mortality salience limits individuals‘ cognitive thinking and awareness and results in a
tendency for people to act out of intuition. My study finds that this intuition sometimes
not only includes a self-preservation mentality, but also a constructive defiance attitude
as discussed in the next section.

Further my results also include a description of

cognitive narrowing effects on an individual‘s moral judgments; those judgments may
lead to individuals acting in a manner inconsistent with their leader‘s wishes. Interview
data, especially in the Fukushima case, identified a self-preservation mentality of
defiance set into the responder‘s emotions. This felt emotion of ―constructive defiance‖
is discussed next.
Constructive Defiance
A key finding emerged from the results considers the cognitive reaction to
extreme and dangerous context categories of extreme events. As discussed earlier, when
(felt) emotional thoughts remain subliminal, people use positive thoughts to offset
negative thoughts.

Once felt emotions, e.g., fright or fear for one‘s life, become

supraliminal, cognitive narrowing begins to influence a person‘s thoughts. This cognitive
narrowing impacts a person‘s ability to make moral judgments. In the Fukushima case, it
appeared that as cognitive narrowing occurred, the operators became more defiant. This
phenomenon also occurred in the Deepwater Horizon event. That is, when faced with
impending death, in some cases, the responders resorted to their intuition, i.e., acts of
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self-preservation including defying their leaders. For example, from the Deepwater
Horizon event:

Chris [subsea supervisor] turned up the stairs taking two at a time to get to the
main deck and the drill floor. Then he saw the fire. He turned around and headed
straight for the bridge, and his BOP (blowout preventer) control panel. As subsea
supervisor on duty, he was the person responsible for executing the EDS
(emergency disconnect switch), which is what he damn sure intended to do right
now. Curt [Captain] stepped in front of him. ―I‘m EDSing‖ Chris said. (Ref.
Shroder, et al. 2011)

Specifically, the operators in the control room at Fukushima defied orders from
their leaders in the emergency control center. As mentioned by a commander in the
Fukushima control room:

We should not evacuate from this room for that reason (loss of power). Once
again, I assured that I would evacuate them safely based on my own judgment
when we really needed to. It might be very Japanese, but I bowed and apologized
to the operators. It was probably not so much about leadership, but what I was
doing there was asking, or begging for help. After we lost all the power because
of the tsunami, we injected water into the reactor by using a diesel fire pump (fire
extinguishing water system) as part of the accident management procedure. That
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was not the instruction from the ERC, but we did it by our own judgment. Ref.
IZ.

Similarly, leaders in the emergency control center defied orders from their leaders
in Tokyo, including defying both the President of the company and the Prime Minister.
Some specific examples of their behavior included: a leader in the emergency command
center actually lied to the Prime Minister and President of the company, and continued to
inject water into the reactors after being told to stop the injection. From interviews:

Then Mr. Y. started shouting, really shouting, or scolding. He told us, "You
know, we can never repeat this program for Unit 2 and Unit 3‖. Our mistake was,
we were always acting under assumption of prediction, very bad prediction.
―From now, you must report to me exactly what you were doing and what are you
going to do by when‖. He also scolded to headquarters through the TV monitor,
―This request or command is to you, as well‖. And the people said, ―Yes‖, very
small, very low. This is the moment that Mr. Y. became a kind of God. Because
after this, there was a very famous exhort that he ignored the request from the
headquarters to stop the injection.

From an interview with a Japanese journalist: Interviewer: ―Mr. Y. did not stop
the injection water when ordered to by the Prime Minister; what did you write in
your book about that?‖ Interviewee: ―Mr. Y. was right. I wrote it that way in my
book.

It‘s also troublesome.

If you see that the leader on the ground,
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disrespecting that … all the problems above at the most critical junction. In prewar days in Japan, the army was so notorious for always disrespecting,
sabotaging, ignoring, defying that authority. That doomed Japan to be such a
disaster. It‘s total lack of governance, total lack of command structure. If you
praise that on the ground, defying the authority, that‘s very much popular,
particularly populist culture. That‘s dangerous.

In the Fukushima case, the young operators in the control room felt vulnerable
and hopeless and wanted to evacuate the control room. Only after their leader assured
them he would protect them against ―outside interferences‖ and begged and apologized to
them did they decide to stay. In some cases, the leader tried to offset constructive
defiance with positive emotions. For instance, at Fukushima, the control room leader
apologized and begged the young operators to stay. He appealed to their sense of duty.
He acknowledged the hazard and he committed to defying his leadership in the event they
asked him to participate in acts that might lead to unsafe conditions for the operators.
Also, at Fukushima, the top leader defied the Prime Minister and the company President
by lying regarding the cessation of water into the reactor, yet he showed respect and
dignity to the leaders. In another case, the leader withheld disturbing information from
the operators, fearful that they would panic. Others prayed to God as inspiration to have
the strength to brave out the adversity. In the Deepwater Horizon case, rescuers simply
asked the victims to have faith in them despite having no preexisting trust relationship.
While defiance was most pronounced in the Fukushima data, there were some less
serious examples in some other cases. For example, in the Deepwater Horizon case, fear
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and instinct motivated young staff members to take unilateral action to disconnect the rig
from the well and broadcast a ―mayday‖ signal without the permission of and despite
receiving a scolding from the Captain not to issue the mayday call.

Specifically, the

instance recalled was:

Now Andrea [mate] jumped up and hit the general alarm. She grabbed the radio
and began calling over an open channel, yelling, ―Mayday, mayday. This is
Deepwater Horizon‖. Curt [Captain] heard Andrea repeating the mayday. It was
a direct violation of chain of command. Regulations permitted only the captain to
give the order to call mayday. He came up behind her: ―I didn‘t give you
authority to do that‖. (Ref. Shroder, et al. 2011).

As discussed by Simon et al. (1997), mortality salience has a motivational effect
that facilitates a shift from an analytic to an intuitive, experimental mindset. Interviewees
reported finding motivation in defiance, skepticism, and protection from outside
influences and other negative thoughts. In one sense, these negative thoughts resulted in
what I describe as constructive defiance. I define constructive defiance as intuitive
actions taken by individuals or leaders under dangerous conditions that are contrary to the
desires of their leader, yet are perceived as consistent (or in the best interest of) with the
individuals or leaders directly faced with the dangerous conditions own well-being. That
is, the results of this dissertation suggest that in the dangerous context category of
extreme events, negative thoughts can serve as a more powerful emotion than positive
emotions. That is especially true because constructive defiance implies that the affected
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individuals who face a dangerous condition might ignore all the encouragement or
directions offered by the leader and succumb to their own thoughts of self-interest. This
occurred in the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon cases because the responders viewed
the underlying action as more correct than the action proposed by their leaders.
In sum, consistent with Fisher et al.‘s (2010) work on ―shadow influences‖, i.e.,
subliminal influences on thinking, one can imply that constructive defiance is another
shadow influence and is motivated by emotions of self-preservation, protection, or risk
for the individual or group. The concept of overwhelming negative thoughts in extreme
events, specifically constructive defiance, is an important phenomenon that expands the
existing crisis literature. Once a crisis event becomes an extreme crisis event or beyond,
felt emotions dominate an individual‘s thoughts and behaviors.

This is especially

pertinent once the threshold of supraliminal emotions is reached. When individuals begin
to recognize their felt emotions, those emotions dramatically affect their cognition, crisis
management, decision-making, sensemaking, and leadership abilities. Ultimately, in the
most consequential events, i.e., in dangerous contexts, an individual‘s emotions of
intuition, defiance, death anxiety, mortality salience and constructive defiance dominate
their thoughts and behaviors.
Additional Perspectives on Decision-making
Decision-making is also one of the six crisis concepts in an extreme event and the
literature associated with decision-making was reviewed in Chapter 2. Once the data
were collected and analyzed, new implications with regard to decision-making were
discovered; therefore, an additional, more focused review of the decision-making
literature was warranted to help understand and integrate with the results. I begin by
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reviewing three major areas of decision making research not considered in Chapter 2.
They are naturalistic decision making, recognition primed decision-making and
macrocognition. Also, as in the other subchapters, I develop a continuum of decisionmaking to support my integrated crisis leadership model. The continuum will include
routine to super catastrophic events and will depict how these three general decisionmaking areas change as the severity of the event increases.
Naturalistic decision-making
Some researchers (Klein, 1993, 2003; Lipshitz, 2001) assert that classical decision
theories are not flexible enough for extreme events in that classical decision processes
primarily use the past to predict the future, and that classical decision theories are about
decision processes not decisions themselves. Literature based on naturalistic decisionmaking (Klein, 1993, 2003) extends the formal, classical, decision-making approach.
The naturalistic decision-making framework studies the methods that leaders adopt to
make decisions and the ways in which leaders respond to the demands of extreme events
(Klein et al., 1993). These demands are characterized by limited time, uncertainty, high
stakes, team and organizational constraints, unstable conditions, and varying amounts of
experience. In assessing my results, the characteristics of the extreme events support the
naturalistic decision-making process.

The process of naturalistic decision-making

involves the use of options, experience, workable solutions, and naturalistic decisions are
focus less on the use of formality in decision-making processes. These concepts of using
experience and making decisions with workable solutions and lack of clarity was noted
by a leader in the Situation Room (RR) when talking about the Hurricane Katrina
response, and the Super Storm Sandy response.
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You saw in Katrina, there were multiple disasters. One of them was the mothernature event. The other one was slipshod approach to the response. Following
rigid structures without any flexibility became the undoing. Everybody intended
to do the right thing in Katrina.

We‘re following the rules the way they

understood them. My whole point to that whole thing is decision making in the
immediate aftermath of a bad event is difficult, and you‘re doing it oftentimes
with less than full information. Decision making during the recovery phase of an
event and Fukushima is another good example is equally difficult and
complicated. You would think that with more information comes more clarity.
Sometimes

with

more

information

comes

more

confusion,

which

is

counterintuitive. It‘s like golf that way; the harder you swing, the less far the ball
goes. It doesn‘t make sense. It is an important point. I‘m not sure how to
characterize it for you other than to say most people don‘t see it that way. You
think with clarity comes precision. Not necessarily.

These quotations illustrate that leaders in extreme events may use more situational
decision-making, particularly, those leaders closest to danger. In extreme events, it is
more than likely that much of the information needed for decision-making will not be
available. At that point, leaders must use the most reliable source of facts (Ref. DT) at
their disposal and make decisions based up situational considerations.
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Data-framing theory
Another literature stream related to naturalistic decision-making comes from
Klein (1993) who discusses the decision ―data-framing‖ theory as a subset of
sensemaking. In Data-framing theory, Klein (1993) asserts that the situational context is
explained when it is fitted into a structure that links observations together into a mental
―frame‖. Mental frames are a means of organizing data to link to other data. A frame
might be a story, a map, a script, a chronology, or landmark to account for observed data.
Creating such known frames facilitates a search for more data. Data-framing is primarily
based upon the person‘s experience. Basically, a person pieces the data gathered based
upon the familiar. Once a framing piece is created, the person seeks hidden data to
expand the frame.

Much as in a three-dimensional picture where a person seeks

something familiar and then after studying the 3D picture further or having someone
point out a shape, then the person frames or links that new data with the known data.
Data-framing is a process of framing and reframing, or linking the data into a frame to
allow for interpretation. Conversely, data-framing can start out with a map, and then the
person seeks data to match the map by finding data that fills-in the map. Once the data
and frame are in congruence, sensemaking stops. Sensemaking can continue if new data
or frames are added to the environment; however, Data-framing is not an endless search
for data and frames (Klein, 1993) because there is an endless source of data. Also,
people with more experience usually are faster at data-framing before less experienced
people; however, both novices and experts employ the same reasoning processes
(Barrows, et al., 1978).
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Recognition-primed Decision-making
One of the characteristics of extreme event decision-making is the speed of
decision-making that is typically required of the leaders (data from Chapter 4 highlights
the need to match decision-making speed with the speed of the event). The naturalistic
decision-making theory of recognition primed decision-making (Klein, 1998) is
consistent with this premise. Recognition primed decision-making essentially suggests
that the decision-making process is heavily influenced by the leaders‘ levels of
experience, as these leaders identify parts of the situation and then use their experience
and imagination as the foundation to arrive at decisions. In recognition primed decisionmaking, much of the leaders‘ decision-making stems from intuition and instinct (Klein,
1998). Recognition primed decision-making is particularly useful in conditions of time
pressure, and in which data is partial and goals and outcomes are poorly defined.
Recognition primed decision-making is a form of naturalistic decision-making that is
based on the use of intuition which can be described as understanding without rationale.
It can be considered a ‗gut reaction‘ and can include stages of reasoning,
representativeness, feature matching (data framing), situational assessment, and use of
experience (Bond, et al. 2005).
Macrocognition
Macrocognition decision-making is consistent with the naturalistic processes
including the recognition primed and framing theories.

Much of macrocogition is

underpinned by Piaget‘s notion (Piaget, 1967, 1971) of the constructivist understanding
of learning. Piaget recognizes that people learn by linking data and framing their initial
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learning. Then people build on their learning by using updating, doubt, rejection and
replacement thoughts to continue building a frame.
In sum, decision-making in an extreme event is a highly cognitive process under
demanding conditions. The non-linear environments found in extreme events require
non-linear decision-making processes. Thus, leaders must rely upon decision-making
processes that depend primarily on the leaders‘ experience, instinct, and intuition. The
models of naturalistic decision-making theory, including data-framing and recognition
primed decision-making are more aligned with the dynamic characteristics at the extreme
category of events.
In Table 12, I have developed a continuum of decision-making consistent with the
expanded literature review.

The decision-making continuum starts with the routine

events and culminates, as do the other continuums, in super-catastrophic events. My
study results for routine events are consistent with the classical decision-making
literature. My results indicate that for the hurricane events and Three Mile Island, which
based on my data, are the least severe emotional events, interviewee quotations regarding
decision-making were consistent with formal decision-making process. That is, in each
of these events, there were interview quotations consistent with anchoring decisions in
facts, and with formal rule-based authorities which are elements of classical decisionmaking. Similarly, the results indicate that with resilience events, that is, event where felt
emotions are subliminal, yet some skepticism and expansion of the crisis response occurs,
the data-framing is a typical decision-making model used by leaders.
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Table 12 - Continuum of Decision-making
Situational

Felt Emotion

Decision-making

Subliminal

Classical

Context
Routine

(success)
Resilience

Subliminal

Framing

(skepticism)
Surprise

Supraliminal

Recognition

(unawareness)

Primed or
Naturalistic

Failure

Supraliminal

Macrocognition

(failure)
Catastrophic

Supraliminal

Situational

(death anxiety)
Super-

Supraliminal

Catastrophic

(mortality

Warrior ethos30

salience)

As the event severity expands, in the surprise situational context when leaders
recognize that the organization is not responding adequately to the severity of the event,
supraliminal thoughts of surprise can significantly change the leaders‘ decision-making
processes. Once the situational context exceeds the leaders‘ ability to keep aware of
changing conditions, the cognitive challenges expand greatly (surprise theory) and the
leaders begin to react with decision-making models such as recognition primed or
naturalistic models. As such, the recognition primed decision-making and naturalistic
30

Warrior ethos is a United States Army statement that is sacred to warriors, i.e., ―I will always place the mission first; I will never
accept defeat; I will never quit; and I will never leave a fallen comrade‖ (Kolditz, 2007). Warrior ethos discussed in detail in the
leadership subchapter of Chapter 5.
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models are reactionary models consistent with the demands of these events. An example
of this decision-making model can be found in an interview with RW (military
commander/cross-case) who stated:

Take one for the Gipper, but you can never relent. So how a leader, when he‘s
getting fatigued, so this has gone long, the crisis seems to be out of my control,
it‘s still the best decisions you can make. You‘re still prioritizing. You‘re still
trying to get essay, figure out what you don‘t know, empower other people to lead
because you‘re falling behind, whatever it is, and you do it until your dying
breath. That‘s what I believe and that is, I think, what the military probably tends
to drill into most of us because of the combat circumstances, and the ground
forces know this, so you fight on. The concept of stopping, stop leading … I‘ve
been overcome so I‘m going to stop leading … that is a non-starter.

Thus, this leader is focused on good decision-making with prioritization
techniques, not purely instinct or intuition based decision-making. Note this this is
interview was from the military domain. Later in the discussion of the concept of
leadership in the non-military domain there will be some differences in the leader‘s
attitude towards decision-making.
In the failure realm of events, the results are consistent with macrocognition
decision-making especially in the use of updating and doubt processes used by the
leaders facing these events. An example of the use of macrocognition decision-making
came in the cross-case interview of RR who stated:
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In the immediate response phase of any event, you are making decisions based on
less than accurate and full information. You are making decisions, potentially
consequential decisions, based on the best advice you can get. We‘ve seen the
President and his leadership team do that. By and large, done it well. As you get
more clarity around the situation and around what decisions need to be made, if
the algorithm changes, it‘s less about making decisions based on limited
information. It‘s more about making decisions based on all of the things that you
didn‘t have previously. Now you‘re looking at decision making in the context of
geopolitical issues, national issues, election-related issues, economic-related
issues.

Specifically, in this quote the interviewee discusses a changing algorithm with
limited information causing the leader to think about issues other than the immediate
event. That is, using the best advice given the situation. A similar example occurred in
the Three Mile Island event when the Governor was faced with disagreements among
experts on the potential for a hydrogen explosion, and the need to evacuate citizens from
around the area. Also, the President of the United States was arriving on the scene in just
hours. Given that the evacuations plans were inadequate, the Governor chose not to order
an evacuation based on limited information, inadequate evacuation plans and the
disagreement among experts. This decision-making was premised more on the holistic
perspective rather than on the technical merits. Thus, this decision-making focused on
the macro versus the micro issues, i.e., macrocognition.
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Catastrophic events that involve impending death often result in leaders and
workers using their instinct and intuition for decision-making. Thus decision-making
becomes highly situational. There were many examples of the use of intuition, instinct,
and constructive defiance, by leaders in the interview data. One of the significant quotes
came from a control room operator at Fukushima (Ref. IZ):

When I was a young operator, I remember this shift supervisor was saying that
when you were in that position, you were the final decision maker. However,
when I really had that situation, I did so not because I remembered that, but
probably because my instinct told me to do so. At that moment on that day,
although I had my senior supervisor next to me, I was the supervisor of the day; I
was the last person of last resort. It is not something I learned from someone, but
more like Bushido (the spirit of the samurai). I have read a lot of Bushido related
books. Basically, I had a feeling that I had to take the responsibility to be the last
person to last resort. Therefore, in the main control room, I was the decision
maker. I think that was the basic thought in mind. I can‘t explain what that was
based on in words.

For super catastrophic events with conditions of high mortality salience, decisionmaking reflects a warrior ethos that the literature (Kolditz, 2007) discovered in dangerous
contexts. The concept of warrior ethos is explored in more detail in my upcoming
discussion of the crisis concept of leadership. Nevertheless, in dangerous conditions,
most notably military domains, (there is little or no literature in this area for non-military
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domains) the environment becomes more like wartime in which decision-making and
leadership are heavily dependent on the trust and confidence of the leader. Thus, as will
be explained later, decision-making will vary in the military versus non-military domains.
In the military domain, leaders focus decision-making first upon completion of the
mission and second on the survival of the troops.

In the non-military domain the

priorities switch. My results indicate that in the non-military domain, survival of workers
becomes the important consideration for decision-making over resolution of the event.
In sum, the non-linearity of an extreme crisis means that felt emotions –
particularly negative, supraliminal, emotions – make decision-making more challenging.
The integration of additional literature beyond classical models of decision making helps
to develop a more complete picture of the continuum for decision-making in extreme
crisis conditions. The results of this study suggest that there is an opportunity to link the
existing crisis response theories, e.g., failure and surprise theories, with decision-making
theories of recognition-primed and macrocognition theories in a way that provides an
integrated description of the sensemaking cosmology (Lagadec, 2007) for extreme
events, especially for the categories of catastrophic and super-catastrophic events.
At this point I have discussed three crisis concepts including a concept introduced
from this study, situational awareness, and two previously existing concepts, felt
emotions and decision-making. The results from these three crisis concepts imply a
significant nexus among them. That is, situational context sets the stage for the other two
concepts by describing the event and the organization‘s ability to cope with the event.
The non-linearity of the situational context results in significant felt emotions particularly
at the most extreme end of catastrophic and super-catastrophic events. At that end of the
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continuum, felt emotions significantly impact the decision-making process of those
involved in the extreme event and at that breakthrough point or transition, the ability of a
leader to use decision-making techniques, e.g., naturalistic decision-making or
macrocognition becomes extremely limited due to cognitive narrowing. As the situation
worsens, and when those involved face imminent death, then felt emotions dominate the
thoughts of those involved and they tend to use instinct and intuition in their decisionmaking processes. This dynamic can lead to constructive defiance and a breakdown in
macrocognition and naturalistic decision-making. The next section provides a discussion
of the other three crisis concepts, i.e., sensemaking crisis response, and leadership. I
continue to develop an integrated model that links all six crisis concepts together to
explain the cosmology of extreme event leadership.
Crisis Response
In my ATLAS.ti codebook, I defined crisis response as ―quotes that refer to
instances where leaders discuss activities, thoughts, or comments related to the actual
performance of tasks or conditions that contributed to the outcome of the event‖.
Essentially, the code of crisis response refers to instances when the interviewees
described acts or performances that they believed directly contributed to the outcome of
the crisis, either successful or unsuccessful.
Before building the continuum for crisis response, there is a discussion of three
areas that provide insights to the existing literature regarding crisis response. Afterwards
the continuum of crisis response is discussed, including how the usefulness of crisis
response concepts, e.g. logistics, diminished significantly for the most consequential
events.
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The results identified three areas that expand the existing crisis response
literature. First, the results show that latent organizational weaknesses, such as the role
confusion on the Deepwater Horizon, have serious negative consequences on crisis
response. That is, with the non-linear characteristics of extreme events, even small latent
organizational weaknesses become hugely impactful. For instance, in the Deepwater
Horizon case, the legal status of an oil rig with regard to whether the rig is also a ship is
not clear. The regulations state that if the ship is ―attached‖ it becomes an oil rig. The
question becomes, ―Does the pipe connecting the ship to the well mean that the ship is
attached?‖ This situation leads to a source of confusion over command of the vessel, that
is, whether the ship captain is in charge of the vessel, or conversely if it is an oil rig, then
whether the ―oilman in charge‖ is in charge. This lack of clarity in the definition of ship
versus oil rig led to leadership confusion regarding actions such as issuing a Mayday call,
disconnecting the well from the rig and evacuating the oil rig, among other leadership
issues. Ultimately, this latent organizational weakness, i.e., definition of a ship, became a
significant complication in crisis response for the Deepwater Horizon event.
Second, the results confirm Lettieri, et al.‘s (2009) conclusion that more research
is needed on setback management. Throughout the extreme events in this dissertation,
there were instances of setbacks.

Given the number and severity of setbacks that

occurred during these events, it is evident that setback management has an important
impact on crisis response and should be studied further. There was a conclusion in
Chapter 2, which suggested there are fuzzy boundaries, transition points, or instability
points where crisis response becomes unmanageable. The results suggest these points did
exist in the events reviewed for this dissertation. As an example, when crisis response
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activities were unsuccessful in the Fukushima case, the severity of the event cascaded and
that became an instability point. For instance, when the leaders were attempting to adapt
and expand their resilience, the event conditions exceeded their capacity to respond. The
event worsened and became a ―surprise event‖. As the event progressed, operators called
for supplemental equipment that did not arrive (Ref. IN). Thus, the event became
exceedingly complex:

There was a phone call from headquarters.

Some electrical engineers from

headquarters called them and they are now sending power support trucks, ―So
please don‘t give up‖. Maybe after one or two hours, finally I got the information
that the truck was too heavy for the helicopter. The disappointment at that time
was so large for me. Anyway, we had to wait for the trucks coming on the
surface. But, of course, there was traffic jams and road damage. The problem
was reactor pressure. Of course, it would stay high. So the problem was, we
don‘t have any measure to depressurize the reactor. So our thought was, ―We
need at least ten new batteries or sixteen new batteries of 22 volt‖. Because
normal batteries: One battery has about 22 volt, and one battery has more than
100 kilogram weight. So I could not imagine how to connect the power supply.
We tried to establish a plan to recover some electric power source using the power
supply truck and start the pumps. At the hindsight, it was not so appropriate a
strategy, but at that time, it was the only option for us.
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Thus, the operators at Fukushima attempted to expand their resilience by adding
additional power supplies. When that attempt failed, the reactor conditions worsened,
and the power supply arrangement forced adaptations and resulted in an inappropriate
response strategy. At this point, the crisis response category of resilience was exceeded,
i.e., the event cascaded and resulted in a surprise event. At this point, the crisis response
became extremely uncoordinated and complex. This situation matched the definition of
complexity theory31. That is, the event situation bordered on chaos.
Third, the results of this dissertation highlight the importance of communicating
changes in crisis response strategies.

The downside of over-eagerness, the role of

logistics, and the leadership as mechanisms used to convey changes in strategies to
workers were most evident in the Three Mile Island and Fukushima cases. For instance,
in the Fukushima case, one leader noted the importance of using proper leadership
techniques during changes in response strategy. In the Fukushima operator‘s words (Ref.
MA):

I still needed to change the priorities. If I had been persistent with my words,
everyone would have been confused, so the priorities needed to be changed.
However, I needed to be more cautious and considerate about those who had been
working on the time-consuming task when I made a change in the priorities.

31

For complexity theory, Abel (2011) explains that complexity is not chaos; it is near chaos, because chaos involves the study of
simple patterns leading (linearly) into repeated patterns, while complexity involves simple patterns leading to higher-level patterns,
which are multiple unique interactions, and usually non-linear. Therefore, complexity theory precedes chaos theory. The reader can
reference Chapter 2 for more details on complexity theory.
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In the end, the results indicate that failures in executing crisis response can lead to
events cascading into something more severe. The three areas discussed here, i.e. latent
organizational weaknesses, setback management, and communicating changes in
strategy, were significant contributors to the complexity of the events and resulting crisis
response failures. Next I build a continuum for the crisis response concept.

Table 13 – Continuum of Crisis Response
Situational

Felt Emotion

Decision-making Crisis Response

Subliminal

Classical

Readiness

Subliminal

Framing and

Resilience

(skepticism)

Cognitive

Context
Routine

(success)
Resilience

Continuum
Model
Surprise

Supraliminal

Recognition

(unawareness)

Primed and

Complexity

Naturalistic
Failure

Supraliminal

Macrocognition

Failure

Situational

Situational

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

(failure)
Catastrophic

Supraliminal
(death anxiety)

Super-

Supraliminal

Catastrophic

(mortality
salience)

Crisis response theories reviewed in Chapter 2 include: readiness (routine event)
theory, resilience theory, complexity theory, and failure theory. Refer to Table 13 for the
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Continuum of Crisis Response. Overall, for routine and resilience events, the results
were consistent with the readiness and resilience theories; however, once events reach the
situational context of surprise, failure, and beyond, the results indicate that, in reality, the
concept of crisis response becomes increasingly less important in determining the
outcome of an event.

This phenomena happens because as the event worsens, felt

emotions begin to influence leadership and decision-making greatly; therefore, the
leaders‘ focus on issues such as logistics, formal decisions, and other general crisis
management techniques becomes a lower priority.
Specifically, in the surprise realm of events, conditions are usually unfathomable.
Complexity theory suggests that leaders in this realm of events should step back so that
they can see unforeseen connections (Muffet-Willett & Kruse, 2009). The crisis response
in this realm can be described as a rubric of complex responsive processes (MuffetWillett & Kruse, 2009). Abel (2011) describes it as dissipative structure that moves into
the edge of chaos and is usually non-linear.
Beyond the surprise realm, the situation worsens as the organization has failed to
execute sufficient crisis response tactics. At this stage of events, failure theories, e.g.,
normal accident theory, would suggest that latent organizational weaknesses exist and
that those weaknesses result in crisis response failures, as evidenced in the Deepwater
Horizon case discussed above.
In the catastrophic and super catastrophic events, crisis response becomes highly
situational because of the effects of felt emotions on the leaders. This situation occurs
because the felt emotions of leaders become supraliminal (after the failure category of
events) and they begin to dominate the data for the other six crisis concepts (we will see
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this later under the leadership discussion as well). The results suggest that at the extreme
end of the crisis response continuum, felt emotions dominate the thoughts and actions of
the responders. Specifically, at these non-linear or breakthrough points, leaders typically
resort to intuition and instinct in performing their crisis response duties, rather than
organized approaches to crisis response.
In sum, crisis response relates to the outcome of an extreme event in that
successful crisis response can mitigate or resolve events. However, there are significant
organizational and tactical factors that influence an organizations crisis response, e.g.,
latent organizational weaknesses. In the continuum of extreme event crisis response, as
event conditions worsen, the efficacy of crisis response declined for the events studied.
When leaders begin to experience death anxiety or mortality salience as in catastrophic
and super catastrophic events, then leaders resort to intuition, instinct and a warrior ethos
in executing their crisis response duties.
Next is a discussion of sensemaking as a crisis concept. As one of the six crisis
concepts, sensemaking also parallels the non-linearity of extreme crisis events. As in
with the other crisis concepts, the next section will develop a continuum for sensemaking
that fits into the integrated model of crisis leadership.
Sensemaking
Although the results indicated that researching the crisis concept of sensemaking
across multiple cases is extremely difficult, there were a number of insights discovered in
analyzing the results.

Specifically, the results show that some of the concepts of

sensemaking are more appropriately researched through the case study method than
through cross-case studies. I compared my data to the sensemaking elements suggested
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by Weick (1988; 1995).

As a refresher, Weick (1995) discusses three types of

understandings: commitment, identity, and expectations – meaning commitment to
understanding, understanding one‘s identity; and expectations connect with cues to create
understandings (Weick, 1995).
Overall, the results for these elements were inconclusive. Each element was
essentially evenly distributed in the data. This suggested, as discussed in Chapter 2.8,
that these elements of sensemaking are better evaluated at the individual level versus the
case level.

For instance, Weick (1995) discusses the element of ―identity‖ in his

assessment of the Mann Gulch firefighters when they dropped their fire implements to
run from the fire (1949). According to Weick (1995), at that point the firefighters lost
their identity as firefighters. Therefore, it appears from my analysis of the sensemaking
elements of commitment, identity, and expectations, that Weick‘s single case study
approach to these elements is more appropriate than a multiple case study analysis used
in my research. Thus, my research has no conclusions on the efficacy of Weick‘s (1995)
three elements of sensemaking.
Other elements of sensemaking were conclusive. Those elements included: the
use of positive thoughts; pessimism; pluralistic ignorance; collective sensemaking;
optimistic bias; institutional effect; updating; doubt; and felt emotions. The results are
discussed next.
In the early stages of the Fukushima event and during the Three Mile Island
accident, the use of positive thoughts was at least partially significant in the formulation
of sensemaking for those leaders.

The leaders in those two cases made positive

evaluations of the situation and used those evaluations in guiding the organization
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through the event. In all of the cases studied in the dissertation, there were pessimistic
quotes noted by the interviewees. Because all of the cases in this research were extreme
events with significant consequences, this observation regarding the significance of
pessimism in the data is not surprising. In the Deepwater Horizon case, sensemaking was
dominated by pluralistic ignorance and felt emotions. Hardly anyone on board the rig
attempted to respond to the fire, e.g. firefighting, or had an understanding of the events as
they unfolded. Further, in the Deepwater Horizon event, there was a significant amount
doubt in the abilities of leadership by the workers. However, in the Fukushima case,
despite the severity of that event, the interviewees all had a significant understanding of
the event, that is, collective sensemaking. Although they were surprised by the amount
of devastation and severity, they did understand the causes and conditions leading to the
event, specifically an earthquake, loss of electrical power, and tsunami.

Also, the

Fukushima interviewees expressed that they continuously used updating in their
sensemaking as conditions changed. Nevertheless, in the later stages of the Fukushima
event, felt emotions dominated the leaders‘ sensemaking abilities. As the Fukushima
leaders‘ mortality salience increased, there were more significant impacts on the leaders‘
sensemaking abilities.
The level of optimistic bias, which might influence sensemaking, was consistent
in the data among all of the cases. This result suggests that over-optimism did not play a
huge role in sensemaking for any of the interviewees.

Conversely, the degree of

institutional effect, i.e., organizational failure, was significant and consistent among all of
the cases.

During these extreme circumstances, there were institutional barriers to

effective sensemaking.

From hurricanes to the Fukushima case, the interviewees
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discussed the flaws in organizational decision-making, leadership, and crisis response,
which impaired their sensemaking ability.
Finally, the effect of felt emotion on the leaders‘ sensemaking abilities was most
significant in the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon cases.

According to the

interviewees, felt emotions were not significant for the Three Mile Island case, in that,
there was little fear of death for the leaders. Certainly the workers in the plant held
significant felt emotions.
For example, the use of positive thoughts for sensemaking (Kayes, 2004) was
partially significant for the Fukushima case as follows:

In the Fukushima case,

interviewees expressed positive emotions up until the reactor buildings exploded.
Afterward, their emotions and consequently their sensemaking turned negative or nonexistent. From the Fukushima interviews (Ref. IN):

Very, very fortunately, the status wasn‘t growing worse. We were gradually
feeling safe because now we are stable condition status, and certainly safe.
Already some people came back to the plant. They are very ... How do you say?
Fortitude and the brave. The explosion of the Unit 4, actually, a jolt was caused
by the explosion of Unit 4. So this is very confusing. We had only single jolt in
the early morning on the 15th, but our imagination was it was due to some
problem of Unit 2. That‘s why some people outside still misunderstand. Unit 4,
actually, Mr. Y32 asked all operators to evacuate to the ERC (Emergency
Response Centre), and one shift supervisor reported the reactor building of Unit 4

32

Throughout this dissertation, the reference to ―Mr. Y‖ refers to a senior leader at Fukushima. As in the other interviews, his full
name is redacted for purpose of autonomy.
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was seriously damaged. So then we started being confused: ―Oh, is it Unit 4? Or
is it ...Unit 3 or 2, why Unit 4 exploded?‖

Prior to the explosions, the interviewee expressed confidence about the situation
and the strategic direction that the operators were implementing. Once the explosion
occurred, the operators were confused and surprised that such an event could occur. This
indicates a significant disparity between sensemaking in events when they are in the early
stages when consequences are much less severe versus later in the continuum when
circumstances are severe.
In sum, sensemaking was particularly effective for the lesser events, e.g.,
hurricanes and the Three Mile Island accident. As severity of an extreme event increases,
the level of sensemaking generally decreases. Ultimately, in the most extreme cases, e.g.,
life and death, sensemaking is almost non-existent, and the individuals resort to a
situational sensemaking that is primarily based upon self-preservation.
Next, I continue the process of developing the integrated model of crisis
leadership by explaining the results related to sensemaking.

The continuum of

sensemaking ranges from useful sensemaking, that is, leaders understand the event and
apply enacted sensemaking to reach a successful outcome.

As the event severity

progresses, then sensemaking changes forms to adapt to the situation; however, in the
most extreme events, as with other concepts, if conditions are life threatening,
sensemaking stops as an effective tool.

Then those individuals affected resort to

situational sensemaking, which is founded in their self-preservation and other strong felt
emotions, e.g., instinct and intuition.
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Table 14 - Continuum of Sensemaking
Situational
Context
Routine

Felt Emotion

Decision-making

Crisis Response

Sensemaking

Subliminal
(success)
Subliminal
(skepticism)

Classical

Readiness

Positive evaluation

Framing and Cognitive
Continuum Model

Resilience

Collective
sensemaking

Surprise

Supraliminal
(unawareness)

Recognition Primed and
Naturalistic

Complexity

Failure

Supraliminal
(failure)

Macrocognition

Failure

Updating,
Optimistic bias, &
Institutional effect
Doubt &
Pessimism

Catastrophic

Supraliminal
(death anxiety)

Situational

Situational

Situational

SuperCatastrophic

Supraliminal
(mortality
salience)

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Resilience

In developing the sensemaking continuum, the results indicate that positive
evaluations, also known in the literature as positive felt emotions, will dominate in the
less serious events, while felt emotions dominate in the extreme events. The threshold or
point at which the continuum deviates is at the point where the surprise realm of (Table
14) situational context is reached, e.g., in the Fukushima case, when the reactor building
exploded. At that point, felt emotions became supraliminal and began to dominate
sensemaking.
Another finding was that interviewees who were closest to the event were affected
most by felt emotions. This insight is not a surprise; however, it suggests that as an event
progresses into the extreme categories of events, sensemaking may be more effective for
those leaders further away from the event that are less impacted by felt emotions. This
insight should be considered when managing an extreme crisis event. Normally, first
responders are relied upon to provide leaders the picture of the event; however, in the
most severe events, this picture could be clouded by felt emotions of the responders.
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Interestingly, the research by Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) concluded that
negative emotions may be more helpful earlier in an event as a countermeasure to
optimistic bias. Negative emotions can offset the optimistic bias and positive thoughts
that often occur earlier in an event. In fact, Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) suggest that
negative emotions should be built into crisis response. This research confirms the value
of their suggestion.
In sum, the continuum of sensemaking follows the non-linear progression noted
throughout this research. There exists a threshold where emotions turn from positive
subliminal thoughts of success into supraliminal negative emotions of failure.
Ultimately, as in the other crisis concepts, felt emotions dominate sensemaking. Next is a
discussion of the crisis concept of leadership. My research finds that leadership is a nonlinear concept with new insights identified for leadership in the catastrophic and super
catastrophic events.
Leadership
This subchapter discusses the results for the crisis concept of leadership.
Generally, my results can be divided into two categories, i.e., general leadership theories
and situational leadership concepts. First, I discuss the contextualization of situational
leadership concepts.

Second, I discuss the general leadership theories as they are

applicable to these results. Finally, a continuum of the crisis concept of leadership is
developed.
There were a number of situational leadership concepts investigated in the
analysis of the interviews. Most importantly, the results show that extreme events are
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highly contextualized with regard to leadership33. Because of this, they become a maze
of situational leadership concepts that is difficult to categorize, summarize, and explain.
With the highly contextualized nature of the crisis concept of leadership, my conclusion
is that the continuum of leadership is best built with a mix of situational leadership
concepts and leadership theories. Discussing leadership with this mix of situational and
theoretical allows for case-specific contextualization and integrated discussion of
leadership theoretical concepts.
Next, I discuss the results regarding the crisis concept of leadership and build
towards a continuum of the crisis concept of leadership. Table 15 depicts the continuum
of crisis concepts of leadership.

Table 15 – Continuum of Crisis Leadership
Situational
Context

Felt Emotion

Decision-making

Crisis
Response

Sensemaking

Leadership

Routine

Subliminal (success)

Classical

Readiness

Positive evaluation

Collaborative

Resilience

Subliminal
(skepticism)

Framing and Cognitive
Continuum Model

Resilience

Collective
sensemaking

Authoritarian
and setback

Surprise

Supraliminal
(unawareness)

Recognition Primed and
Naturalistic

Complexity

Adaptive

Failure

Supraliminal
(failure)

Macrocognition

Failure

Updating,
Optimistic bias, &
Institutional effect
Doubt &
Pessimism

Catastrophic

Supraliminal
(death anxiety)

Situational

Situational

Situational

Situational

SuperCatastrophic

Supraliminal
(mortality salience)

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Non-linear

Starting the discussion with routine events, the results for leadership imply that
classical concepts of collaborative leadership are used in responding to routine events, in
that leaders, workers and event responders collaborate to address the challenges of a
33

An assertion that extreme event leadership is highly contextualized was also made by Hannah, et al. (2010).
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routine event. Whether the event is an office fire or a worker slipping and falling,
typically the organizational response is collaborative. That is, the organization works
together in solving the situation (Voogd, 2004; Quarantelli, 1988). This dissertation does
not dispute this dynamic. In fact, there were no results that dispute these conclusions.
When events exceed the routine, organizational stress can set in, especially when
the event conditions (situational context) exceed the organization‘s resilience. As event
conditions worsen, organizations typically seek external assistance. Classically, the need
for leadership and coordination with external assistance organizations increases, and at
this point incident management structures are characterized by more authoritarian or
setback leadership models (Lettieri, et al., 2009).
As extreme events progress to a situational context category of ―surprise‖,
organizations discover that their crisis response mechanisms are failing to arrest the
progression of the event. They become surprised that their efforts fail. Farazmand
(2009) suggests that surprise leadership has its roots in chaos, complexity, and dynamic
systems theory. Under these conditions, interviewees (Ref. JB, RR, OD) suggested that
leaders must use their judgment, lean forward (adapt), innovate, repurpose (adapt), use
people as resources (adapt), and use an adaptive approach to leadership. These specific
leadership concepts are consistent with the theory of Adaptive Leadership (Yukl, 2006).
Once the situational context reaches the failure stage event context, and with
supraliminal felt emotions gaining in importance, leadership acumen must be flexible.
Farazmand (2009) calls this situation ‗living on the edge of chaos.‘ Other researchers
caution that most managers often make a big mistake of thinking linearly; managers try to
solve non-linear organizational problems in a linear fashion.
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Managers must think

strategically and non-linearly to anticipate and manage the ―unexpected‖ (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2007).
In the case of the catastrophic and super-catastrophic events, felt emotions are at
their peak and dominate a leader‘s thoughts. Under these dangerous contexts, situational
leadership concepts begin to influence the leader‘s decision-making.

Situational

leadership concepts in the dangerous categories of extreme events can include: instinct,
intuition, hopelessness, defiance and at the far end of the leadership continuum, warrior
ethos. Next, I provide a deeper discussion of the specific leadership concepts applicable
to the dangerous categories of extreme events.
Situational leadership concepts in the dangerous contexts, specifically supercatastrophic events, are best studied by observing organizations that face life-and-death
conditions frequently, e.g., warriors.

Generally, the military domain is studied for

dangerous context leadership more than the non-military domain (Kolditz, 2007). The
major differences between the two domains include the military leader‘s familiarity level
with experiencing dangerous contexts and cohabitation of the military leaders and their
soldiers, which leads to development of a ―warrior ethos‖ mentality (Kolditz, 2007).
There are other differences as well. Specifically, Kolditz (2007) defines dangerous
contexts as those where leaders: (a) embrace continuous learning because dangerous
situations demand it, (b) share risks with followers, (c) maintain a common lifestyle with
followers (cohabitation) and emphasize shared values rather than material possessions,
(d) possess technical competence (i.e., proficiency in domain-specific skills as opposed to
traditional leader competencies) that allows them to make rapid and effective decisions,
(e) create feelings of trust among team members, and (f) exhibit and create loyalty.
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Samuels, et al. (2007) discuss the uniqueness of dangerous contexts including the
ability of leaders in dangerous contexts to build leader trust that overcomes the natural
intuitions and instincts of the followers, e.g., as noted by Weick‘s (1988) study of the
Mann Gulch event in 1949 where firefighters dropped their tools and ran away,
disobeying their leaders‘ instructions.

This issue of overcoming natural instincts

becomes important as situations move from routine to super catastrophic.
Trust between group members is created through training under adverse
conditions and by cohabitating responders as in the case of firefighters and the military.
This condition rarely exists in a non-military domain. Also, in dangerous contexts, the
fear of imminent death, i.e., mortality salience is expected. In the non-military domain,
the fear of imminent death is not explicitly considered in both training and daily
operations (Samuels et al., 2007).
In the military domain where dangerous contexts and felt emotions are often
experienced, a ―warrior ethos‖ is developed among leaders and followers; however, in
both the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events, examples of a warrior ethos did
emerge. Specifically, the leaders and responders stated their immense ―concern for
workers‖. For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon event (Shroder, et al. 2011):

Dave Young [chief mate] was torn between staying on the bridge and going back
on deck. The bridge was still in chaos, Curt seemed overwhelmed, but as chief
mate his responsibility was to direct the emergency response and firefighting. He
had to go. When Dave got to the emergency gear locker, the muster point for the
emergency team, only one person was there, a roustabout named Christopher Coy.
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Apparently, everyone else on the fire team had ignored their training and already
gone to the lifeboats. The fire was spreading. Dave knew that he had to hurry.
He just grabbed the coat and ran toward the column of flame. Chad Murray
[Chief Electrician] came running the other way and said ―Dale Burkeen is down‖.
Dave started toward the crane. Another blast knocked him off his feet and drove
him back twenty feet. He picked himself up and checked for Dale‘s pulse. He
couldn‘t find one, but knew he had to stay there trying.

As noted in this quote, the leader valued support for his worker over his firefighting duty. This is an interesting conundrum. Had the individual continued on with
his fire-fighting duties he may have been able to reduce the fire and save lives. That
assumption is counterfactual; however, if it is considered for purposes of example, we
can compare and contrast the non-military domain to the military domain. During the
interview with a military commander (Ref. RW), he discussed the concept of Total Ship
Survivability. The concept of Total Ship Survivability implies that some lives might be
lost to save many. In many of the interviews with the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon
leaders, the interviewees emphasized their concern for workers over the crisis
management response to the event. The non-military leaders leaned heavily in favor of
concern for workers, while the military leader balanced concern for workers with
successful crisis response.

Thus, the two domains, military and non-military, have

significant differences with regard to the warrior ethos. In the military domain, the
priorities are (1) mission first, then (2) protection of workers (troops); in the non-military
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domain those priorities are reversed. This is a significant area for future research in crisis
leadership.
Next I suggest that this integrated model of extreme crisis leadership provides a
useful framework for future research in extreme crisis leadership. My integrated model is
an attempt to show how disparate theories actually work together in continuums that
illustrate the leadership concepts from routine through extreme to dangerous contexts. I
incorporated the leadership characteristics from the major crisis theories (discussed in
Chapter 3) into six extreme crisis concepts and then demonstrate how those extreme
crisis concepts change as events proceed from routine to dangerous. Further the model
shows the underlying dynamics of how those extreme crisis theories from Chapter 3 work
in concert to explain extreme event leadership.
Integrated Model of Extreme Crisis Leadership
In sum, the integrated model of extreme crisis concepts (Table 16) provides a
framework for the future study of crisis management leadership. This framework focuses
on the crisis management literature as analyzed with the results of this dissertation. I
believe that this integrated model helps to reduce the ―Tower of Babel‖ (Chapter 2)
criticism of the crisis management literature. Further, that this integrated model offers a
continuum of context, underlying dynamics and a model to explain leadership under
extreme event circumstances.
As developed for each of the six extreme crisis concepts, Tables 10-15 represent
the integrated extreme crisis model shown as Table 16. Therefore, with the integrated
model, the situational context represents the categories/severities of the events, and as the
situational context continuum progresses from routine events to super-catastrophic, the
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other five extreme crisis concepts reflect their associated continuums. For example, for
catastrophic events, one could expect to experience supraliminal felt emotions of death,
situational decision-making and crisis responses (as stated earlier, these concepts become
dominated by felt emotions), situational sensemaking and leadership that is situational
and dominated by felt emotions of instinct and intuition.

Table 16 – Integrated Model of Extreme Crisis Leadership
Situational
Context

Felt Emotion

Decision-making

Crisis
Response

Sensemaking

Leadership

Routine

Subliminal
(success)

Classical

Readiness

Positive evaluation

Collaborative

Resilience

Subliminal
(skepticism)

Framing and
Cognitive
Continuum Model

Resilience

Collective
sensemaking

Authoritarian
and setback

Surprise

Supraliminal
(unawareness)

Recognition
Primed and
Naturalistic

Complexity

Updating,
Optimistic bias, &
Institutional effect

Adaptive

Failure

Supraliminal
(failure)

Macrocognition

Failure

Doubt &
Pessimism

Non-linear

Catastrophic

Supraliminal
(death anxiety)

Situational

Situational

Situational

Situational

SuperCatastrophic

Supraliminal
(mortality
salience)

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Warrior ethos

Noteworthy for this model is that events can proceed along different continuums.
For instance, events may be catastrophic (situational context), yet the leader‘s decisionmaking process remains classical, or at the routine category of events. If decisionmaking remains classical, this progression would likely be insufficient in creating a
successful outcome for the event.

This integrated model was developed with

progressions through the extreme crisis concept continuums as experienced from the
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events studied (including the recognition that the Deepwater Horizon event proceeded
immediately as a super-catastrophic event).
In the end, it is possible that the reason there are so many crisis theories is
because each event is unique and presents data that create new streams of literature and
different theories for each crisis concept and each portion of the continuum. I believe
that this uniqueness (primarily driven by case study research which builds unique
theories) has created an array of seemingly disparate theories and concepts that lack
integration. This integrated extreme event crisis leadership model presented here (Table
16) harmonizes those theories by demonstrating the applicability that each theory has
within the continuum of routine to super-catastrophic events. Rather than disparate
theories, this integrated model shows how these crisis theories may be more useful at
certain points during a crisis and how those theories apply as the severity increases. This
integrated model can be used to organize future extreme crisis research so that theories
can build upon each other without exacerbating the ―Tower of Babel.‖
Further, this integrated model of extreme crisis leadership finds the outer reaches
of existing theories by discovering the significant impact of felt emotions on extreme
crisis leadership.

The conclusions herein explore the dynamics that exist at the

boundaries of extreme and dangerous events and the associated non-linearities. As such,
the felt emotions of leaders result in a warrior ethos of leadership. For non-military
domains the warrior ethos focuses on support for workers whereas in the military domain,
mission often comes first before the focus on ―workers‖.
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Limitations and Areas for Future Research
The limitations of qualitative research are covered in detail in Chapter 3.
Especially in Chapter 3.8.1, I reference specific limitation from the research. I offer two
additional areas where I was limited in my pursuit of issues raised in the interviews.
Those were in the areas of organizational adaptation and even more exploration of
sensemaking in these events. Next is a brief summary of those limitations and my
response to them.
There is a potential limitation in this dissertation for interviewer bias given my
extensive background in crisis leadership, and specifically, due to my personal
involvement in the Fukushima event. Regarding limitations for qualitative research, as
discussed in Chapter 4, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 30) challenge the qualitative
researcher to find fresh theory bridging well from rich qualitative data into mainstream
deductive research. Through the strategies mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, I concentrated
on ensuring that this research seeks to comply with these major points. Specifically, this
research relies upon recursive cycling, the identification of research gaps, smart sampling
of cases to illuminate interesting concepts, controlling interviewer bias, and pooling the
data to develop a ―good‖ theory. One area where this research has limits is in sampling
routine crisis cases. As discussed earlier, I intend to study extreme event cases. There
are many ―routine‖ crisis studies, which I can use as parallel data during my data
analysis.
Gephart (2004) raises six problems noted in qualitative research. First, Gephart
(2004) suggests that there are too many ―one off‖ papers, i.e. one-of-a-kind, submitted.
Agreed, this dissertation is a one-off paper. Second, Gephart (2004) concludes that
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researchers fail to conduct a thorough literature review at the beginning of their work.
My literature review was extensive, and I added two additional literature reviews, i.e. felt
emotions and decision-making. A third and related problem noted by Gephart (2004) is
that qualitative researchers need goals, objectives, or research questions to guide their
work. In my research, I identified nine ―research threads‖ that I use to guide my research
and avoid this pitfall. Fourth, Gephart (2004) advises that research papers provide the
theoretical background related to the concepts covered by the researchers‘ paper
including explaining key concepts among the theories, research questions, and
methodologies of the domain. In my research, I exhaustively explain the applicable
leadership theories, concepts, and methodologies contained in the leadership literature.
Fifth, Gephart (2004) concludes that many qualitative researchers fail to describe
thoroughly the methodology, especially in capturing meaning of data, thoroughly
interpreting results, drawing linkages across data, and explaining the origins of
conclusions. I believe that this dissertation accomplished these goals through the use of
ATLAS.ti, and the qualitative reference books cited in Chapter 4.

Finally, Gephart

(2004) notes a problem in that qualitative researchers fail to revisit research questions or
goals in the results section of the researcher‘s submittal. This dissertation revisited the
past research prior to the conduct of this study as well as again to better frame some of
the findings of this study not considered in the original literature review. Also, the
broader implications of the topic were addressed through the linkage of the crisis
leadership theories to build an integrated model of crisis leadership.
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In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, Thomas and James (2005) offer a critique
of grounded theory by challenging three fundamental precepts of grounded theory, i.e.,
ground, theory, and discovery. Thomas and James (2005) claim first, that,

Grounded theory oversimplifies complex meanings and interrelationships in data;
second, that it constrains analysis, putting the cart (procedure) before the horse
(interpretation); and third that it depends upon inappropriate models of induction
and

asserts from them equally inappropriate claims to explanation and

prediction (p. 768).

Thomas and James (2005) assert that holding to the terms ground, theory and
discovery, limits the appreciative inquiry of researchers. Thomas and James (2005)
challenge the benefit of ―interpreting interpretations‖ (p. 789) as taking the process a step
too far. In this dissertation, I made liberal use of direct quotations. Using direct quotes
as a reference for conclusions should strengthen my research arguments.
Conversely, Suddaby (2006) answered Gephart‘s (2004) ―From the Editors‖ column in
the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) on the problems identified by AMJ Editors
with qualitative research, specifically grounded theory research. Suddaby (2006) gives
six misconceptions regarding ―what grounded theory is not,‖ refer to Chapter 2.

I

addressed those misconceptions by:



Following their advice as I proceeded through the collection and analysis
of my data.
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In my dissertation I provided definitions for my codings and examples of
codings.



I address theoretical saturation in Chapter 4.



Grounded theory method is not perfect, nor is it easy.

(Researcher

comment: Noted!!!)


As developed in my dissertation, my methodology was rigorous, and
thorough.

Glaser with Holton (2007) takes strong exception to naturalistic approaches to
grounded theory research. They believe that quantitative approaches (QDA) are invading
grounded theory. Furthermore, Glaser with Holton (2007) believes the flaws of QDA are
many.
On the other hand, Glaser (2009) talks about the benefits of retaining grounded
theory in the hands of the novice and believes that the future of grounded theory rests in
the hands of these novices. Thus, in this dissertation, I used a modified grounded theory
approach which was more inductive research from a literature review and I used a fairly
rigorous quantitative process with plenty of actual interview data included.
With regard to the validity of the interviews, I have discussed theoretical
saturation earlier. I also address retrospective bias of interviewees including conducting
a sample analysis of ―in-case‖ versus ―past-case‖ test for validity. The results showed no
bias for the sample taken. Also, forgetfulness is a flaw for some historical research. In
my interviews, I observed no instances where people could not remember details. It
could be that these cases are so dramatic; it is hard for people to forget the details. I did
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use secondary data for the Deepwater Horizon case for which there was the potential for
retrospective bias or forgetfulness.
Further, there are a number of areas where this dissertation could expand into
deeper research. Specifically, this research was limited in the area of organizational
structure as it relates to crisis management, and there is additional work that could
provide further insights on sensemaking at the case level for the events covered in this
dissertation. This subchapter illustrates some of those limitations and offers suggestions
for future research.
In the areas of organizational structure, research into the adaptive culture of
organizations might provide more insights on the relationships between leadership and
organizational structure for extreme events. In several cases, interviewees discussed how
a non-adaptive organizational structure and fragmented control have actually complicated
the resolution of the event. Specifically, in Super Storm Sandy, the differences between
the leadership response in New York and New Jersey were mirror images. In New York,
the non-adaptive nature of multiple jurisdictions caused difficulties in establishing a
unified command and developing a picture of the consequences of the storm unlike the
adaptive and unified command in New Jersey. With multiple jurisdictions in New York,
it was difficult for the federal government to work with New York as opposed to the
unified command in New Jersey.

Also, interviewees claim the response was more

effective and efficient in New Jersey. Given that the New Jersey Governor had hired his
entire command structure, it was a significant advantage over the situation in New York
with multiple leaders and staff tenure. Similarly, in the Three Mile Island event, the
Governor, because he was a new and did not have his team in place at the time of the
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accident, adapted his organizational structure by bringing in people that he could trust
from the outside, into his leadership circle.
In the Fukushima case, interviewees (YF, IN) suggested that early in the event,
the organizational structure was non-adaptive.

The Prime Minister and the Tokyo

Electric Power Company were separated from the operators at Fukushima. This led to a
major focus on the consequences in Tokyo (psycho-physical distance).

Some

interviewees (YF, IN, MA) discussed their view that this non-adaptive, stovepipe
organizational structure and how it contributed to elite panic. For instance, not until 10
days into the event did the government establish a unified command with Tokyo Electric
Power Company and the Fukushima operators. A similar organizational phenomenon
occurred during the Three Mile Island event (Ref. HD).
Many interviewees (YF, GH, SS, RR, OD, and RW) discussed the role of
leadership in sensemaking. Chapter 4 provided some pertinent examples of leadership
influences on sensemaking. These examples included a case where the leader(s) was not
aware of the actual physical condition of the facility because the leaders were sequestered
in a bunker, while a leader in a similar situation did leave the bunker and he better
understood the physical conditions and consequently was more successful in
sensemaking. Also, emotional intelligence was mentioned as a significant factor in
leadership‘s capacity for sensemaking.

For example, interviewee (RW) was more

appreciative of the role of emotional intelligence in an extreme event than some nonmilitary leaders. Another example of leader capacity noted by interviewees as being
significant to sensemaking and crisis outcome was the construct of ―optimistic bias‖.
The concept of ―optimistic bias‖ was most notable in the Fukushima case where an
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incorrect response strategy seriously complicated the event. The response strategy could
not keep pace with the event. This insight of the ―response speed keeping pace with the
event speed‖ is discussed by a number of interviewees (RW, RR, and OD) in this
dissertation.
These are a few areas that are important future research topics.

A better

understanding of the role of adaptive organizational structures would enhance the
abilities of organizations responding to extreme events. The associated leadership,
decision-making, and external influences constructs can only illuminate the elements of
sensemaking thereby, enabling clearer insights on the roles of leadership in extreme
events.
Conclusions
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the leadership constructs that
apply uniquely to extreme event crises.

A qualitative, grounded theory-influenced

approach was used to discover insights regarding extreme events despite their rarity. An
inductive and qualitative approach allowed the researcher to explore and gain theoretical
knowledge of a phenomenon without biasing the data and results with preconceived ideas
or hypotheses (Glaser, 1992), and instead, enabling the gathering of unique theoretical
knowledge grounded in real events. Nineteen interviews, one book (Shroder, et al. 2011),
and five court transcripts were used as data that ranged from the White House Situation
Room, the Red Cross, senior level responders, and first responders of three extreme
events.

Stories from the interviewees were vivid and highly informative.

This

dissertation benefitted from their sometimes tragic experiences. The resultant insights
regarding the six major crisis concepts, the uniqueness of each event, the role of felt
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emotions, and the integrated extreme event crisis leadership model came from those
experiences. In particular, the role of felt emotions cannot be underestimated during
Black Swan (Taleb, 2010) events. In those events, felt emotions changed the dynamics
of each of the five other constructs dramatically and, more likely, determined the success
or failure of the extreme crisis responders.
I hope that this dissertation inspires researchers to reach beyond the results
discovered herein. In the events researched for this dissertation, and many others, there
were heroes who responded effectively to the extreme events and prevented them from
cascading into more dangerous events. Those responders are considered heroes for their
actions under unfathomable conditions. The goal of this research was to discover new
leadership models that would aid future extreme crisis leaders and eliminate or reduce the
need for more heroics. Those who toil in this area of research hope that their research
means that there will be less need for heroes in the future.
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APPENDIX A – Table of Unified Extreme Event Characteristics

Researcher(s)
Chatterjee and Hambrick
(2007)

Hannah, et al. (2009)

List of Unified Extreme Event Characteristics
Characteristic
Discussion
Summary
Non-linearity as a
Concepts like trust may
Discusses how the threshold effect impacts
―threshold‖ effect
be linear up to the point
the way researchers might measure concepts.
where life and death
consequences or
decisions are involved.
Beyond an undefined
threshold, the concepts
take on completely new
meanings.
1.Intolerable magnitude
1. Such threats must
Leadership is differentiated in a routine crisis
2. Preparation time as a
reach the threshold of
and extreme event.
non-characteristic
―intolerable magnitude‖
3. Probability
(Hannah, et al. 2009, p.
4. Ambiguity of cause,
898) where goals are
effect, and means
imperative such as life
resolution (leaders fail)
and death and require a
level of leadership much
beyond that of a routine
crisis. 2. Extreme events
can be slow in inception
or lengthy. 3.
―Probability‖ as an
ingredient but not
necessarily a stand-alone
characteristic. 4.
Organizations may find
themselves in an extreme
crisis with the capacity to
respond but may not be
able to execute the
capacity adequately or
may become hampered
by ineffective decisionmaking.

Taleb (2010)

1. Confirmation biases
narrative fallacy
2. Lack of human
imagination
3. Signal theory (missing
signals),
4. Ludic fallacy (tunnel
vision)

Vendelo and Rerup
(2009); Weick (1990) &
Dunbar and Garud (2009)

1. Risk context
2. Incubation period
3. Pluralistic ignorance
4. Collective sensemaking
5.Team trust
6.Panic
7.Length of disaster

Boin (2009)

Transboundary effects
1. Tightly coupled
systems
2. Extends crossfunctionally and crossnationally
3. Transcends time
boundaries

Lack of planning for
Black Swan events or one
does not recognize the
possibility of an
impossible catastrophe.
He focuses on the human
element that often ignores
the possibility of Black
Swan events.
Situations where threats
are low; perceived low
risk environments but
risks can incubate. There
is a period where latent
weaknesses are present
but yet unobserved or
active.

Humans have blind spots.

Describes the ―escalatory
power‖ of a
transboundary crisis.
Because globalization
makes the world flatter
small perturbations may
have drastic
consequences. A

Events cascade, escalating the consequences
dramatically through coupling.
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Latent conditions go unobserved.

Wachtendorf (2009)

4. No defined beginning,
end, or ground zero
5.Escalates quickly in
unforeseen directions
exploiting linkages
6. Causes unfathomable
damage
Transboundary social
ruptures

coupling of systems
extends this issue by
creating the ―highways
for failure.‖

National and
transnational system
vulnerability to and
resiliency.
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Describes events that reach beyond societal
boundaries and disrupt multiple social
systems across nations.

APPENDIX B – Summary of Extreme Leadership Concepts

Throughout this dissertation, I discuss the need to identify leadership ―concepts‖.
Those concepts are characteristics and actions that may constitute ―leadership‖ and
enable the systematic examination of leadership (Campbell, Hannah & Matthews, 2010).
Section 2.1 of this dissertation describes the relationship between the characteristics of
extreme events and the concepts of leadership. That relationship is important because the
unique characteristics of extreme events, e.g., intolerable magnitude, cascading,
transboundary nature of extreme events, necessitates a very different type of leadership
needed in these events.

Remember the points made by Dynes (1974); Dynes and

Quarentelli & Kreps (1981), that the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of
the event itself in determining the outcome of a disaster. Thus, concepts that formulate
leadership must be considered in the study of extreme events. This section consolidates
the concepts identified throughout the dissertation.

This consolidation is useful in

identifying all of the elements in extreme event leadership.
Within this dissertation several sections identify leadership concepts.

For

example, in discussing the characteristics of extreme events, Chatterjee and Hambrick
(2007) highlight ―trust‖ in leadership and how trust can vary due to the threshold effect.
Thus, when formulating the research design for this dissertation, leadership trust and the
threshold effect are strong variables for consideration.
In discussing readiness theory, Voogd (2004) shared that command and control
along with other readiness concepts have their limits. Extreme events are difficult, if not
impossible, to predict; therefore, common leadership concepts such as training, roles and
responsibilities, role knowledge, training, rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during
crisis may be of limited value in an extreme crisis. In fact, training and simulation may
cause blind spots. These thoughts are important in designing questions for this study.
A significant discussion of leadership concepts within this dissertation surrounds
the sensemaking theory. Weick (1988) cautions us that leaders while trying to make
sense out of a situation may actually change the event thereby making the situation
worse. Weick (1988) concludes in his research that developing a ―shared understanding‖
is essential for leadership success. Weick (1988) dissects shared understanding into three
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components, i.e., commitment, identity, and expectations.

Weick (1988) identifies

another construct in wisdom. Weick (1988) tells us that the elements of wisdom are
―updating and doubt‖, and importantly, wisdom enables adaptation and innovation.
Finally, in the section of this dissertation on sensemaking, there is a debate discussed
between Weick‘s (1988) belief that ―felt emotions‖ can take away from sensemaking.
While Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) believe that negative felt emotions may actually
promote sensemaking.
The last leadership construct discussed heretofore is that of Boin (2009) who
identifies ―executive tasks‖ for extreme event leaders.

While these tasks are not

technically a ―leadership construct‖ these tasks do provide insights on the types of
activities leaders must be capable of accomplishing.

Those executive tasks are: 1.

Preparing in the face of indifference, 2. Making sense of an emerging and evolving crisis,
3. Managing large response networks, 4. Offering credible answers, and 5. Learning
under pressure. Given Boin‘s (2009) description of the cascading and transboundary
nature of extreme events, it seems reasonable for this study to focus on the tasks that
Boin‘s (2009) suggests will ―make-or-break‖ leaders in extreme events.

Leadership Concepts Summary Table
Reference
Chatterjee and
Hambrick
(2007)

Construct
Trust

Voogd
(2004)

Command &
Control
(readiness)

Weick
(1988)

Sensemaking

Extreme Leadership concepts in Literature
Description
Method
Results
Measuring trust
Testing
Consider testing for threshold effects and long-term
is difficult given Narcissistic
effects of the threshold effect.
the ―threshold
CEOs
effect‖
Challenges
Case study
Common leadership concepts such as training, roles
whether
Netherlands
and responsibilities, role knowledge, training,
readiness can
fireworks
rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis
prepare leaders
explosion
may be of limited value in an extreme crisis. This
for extreme
dissertation discusses some problems with regard to
events
disaster prevention policy in the Netherlands. In May
2000, a devastating fireworks accident in the Dutch
town Enschede took place, destroying a significant
part of the built environment of this town, with an
investigation by an independent evaluation
committee painfully highlighting the failure of the
local and national authorities‘ preventative policies.
The Enschede disaster stimulated many new
activities at various levels of government with regard
to the need to improve disaster prevention and
control. However, recent studies reveal that the
lessons of Enschede have yet to be put into practice.
This raises questions about the usefulness of a
‗command-and-control‘ prevention approach.
-shared
Case study Mann When faced with extreme conditions, people often
understanding
Gulch
revert back to fundamental training and fail to
a. Commitment
conduct ―sensemaking‖. Weick‘s work is too
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Boin
(2009)

Executive tasks &
Transboundary

Boin
(2009)
Casto
Samuels, et al.
(2010)

Task
Interdependency

Campbell, et
al. (2010)

Effective
leadership

Hannah, et al.
(2008)

Leadership
efficacy

Hannah and
Avolio
(2011)

Leader character
as a locus

Self-efficacy

b. Identity
c. expectations
-Wisdom
-Felt emotions
1. Preparing in
the face of
indifference, 2.
Making sense of
an emerging and
evolving crisis,
3. Managing
large response
networks, 4.
Offering
credible
answers, and 5.
Learning under
pressure
Relationships
between the five
executive tasks
Ability to
remain calm and
make tough
high-stakes
decisions
Effectiveness
across the
individual,
dyadic and team
levels

extensive to fully discuss here.

Qualitative piece
– editorial

Transboundary and social rupture research and
future directions. Discusses the escalatory power of
transboundary events.

Qualitative

This is not discussed in Boin; however, it seems that
there would be relationships between these tasks.

Survey of the Air
Force Freefall
and Soaring
programs

Suggests that successful performance under anxietyprovoking situations that require personal mastery
may increase self-efficacy in domains critical to
leading effectively in extreme contexts.

Multilevel
review of six
research papers

Leadership effectiveness is enhanced by:
a.
Shared mental models
b. Leader creativity
c.
Affect management
d. Creation of cohesiveness and positive
climate
e.
Successful performance
Effectiveness hindered by:
a.
Work overload at the individual level
b. Stress at the individual and dyadic levels
c.
Conflict at the team and dyadic levels

Development of
a multi-level
and multivariate
construct

Longitudinal
review of 20
studies

Characteristics
of leaders
character
construct and
how character
and competence
serve to foster
sustainable
leadership
across contexts,
cultures and
challenges

Address the
ontology by
using a metaframework
distinguishing
between locus,
transmission, and
reception of
leadership and a
epistemological
perspective

Development of a framework for leader efficacy and
leadership efficacy. This framework differentiates
leader efficacy from leadership efficacy.
Leader efficacy:
a.
Greater breath of generalization
b. Self-motivation
c.
Domain-specific leader efficacy
d. Leader though efficacy
e.
Generalization of efficacy and leader
adaptability
f.
Efficacy and adaptable leadership styles
g.
Self-system
h. Automaticity of leaders efficacy
Leadership efficacy:
a.
Leader and follower bidirectional
influence
b. Collective efficacy
c.
Cross-level models
d. Shared mental models
e.
Multilevel leadership efficacy
The need for a research stream to discuss character
and character-based leadership. Suggest that
character is (if not the) critical component of
leadership. Development of this construct is needed
in the literature.
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Quick and
Wright
(2011)

Character-based
leadership, context
and consequences

Investigate the
link between
morality and
character

Literature review
response to
Hannah and
Avolio (2011)

Hannah, et al.
(2010)

Contextualized
leadership in
extreme events

Call for
Multilevel focus
and systems
approach to
dynamic
leadership
processes

Proposal for
relevant concepts
at each level

Baran & Scott
(2010)

Ambiguity

Grounded
method Analyzed 100
reports of ―nearmiss‖ situations
in which fire
fighters escaped

Fisher, et al.
(2010)

In Extremis
leadership

Social process
by which groups
make effective
sense of the
hazards while
avoiding
catastrophic
mistakes
―Bright‖
leadership
competencies
and shadow
influences

Yammarino,
et al. (2010)

Interdisciplinary,
multilevel model
of leadership and
team dynamics.

Pragmatic
leadership at the
individual
level,
individualized

Proposal for
experimental
studies,
interviews,
surveys and

Single case study
Australian Army
Training Team
Vietnam
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Is character the locus of leadership? If so, what are
the locus, transmission and reception linkages?
Character is not personality; character is not values.
Character-based leadership is a general construct not
tied to leadership style.
Context and consequences – leader-in-practice –
successful leaders complement their knowledge of
leadership through the mastery of hands-on practice
and experience.
Is character developable? Yes, but need selfawareness to develop
Multilevel –
Micro a.
Emotions
b. Meaning-making
c.
Cognition and danger
d. Individual differences and danger
e.
Physiological effects
f.
Motivation and danger
Dyad –
a.
Leader-member relationship quality
b. Effective leadership style
Meso –
a.
Group/team type
b. Group processes
c.
Group complexity
d. Social networks
e.
Group prototypes
Macro –
a.
Organizational adaptability
b. Organizational structure and systems and
adaptability
c.
Professions and professional ethics
d. Ethos
Integrates interdisciplinary perspectives of
sensemaking, ambiguity, and high-reliability
organizational theories. The fundamental process of
organizing ambiguity-and it subprocesses of
framing, heedful interrelating, and adjusting leads to
goal attainment.
Themes – trust, mateship and training
―Bright‖ competencies –
a.
Physical courage
b. Adventurous/risk-taking
c.
Learning organization
d. Caring ethos
e.
Leading by example
f.
Level of experience
g.
Stamina
h. Expertise/control
i.
Self-reliance
j.
Humor
―Shadow‖ Influences –
a.
Highly stressed
b. Violent credo
c.
Corruption
Other considerations – role of mateship and training
as a buffer and facilitator; limits to the amount of
stress that can be tolerated; in extremis environment
exposes leader to powerful and subversive forces.
Thus, before assignment, leaders should be assessed
for their character, psychological makeup, and
required skills.
Twelve key multilevel propositions and five
multilevel exploratory ones are derived from the
model. Leadership approaches:
a.
Pragmatic at the individual level
b. Individualized Leadership: A Dyad-Level

Sweeney
(2010)

Trust

leadership at the
dyadic level,
and shared
leadership at the
team
level provide an
integrated core
for the
approach.

archival data

The purpose of
this exploratory
study was to
investigate
whether soldiers
reevaluated
trust in their
leaders prior to
combat
operations and,
if so, identify
conditions
that would
prompt it and
assess the
impact of any
reevaluation on
the level of
trust in the
leader–follower
relationship.

Seventy-two
male soldiers,
ranging in rank
from private to
lieutenant,
participated in
the study through
questionnaire.

Approach
Shared Leadership and Team Dynamics:
A Team-Level Approach
Yammario, et al. propose that the integration of three
models of leadership and team dynamics (i.e.,
pragmatic, individualized, and shared) that operate
at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, dyad,
and team, respectively) are the most beneficial for
understanding the dangerous military environment,
and these approaches form the core of a model of
concepts that operate at multiple levels of analysis
and involve team formation and assembly (i.e.,
coming together of a group of individuals for a
common purpose; which result in leadership and
team dynamics, which in turn yield team
performance and maintenance (i.e., analysis and
monitoring of task and socio-emotional demands (p.
S19)).
Soldiers do reconsider trust many times. From
training into combat operation and in new contexts
soldiers reconsidered trust based upon role
requirements. Soldiers seemed to place the most
importance on the leader‘s trait(s) that upheld their
greatest dependencies or reduced their greatest
vulnerabilities. In the case of combat, soldiers‘
welfare, especially at the platoon and company
levels, depends greatly on the competence of their
leaders. The data suggest that soldiers reevaluated
their leaders‘ abilities to manage stress, respond to
problems, demonstrate technical and tactic
proficiency, be honest and candid, and take care of
group members‘ needs during the deployment and
preparation phases to extrapolate whether they could
trust their leaders to lead in the new context of
combat. In the cases where reconsideration did
change, it increased the level of trust in the leader.
this study found that (a) the majority of soldiers did
reconsider trust in their leaders prior to following
them in the new context of combat; (b) soldiers‘
concerns about their leaders‘ competence to meet
role requirements in the combat context seemed to
initiate the trust reconsideration process; (c) for over
half the soldiers, the trust developed in peace time
appeared to carry over to the combat context; and (d)
for the soldiers for whom trust changed, the majority
experienced an increase in the level of trust in their
leaders. The results imply that leaders can leverage
the trust reconsideration process that results from
preparing to lead a group into a new context,
especially ones that increase the vulnerability or risk
to group members‘ welfare.
c.
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APPENDIX – C Research Threads Identified in Extreme Event Paper

#

Author(s)

1

Mikusova (2011)

Nature of the
Thread
Methodological

2

Mikusova (2011)

Methodological

3

Thompson and Hunt
(1997)

Methodological

4

Lettieri (2007)

Context

5

Hannah, et al. (2009) &
Taleb, (2010)
Casto

Context

6

Sementelli‘s (2007)

General
Leadership
Theory

Description of the Thread
Many researchers simplify the research by
studying more routine events such as first
responders and then attempt to extrapolate
their insights to extreme events.
Scientists from many disciplines have added
to the research of crisis management
studying it from their perspective with their
own context, language, theories and
approaches.
Characteristics of extreme events have
implications on the concepts used to
investigate crisis leadership. For example, a
mere ―crisis‖ might involve a threat to the
achievement of a corporate goal or layoff of
workers. That threat is much different from
a threat experienced under extreme
conditions, which might include life and
death situations; therefore, this implies that
concepts such as trust, or followership,
among others, can be non-linear.

Consequences or
Benefits
Limits insights (validity)

Fails to facilitate
integrated theory

Common leadership
concepts take on an
entirely new meaning in
extreme crisis versus a
routine crisis and the
difference will affect the
research methodology.
For example, in
quantitative leadership
research, the construct of
―trust‖ is commonly
included as the leadership
variable. In extreme
events, beyond the
threshold of life and death,
a survey or even an
experiment cannot
duplicate the stress of a
life and death situation and
therefore that research
method would be less
valid than a deeper study
based in the grounded
approach that actually
studies an extreme event.
Thus, knowing the specific
characteristics of an
extreme event becomes
important not only in
defining the concepts but
also in how one
approaches the research
methodology.

1 - few researchers have delved into
―transboundary‖ effects of crisis
2 – Limited to USA & Canada
This review could find no unified list of
extreme event characteristics. Some
researchers have identified their own unique
descriptions of the characteristics for
extreme events.

Limits scope of findings
and insights.

There is little in the way of theory
development in literature. Mostly the
literature applies theory but does not add to
it. Specifically for the leadership theories,
he concludes that they are ―heavily examined
yet poorly understood‖ in this context

Developing a theory that
integrates the existing
literature would be a
valuable expansion of the
extreme crisis leadership
theories.
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Limits consistency in the
research - These
characteristics are
important considerations
in developing the concepts
associated with extreme
events and are a
foundation for the
research.

7

Smits & Ezzat-Ally‘s
(2003)

Readiness
Theory

Readiness theory adds little theoretical
development to extreme crisis management.
Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies
command and control limitations of the
theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of
decentralization and Quarentelli (1988)
concludes extreme events necessitate
adaptations

Knowing the important
concepts associated with
extreme event leadership
could enable organizations
to better inoculate
themselves against the
uncertainty of extreme
events through improved
readiness.

8

Mirvis (1996)

Complexity
Theory

Complexity Theory tends to require that
people behave outside of norms in
responding to a crisis. This requirement is
counterintuitive to most administrative
theories of org behavior.

9

Nutt (2004)

Normal Accident
Theory

10

La Porte (2011) and La
Porte and Rochlin (1994)

Normal Accident
and HighReliability
Theory

NAT has yet to explain everything about the
escalation of accidents. If accidents are
―normal‖ then, the question is why do most
organizations avoid them? Not every
organization experiences accidents;
therefore, perhaps most organizations have
learned to become safer. It could be that
they learn to de-couple their processes or it
could be that they have just become more
reliable.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) insist that
organizations can merge culture and
organizational structure into a Highly
Reliable Organization. While La Porte
(2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994)
agree with the basic HRT theory, they
somewhat disagree with Weick and Sutcliffe
(2011). La Porte (2011) and La Porte and
Rochlin (1994) challenge the ability of
organizations to combine culture and
structure to limit events.

Most organizations want
to limit uncertainty and
they do so by building
procedures and processes
that constrain individuals
to behave in predictable
ways for predicable
events. The concern then
becomes for individual
and organizational
behavior during
unperceived events.
Typically, when people
behave outside expected
norms, the organization
seeks to return the
behavior to those within
norms.
Are accidents inevitable?

11

Maitlis and Sonenshein
(2010)

Sensemaking

Not explicitly discussed among the three
themes of sensemaking is the role of ―felt‖
emotions in sensemaking. i.e., ―felt‖
emotions such as panic, on sensemaking

12

Landau and Chisholm
(1995)

Sensemaking

Argue that pessimism, with the failureavoidance organizational perspective that it
entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.
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Resolution could break the
deadlock between the two
theories, NAT & HRT.
Current research does not
integrate these two
theories (HRT and NAT)
with complexity theory.
My research may shed
some light on this
integration. It might be
helpful in resolving the
deadlock to consider
whether embracing
complexity helps move the
debate forward. Through
the investigation of
extreme events, perhaps
my research can shed light
on the argument and settle
the deadlock.
Investigation would
strengthen the
understanding of more
characteristics of
sensemaking.
Better understanding of
the implications of
optimistic bias and
pessimism on
sensemaking.

13

Jennings & Greenwood,
(2003)

Sensemaking

There is little research on the institutional
effects of sensemaking in crisis, e.g.,
processes, mindset.

14

Casto
(2013)

Sensemaking

15

Boin, (2009)

Transboundary

While it is obvious that panic exists among
individuals when a disaster unfolds, it would
be interesting to find measures of
organizational or leadership panic.
(Table 1)
Few crisis management researchers have
delved into studying transboundary effects.
Including – executive tasks during
transboundary crisis; relationship between
risk, crises, and public management.
Lagadec's (2009) focus on innovative
thinking when in the throes of transboundary
crises. Wachtendorf‘s (2009) social-ruptures

16

Hannah, et al. (2009)

Leadership
Context

17

DeChurch, et al. (2011)
Hannah, et al. (2009)

Leadership
Context

18

Farazmand (2009)
Casto (2013)

Extreme Event
Context

19

Farazmand (2009)
Casto (2013)

Surprise
Management &
Sensemaking

20

Yukl, (2006)

Adaptive v.
Administrative
Leadership

21

Hannah, et al. (2009)

Context

Discuss the tensions between leaders who
are adaptive versus those who are
―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis.
By ―administrative‖, they mean classic
authoritative or directive leadership. There
exists a general tension between using
adaptation during an event versus following
the administrative, i.e., classic leadership
route.
A discovery of the unique interrelationships
between leadership concepts and perhaps a
discovery of the most important concepts in
the extreme context.

There is a similarity between a
transboundary crisis and an extreme event or
an extreme event context. While there
appears to be little, or no, literature in this
area, these crises, events, and contexts
appear to have similar characteristics.
These two theories have roots in the same
areas of chaos, complexity, and dynamic
systems‘ theories. They clearly it have roots
in Weick‘s ―management of the unexpected‖
as well. Especially the characteristics of
non-linear thinking
A fundamental tension exists between
adaptive leadership and administrative
leadership styles. Adaptive leadership
consists of ―improvisational‖ and
―ambidextrous‖ leadership styles, which are
styles that flex between exploitation and
exploration. While administrative leadership
styles are those of classic leadership, for
example, autocratic or directive, the key to
the success of this research is to uncover the
relationships between leadership styles in
extreme events. This tension is a very
important insight for this research.
One major limitation is how extreme event
leadership can apply across many domains.
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Deeper understanding of
organizational failure,
perhaps even latent org
failure or incubation.
Very little, almost no
literature on the
consequences of
leadership panic in
extreme events.
Transboundary effects are
highly important concepts
for this research. As the
world flattens, extreme
events multiply, and our
ability to create fear
around the world expands,
most extreme events will
take on the characteristics
of a transboundary event.
This tension needs much
more development in the
literature.

recognition that extreme
leadership research may
not change the essence of
leadership, or make
leadership concepts
invalid; however, they
suggest that it could
discover new relationships
between concepts and
necessitate advanced
methodologies
Farazmand states this as a
gap in the literature…
discusses a perspective
that all ―grand failures‖ by
governments have global
implications.
Finding the linkages
between these theories
(elements) would be
helpful in establishing one
integrated extreme
leadership theory.
Understanding whether
organizations need to be
more improvisational or
whether they need to be
more ambidextrous will
provide valuable insights
for leadership. As this
research progresses,
further exploration of this
tension is necessary.

Are the leadership
strategies identified for
technical events applicable
to information technology
events, public health

22

Hannah, et al. (2009)

Readiness
Theory

As the potential for extreme events spreads,
more ―naïve‖ organizations will face
leadership challenges for which they may be
unprepared.

23

Hadley, et al. (2011)

Decision Making

Suggest that there is a need for greater
precision in the measures of decisionmaking. Those measures must focus on
―difficulty‖ and ―confidence.‖

24

Decision Making

Authors suggest building ―tools‖ for
decision-making

25

Santella, et al. (2009); von
Lubitz, Beakley &
Patricelli, (2008)
Parashevas (2006)

Decision Making

Suggests that decision-making should be a
living and evolving system and that agents
must understand their roles in this system.
He suggests that researchers should use
complexity science in researching the kind of
leadership necessary to generate these
realizations and behaviors.

26

Casto (2013)

Social Justice

Social justice influences on technical justice
decisions or leader accountability is not well
understood.

27

Casto (2013)

Dangerous
Contexts

Dangerous contexts are the next domain
beyond extreme contexts. Dangerous
contexts have unique leadership qualities.
There is little or no literature that explores
the commonalities or differences between
these two leadership contexts.
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events, or other nontechnical events?
The question arises as to
how the leadership
challenges vary across
organization types, such
as, the naïve versus the
trauma organizations.
Others suggest that a
single measure, which
might capture all of these
considerations, is ―selfefficacy.‖
OODA loop, etc. Out of
scope for this study.
Sometimes, a routine crisis
escalates into an extreme
event and this escalation
could bring with it new
considerations for
decision-making.
Parashevas (2006)
highlights this escalation
as an acute stage in the
crisis where the
organization reaches a
―critical instability‖ point
that might involve a
―bifurcation point‖ or
―phase transition‖. This
transition may become
important because it often
decentralizes decisionmaking.
Understanding how social
justice pressures create
heightened accountability
of political and crisis
leaders could shed
significant light on how
decisions get made and the
consequences of political
pressures caused by social
justice on the crisis leader.
Understanding how
similar these two contexts
are would inform our
knowledge of leadership
in both contexts.

APPENDIX D – Addressing Individual Research Threads

#
4
5

6

7

Research Thread (Context Only – not Methodological Gaps)
1 - few researchers have delved into ―transboundary‖ effects of crisis
2 – Limited to USA & Canada
This review could find no unified list of extreme event characteristics. Some
researchers have identified their own unique descriptions of the characteristics
for extreme events.
There is little in the way of theory development in literature. Mostly the
literature applies theory but does not add to it. Specifically for the leadership
theories, he concludes that they are ―heavily examined yet poorly understood‖ in
this context
Readiness theory adds little theoretical development to extreme crisis
management. Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies command and control
limitations of the theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of decentralization
and Quarentelli (1988) concludes extreme events necessitate adaptations

8

Complexity Theory tends to require that people behave outside of norms in
responding to a crisis. This requirement is counterintuitive to most
administrative theories of org behavior.

9

NAT has yet to explain everything about the escalation of accidents. If accidents
are ―normal‖ then, the question is why do most organizations avoid them? Not
every organization experiences accidents; therefore, perhaps most organizations
have learned to become safer. It could be that they learn to de-couple their
processes or it could be that they have just become more reliable.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) insist that organizations can merge culture and
organizational structure into a Highly Reliable Organization. While La Porte
(2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994) agree with the basic HRT theory, they
somewhat disagree with Weick and Sutcliffe (2011). La Porte (2011) and La
Porte and Rochlin (1994) challenge the ability of organizations to combine
culture and structure to limit events.
Not explicitly discussed among the three themes of sensemaking is the role of
―felt‖ emotions in sensemaking. i.e., ―felt‖ emotions such as panic, on
sensemaking
Argue that pessimism, with the failure-avoidance organizational perspective that
it entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.
There is little research on the institutional effects of sensemaking in crisis, e.g.,
processes, mindset.

10

11

12
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

While it is obvious that panic exists among individuals when a disaster unfolds,
it would be interesting to find measures of organizational or leadership panic.
(Table 1)
Few crisis management researchers have delved into studying transboundary
effects.
Including – executive tasks during transboundary crisis; relationship between
risk, crises, and public management. Lagadec‘s (2009) focus on innovative
thinking when in the throes of transboundary crises. Wachtendorf‘s (2009)
social-ruptures
Discuss the tensions between leaders who are adaptive versus those who are
―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis. By ―administrative‖, they mean
classic authoritative or directive leadership. There exists a general tension
between using adaptation during an event versus following the administrative,
i.e., classic leadership route.
A discovery of the unique interrelationships between leadership concepts and
perhaps a discovery of the most important concepts in the extreme context.
recognition that extreme leadership research may not change the essence of
leadership, or make leadership concepts invalid; however, they suggest that it
could discover new relationships between concepts and necessitate advanced
methodologies
There is a similarity between a transboundary crisis and an extreme event or an
extreme event context. While there appears to be little, or no, literature in this
area, these crises, events, and contexts appear to have similar characteristics.
These two theories have roots in the same areas of chaos, complexity, and
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How the Thread is Addressed in this
Dissertation Content
Will address in my results Section
Unified List of characteristics developed –
see Appendix A
Will address in my results Section

Will address in my results Section

Research area – 1 is there a conflict
between behavioral theory, e.g.,
rationality and organization theory during
an extreme crisis?
Research area 2 – Which theories are the
best fit for leadership during a Black
Swan event?

Research area– See #9

Research Area 3 – What is the role of
―felt‖ emotions in extreme event
leadership?
Research area – See #11
Research area – 4 Is sensemaking a
crucial component of crisis leadership
decision-making?
Research area- 5 What impact, if any,
does leadership panic play in extreme
crisis management?
Research area – 6 As the transboundary
effects of an extreme crisis accelerate, do
the executive tasks of the crisis leader
become more difficult?
Research area – See #8

Research area– See #8

Research area – See #4 & #15
Research area – See #11 & #13

20

21
22
23
24
25

26

27

dynamic systems‘ theories. They clearly it have roots in Weick‘s ―management
of the unexpected‖ as well. Especially the characteristics of non-linear thinking
A fundamental tension exists between adaptive leadership and administrative
leadership styles. Adaptive leadership consists of ―improvisational‖ and
―ambidextrous‖ leadership styles, which are styles that flex between exploitation
and exploration. While administrative leadership styles are those of classic
leadership, for example, autocratic or directive, the key to the success of this
research is to uncover the relationships between leadership styles in extreme
events. This tension is a very important insight for this research.
One major limitation is how extreme event leadership can apply across many
domains.
As the potential for extreme events spreads, more ―naïve‖ organizations will face
leadership challenges for which they may be unprepared.
Suggest that there is a need for greater precision in the measures of decisionmaking. Those measures must focus on ―difficulty‖ and ―confidence.‖
Authors suggest building ―tools‖ for decision-making
Suggests that decision-making should be a living and evolving system and that
agents must understand their roles in this system. He suggests that researchers
should use complexity science in researching the kind of leadership necessary to
generate these realizations and behaviors.
Social justice influences on technical justice decisions or leader accountability is
not well understood.

Dangerous contexts are the next domain beyond extreme contexts. Dangerous
contexts have unique leadership qualities. There is little or no literature that
explores the commonalities or differences between these two leadership contexts.
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Research area – See #8 & #16

See my Future Research Directions
Section
See my Future Directions Section
Research area – 7 Are there more precise
measures of decision-making precision?
Research area – See #23
Research area – See #23

Research area – 8 Is there a relationship
between social justice and technical
justice that influences political
accountability and influences leader
decision-making in significantly negative
ways?
Research area – 9 What are the overlaps
between extreme and dangerous event
leadership?

APPENDIX E – Generation of Leadership Interview Questions
Research Areas

Leadership concepts

Research area 1 – There
are unique changes in
normative leadership
behavior from
administrative leadership
to authoritarian leadership
during an extreme crisis.
Research area 2 – As
Black Swan events,
normal accident or high
reliability theory does not
apply to an extreme crisis.

Trust
Self-efficacy
Leader character as a
locus
Character-based
leadership, context and
consequences
Command & Control
(readiness)

Research area 3 – Felt
emotions play a
significant role in extreme
crisis leadership decision
making.

Leader character as a
locus
Character-based
leadership, context and
consequences

Research area 4 –
Sensemaking is a crucial
component of crisis
leadership decision
making
Research area 5 - In the
face of an extreme crisis,
there is an element of
leadership panic that
affects decision making.

Sensemaking

Research area 6 – As the
transboundary effects of
an extreme crisis
accelerate, the executive
task of the crisis leader
become more difficult.
Research area 7 – There
are decision-making
measures and tools that
are specifically applicable
to extreme event
leadership.

Executive tasks &
Transboundary effects

Research area 8 – There is
a relationship between
social justice and
technical justice that
influences political
accountability and
influences leader decisionmaking in significantly
negative ways.
Research area 9 – Some
leadership concepts
associated with dangerous
context events apply to
leadership in extreme
contexts.

Contextualized
leadership in extreme
events

Were there political or social pressures
that impacted your leadership abilities
or decision-making? Discuss how
those impacts influenced you. Did they
cause constraints on your effectiveness
or cause the event to have greater
consequences?

In Extremis leadership
Interdisciplinary,
multilevel model of
leadership and team
dynamics.

For this event, were there varying
levels of leadership within your chain
of command, i.e., how was leadership
different in the different organizational
levels? This is a hypothetical question,
what if the situation had expanded to
include dangerous situations, e.g., life
& death for your or your teammates.
How would that affect your leadership
or decision-making?

Self-efficacy
Effective leadership
Leadership efficacy
Ambiguity

Leadership efficacy

National and Crisis Leadership
Interview Questions
What changes did you see in leadership
behaviors from the normal mode of
operation before the event and then
during the event? As the event
progressed, did you sense that your
followers reassessed their trust in you?

Social Leadership Interview
Questions
Did the national and local leaders
exhibit the proper leadership
behaviors expected for an event
of this magnitude?

Was there a lesson of leadership from
the event that if applied or known
before the event would have improved
the event outcome, i.e., were there
leadership gaps identified as lessons
learned?

What were your expectations
prior to the event for the leaders?
Were your expectations during
the event consistent with your
expectations prior to the event?
Should the leaders have been
more prepared?
Discuss how your feelings of
trust in the leadership changed
throughout the event.

Discuss how your emotions affected
your leadership effectiveness and the
decisions that you made during the
event. Was there a point or points
during the event where you felt that
your followers lost trust in you?
Did you use any ―framing‖ method or
―big picture‖ mapping in your mind
that helped you guide the event
response? If so, describe how that
method worked or did not work.
Was there ever a point where you felt
that the situation was out of control and
you either hesitated in your decisionmaking or lacked for a decision?

Discuss the effects of this event on
other nations, infrastructures
(information technology) or
jurisdictions out of your control. How
did that expansion affect your
leadership or decision-making?
How did your leadership style, tasks, or
decision making differ in this event
versus other lesser events that you have
led?
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Were the leaders able to explain
the situation clearly? Did you
understand what was occurring
and how it might affect society?
Was there a point or points where
you thought that the event
conditions exceeded the
capabilities of the leaders? Were
at any point did they seem
panicked?
Explain the progression of the
event with regard to the societal
impacts. As the event progressed

Were you satisfied with the style
of leadership exhibited by the top
leadership? Did they listen to the
social needs, were they
responsive to your demands and
did they relate to you and
society?
Discuss your involvement in the
event. Was it necessary for you
to involve political leaders to get
your concerns heard or
addressed? Discuss in detail any
involvement by political leaders
in addressing societal needs.

Do you think that the leaders
were ―all-in‖ during this event?
Did they approach the event as if
their lives depended on success?

